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Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and
Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
by
GARY MINDA*
Because business competes for the favor of government as much as
for the trade of customers,' government has become an alternative mar-
ketplace for corporate America.2 It is thus not surprising to find corpo-
rations, trade associations, and their political action committees working,
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank C. Edwin Baker,
David Gray Carlson, Melanie E. Meyers, Jeffery Stempel, and Cass R. Sunstein for their com-
ments and criticism. Heather MacMaster, Susan Sandier, Kimberly Slade, and Beth Shillin
provided excellent research assistance. The research for this Article was supported by the
Brooklyn Law School's Summer Research Fund. © Gary Minda 1990.
1. See, eg., Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the
Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEo. L.J. 65, 68 (1985).
2. American business corporations working through political action committees
(PACs), trade associations, and "grass-roots" lobbyists have had an enormous influence over
the substance and nature of the political process. See, e.g., T. EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF
INEQUALITY (1984); B. JACKSON, HONEST GRAFT: BIG MONEY AND THE AMERICAN POLIT-
ICAL PROCESS (1989); C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977); D. VOGEL, FLUCTU-
ATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA (1989); see also D.
SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986)
(empirical investigation illustrating the substantial power of interest groups to influence gov-
ernment decisions). Critics have observed that there has been a marked revival of corporate
lobbying power in Washington since the early 1970s. See, eg., D. VOGEL, supra, at 193-227
(describing how the business' community, frustrated by the political setbacks of Watergate,
launched a coordinated effort to revive its status as a political power). Thomas Edsall reports
that "[i]n 1974 there were 89 corporate PACs, in 1978 there were 784, and by the end of 1982
there were 1,467." T. EDSALL, supra, at 131. One study indicates that all but a few of the
4,828 PACs active in 1988 were established to make direct contributions to political candidates
during the last Presidential election. See R. BAKER, THE NEW FAT CATS: MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS AS POLITICAL BENEFACTORS (1989). Vogel notes that by 1980 "more than 80
percent of the Fortune 500 companies had established a unit responsible for managing the
external environment." D. VOGEL, supra, at 195. Between 1968 and 1978, the number of
corporations with "public-affairs" offices in Washington increased from 100 to 500. Id. at 197.
By 1980, the number of persons employed by private industry to represent industry interests in
Washington exceeded the number of federal employees in the Washington metropolitan area.
Id. at 198. In 1989, the forced resignations of the House Speaker, James Wright, and the
House Majority Whip, Anthony Coelho, dramatically illustrated the destructive influence of
the power and greed of big money and big business. See generally E. DREW, POLITICS AND
MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO COMPETITION (1983) (discussing the power of money and busi-
ness in Congress).
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unilaterally or in concert, to manipulate state and local government for
purely private economic advantage. 3 Nor is it surprising to learn that
corporate interests have reaped the benefits of legislation and administra-
tive regulations that subsidize private interests adverse to the public in-
terest, causing distortions and inefficiencies in the normal operation of
market competition.4 Truly surprising, and deeply troubling, is the fact
that the courts have been largely unable to develop a workable legal
framework under the Sherman Antitrust Act to regulate predatory con-
duct of business in the governmental sphere even though such conduct
presents potentially serious danger to market competition. 5
The Sherman Antitrust Act declares in the broadest possible lan-
guage that restraints of trade and acts of monopolization are illegal. 6
3. See, e.g., D. VOGEL, supra note 2. A growing chorus of academic opinion has ex-
pressed "considerable dissatisfaction" with the ability of special interest groups to transform
the lawmaking process of government "into a series of accommodations among competing
elites." Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 29 (1985); see
also Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An In-
terest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 223 (1986).
4. See, e.g., M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) (arguing that legislation advancing the needs
of special interests undermines economic efficiency); Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1684-86 (1975) (describing how administrative
agencies have been captured by the interests they are charged to regulate); Wiley, A Capture
Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-25 (1986) (describing how the
benefits of regulation have been captured by private interests at the expense of the public
interest).
5. The antitrust dangers of this form of non-price predation were recognized in a recent
antitrust enforcement guideline of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, International Operations An-
titrust Enforcement Policy, Nov. 10, 1988 (CCH Supp.), which stated that the "use of govern-
mental processes to disadvantage a competitor and thus to increase market power is in general
a more plausible anticompetitive strategy than is pricing below cost, because a firm may be
able to trigger significant litigation costs and other administrative burdens at little cost to
itself." Id. at 26; see also Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 68-76 (demonstrating how abuse of govern-
mental processes may harm market competition by making rivals suffer additional costs; this is
accomplished by erecting entry and mobility barriers, or by facilitating collusion and other
anticompetitive behavior). Even antitrust scholars who are skeptical of the concept of business
predation in other contexts agree that predation in the governmental sphere represents serious
dangers to the process of competition. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 347 (1978) ("Predation by abuse of governmental procedures,
including administrative and judicial processes, presents an increasingly dangerous threat to
competition.").
6. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Section 2, in turn, provides in relevant part: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony ...... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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The Act's drafters used broad terms to avoid the folly of "particulariza-
tion" that might defeat the drafters' purpose by providing loopholes for
escape.7 When a group of competitors or a single firm influence govern-
mental process for the purpose of restraining trade or monopolizing the
market, the statutory objectives of the Sherman Act are placed in serious
jeopardy. The broad language of the antitrust statute ought to compel
the federal courts to regulate this form of predatory "petitioning of gov-
ernment" that threatens federal competition policy. To do otherwise
might defeat the purpose of antitrust law by allowing competitors to use
governmental process as a "loophole" to escape antitrust proscriptions.
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,8 however, the Supreme
Court has immunized the vast majority of government-petitioning cases
from antitrust attack, even when the petitioning is for the purpose of
restraining trade and even if the restraint causes an antitrust injury. The
doctrine provides that when a restraint of trade is the result of valid gov-
ernmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of antitrust
law is established.9 In concluding that the right to petition government
7. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); see also Fischel,
Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 80 n.2 (1977).
8. The doctrine takes its name from two cases decided within a four-year period: East-
ern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); see also infra text accompanying notes 18-
94.
While the doctrine has been regarded by some as an antitrust exemption, see, for example,
Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984), the better view is that the doctrine establishes antitrust immu-
nity and not an antitrust exemption. See, eg., Handler & De Sevo, The Noerr Doctrine and Its
Sham Exception, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5 (1984).
9. The doctrine thus protects antitrust defendants who have influenced or persuaded the
government to restrain a competitor "even if the conduct is motivated by an anticompetitive
purpose, has an anticompetitive effect, and injures competitors or competition." Handler &
DeSevo, supra note 8, at 1. For a review of the relevant literature on the Noerr-Pennington
antitrust doctrine, see Balmer, Sham Litigation and The Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REV.
39 (1980); Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust Violation: Conflict Between the First Amendment
and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 41 (1981); Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the
First Amendment: The Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1988); Costilo, Anti-
trust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333 (1967); Fis-
chel, supra note 7; Handler & DeSevo, supra note 8; Hurwitz, supra note 1; Note, The Brakes
Fail on the Noerr Doctrine, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 518 (1969) (authored by P. Haeber); Note,
Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts and Adjudicatory
Agencies: Analogies To Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 HARV. L. REV. 715
(1986) [hereinafter Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity]; Note, Application of the Sherman
Act to Attempts to Influence Government Action: Trucking Unlimited v. California Transport
Company, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Application of the Sherman Act];
Note, The Commercial Exception: A Necessary Limitation to the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine,
63 IND. L.J. 401 (1987) (authored by M. Gutwein) [hereinafter Note, Necessary Limitations];
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is a fundamental first amendment freedom, essential to a representative
democracy, the Supreme Court has determined that antitrust law should
play little or no role in regulating "genuine" political activity designed to
influence governmental action. 10 The Court thus has sacrificed federal
antitrust policy to protect other values and rights perceived as fundamen-
tal to a representative government.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided the lower courts
with confusing and inconsistent rationales for determining whether the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies in particular contexts. Indeed, the
current state of the doctrine has been characterized as "uncertain," "in-
consistent," "disintegrating," and representing an antitrust "quag-
mire."" The Supreme Court's case-by-case approach to this important
area of antitrust law has been unfruitful because adjudication has failed
to raise, let alone resolve, serious analytical difficulties at the core of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The problems endemic to this doctrine re-
quire a theoretical focus of inquiry that extends beyond particular litiga-
tion. A fresh examination of the allegedly "unassailable"' 12 premises of
the doctrine is required.
In particular, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has proceeded on the
basis of unexamined assumptions about the nature of interest groups in
government. One such assumption involves the separation of politics
and the market: the idea that the first amendment and principles of rep-
resentative government autonomously define a sphere of political activity
independent of market activity that is subject to antitrust regulation.
Another assumption, paradoxically, is that interest groups are essential
Note, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-California Motor's View of the Antitrust and Constitu-
tional Ramifications of Petitioning Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 281 (1973) (authored by R.
Jacobs); Note, A Standard for Tailoring Noerr-Pennington Immunity More Closely to the First
Amendment Mandate, 95 YALE L.J. 832 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Tailoring Noerr-Pennington
Immunity]. For a review of the application of Noerr-Pennington in non-antitrust cases, see
Note, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-Antitrust Right to Petition
Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1984) (authored by R. Zauzmer) [hereinafter Note, Right to
Petition].
10. In Noerr, the Court concluded that "where a restraint upon trade or monopolization
is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act
can be made out." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
11. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 9, at 327; see also Costilo, supra note 9, at 333.
12. Even antitrust scholars who acknowledge that predation in the governmental context
represents a serious antitrust concern assume that the Court's Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
based upon "unassailable" premises. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 5, at 350 (arguing that the
Supreme Court's decision in Noerr was based on an "unassailable" premise, namely "that
'where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of a valid governmental action, as
opposed to a private action, no violation of the Act can be made out.' " Id. (quoting and citing
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943)).
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for upholding political freedoms precisely because they mimic the logic
of the marketplace. A related assumption accepts, again paradoxically,
the logic of the marketplace as an objective medium for structuring and
ordering both political and commercial activity. The vision of political
and market activity as a dichotomy for some purposes, but not others, is
the source of the instability and confusion that has plagued the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine since its inception.
This Article asserts that the courts should adopt a new antitrust
approach for resolving the business petitioning of government cases-an
approach that transcends the politics and market dichotomy by placing
greater antitrust limitations upon the right of business interest groups to
petition government while protecting legitimate forms of true political
expression. Courts should adopt an antitrust immunity standard and an
understanding of the first amendment that carefully limits petitioning ac-
tivity of business when such activity is part of a profit-maximizing strat-
egy for monopolizing markets, regardless of context. Such an approach
can be developed from an understanding of the "sham exception" 13 to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine that would permit the exception to cover
petitioning activity directed at capturing the benefits of governmental
process through corrupt or improper means. 14 The recommended ap-
proach then can be utilized to provide a more principled justification for
13. Paradoxically, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for an exception to the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine in cases in which the claimed petitioning activity is found to be "a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144; see infra text accompany-
ing notes 77-104. This "sham exception" was stretched by the Supreme Court in California
Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509-14 (1972), to cover a wide variety
of cases involving antitrust claims asserting that litigation instituted in the courts or before
quasi-judicial administrative agencies was brought for bad faith purposes. See also infra text
accompanying notes 196-226. In the legislative and executive context, however, the sham ex-
ception has had little or no application even though these arenas are where the danger of
business predation is likely to be the greatest. The antitrust danger presented in such cases is
especially troubling given the awesome purchasing power available to corporations and busi-
ness interests to influence governmental policy. See, eg., Baker, Realizing Self-Realization:
Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
646, 647 & nn.6-8 (1982); see also C. LINDBLOM, supra note 2, at 214.
14. The courts need not inquire into the "genuineness" of the petitioning motive. They
can identify and isolate predatory activity by focusing on those petitioning methods that dis-
tort and corrupt the deliberative process of government. For example, in other areas of anti-
trust law, the courts have made distinctions between legitimate forms of competition-
competition on the "merits"-and illegitimate forms of illegal predation. A firm competes on
the merits when it seeks to "win the field by greater efficiency, better services, or lower prices
reflective of cost savings or modest profits." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AN-
TITRUST 111 (1977). A "predatory firm," however, "tries to inhibit others in ways independ-
ent of the predator's own ability to perform effectively in the market... [by] imp[osing] losses
on other firms, not to garner gains for itself.... Id.; see also Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 69.
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protecting petitioning activities of business and other private interest
groups that are not instrumentally structured by predatory market con-
siderations. Such an approach is supported by modem interest group
theory.
Part I of this Article re-examines the policy underlying the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. Part II identifies the interest group theory that sup-
ports this doctrine. This Part brings to bear some of the insights of the
recent literature dealing with problems of interest groups in American
politics that cast serious doubt on the Supreme Court's rosy assumptions
about interest group politics.15 Part III documents and explains that the
15. Part II will draw from three separate strands of legal theory relevant to interest
groups. One strand, based in law and economics (L/E), will borrow from public choice theory.
Public choice theory has been developed by L/E theorists for analyzing the political process
under economic assumptions that challenge some of the traditional premises about regulation
and the nature of government. See, e.g., Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of
Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC
CHOICE-II 11 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollins eds. 1984). Public choice scholars have argued that
regulation can be understood as a "transaction in which interest groups form the demand side,
and legislators form the supply side." Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory For Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988). From this
analytical perspective, the market for legislation is dominated by special interests that prevent
legislation from providing "public goods (i.e., laws that contribute to the overall efficiency of
society by providing a collective benefit that would probably not arise from individuals acting
separately.)" Id.; see also R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 286-93 (1985); Posner, Eco-
nomics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1982); Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1984). For a critical review of public choice theory, see Farber & Frickey, The Juris-
prudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Juris-
prudence]; Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
See generally W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STAT-
UTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 37-64 (1989).
The second strand, antitrust capture theory, is related to the first. Antitrust capture the-
ory seeks to describe how the legislative process has become captured by private lobbies and
special interest groups. The literature is surveyed and analyzed in Wiley, supra note 4, at 723-
28. Capture theory is frequently identified with the work of conservative economists who have
been critical of the public interest concept of regulation and have argued instead for deregula-
tion. See Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1962). But capture theory has also been used by the left to advance a similar
critique of regulation. See G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963).
Finally, the third strand, republicanism, is borrowed from a new breed of public law
scholars who express deep dissatisfaction with legislative outcomes generated by the political
process, and who question the legitimacy of allowing special interest groups to influence the
legislative process free of governmental restraint. These new "republican" critics question the
basic legitimacy of the pluralistic premises that underlie the views of public choice, capture,
and more traditional theorists. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Law's Republic]; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government]; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
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modem application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is fraught with un-
certainty and confusion. Finally, Part IV proposes and defends a new
test for resolving antitrust claims involving government petitioning in
legislative, administrative, and judicial settings. This test seeks to de-
velop an alternative antitrust analysis based on the view that at least one
goal of the Sherman Antitrust Act is political-to regulate and restrain
the redistributive consequences of corporate power. 16
I. The Policy Underpinnings of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Warren Court created the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in a pair
of cases decided in the early 1960s.17 In these two cases, the Court con-
cluded that the antitrust consequences of predatory attempts to influence
the political process were beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The
Court assumed that interest group lobbying, even with an anticompeti-
tive purpose, is an essential component of our representative government
and arguably a constitutionally protected activity under the Bill of
Rights. The Noerr and Pennington cases thus were decided under a par-
ticular vision of interest group politics-a vision that the Warren Court
believed was justified by an uncontroversial political conception of the
representative process and an uncontroversial constitutional principle.
L.J. 1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival]; Sunstein, supra note 3;
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 910-11 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy]; Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]; see also Macey, supra note 3, at 223. Re-
cently, antitrust theorists have discovered the importance of the republican tradition as a new
source for antitrust criticism. See Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1238-47 (1988).
16. See, e.g., Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (arguing that antitrust
policy seeks to restrain producer efforts to appropriate wealth consumers would realize in a
competitive market); Peritz, The "'Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Re-
straint of Competition, 40 HASMTNGS L.J. 285 (1989) (arguing that antitrust legislation was the
product of competing "logics" that recognize antitrust as a series of sociopolitical choices
about the legitimacy of different distributions of wealth); see also Pitofsky, The Political Con-
tent of Antitrust, U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) (arguing that "[it is bad history, bad
policy, and bad law to exclude political values in interpreting the antitrust laws").
17. The fact that the doctrine is the "child" of the Warren Court is ironic when consid-
ered in light of the antitrust philosophy normally attributed to Chief Justice Earl Warren. In
antitrust law, the Warren Court has been associated with a strong commitment to the policy of
market deconcentration and the protection of small business. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 5,
at 200-02 (discussing how the Warren Court merger policy reflected a deconcentration policy
emphasizing the importance of retaining local control over industry and the protection of
small business). On the other hand, the development of the Noerr doctrine is perfectly consis-
tent with the egalitarian and pluralistic philosophy that has come to characterize the work of
the Warren Court in public law fields. See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WAR-
REN (L. Levy ed. 1972).
April 1990]
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A. The Noerr and Pennington Cases
(1) Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight 1 8
For nearly three decades the railroad and the trucking industries
were locked in an "economic life or death"' 9 struggle for the lucrative
long-haul freight business. The railroads once had a monopoly in the
industry, which they struggled to maintain as an increasing number of
long-haulers turned to the flexible alternative offered by trucks. 20
By the early 1930s, the railroads established a committee to consider
the trucking problem. 21 Working in conjunction with the Association of
State Highway Officials, the committee approved standards for road con-
struction that included a road weight restriction for heavy vehicles. The
committee's recommendations and reports subsequently were used by the
railroad industry to launch a massive state and federal lobbying effort to
promote antitruck legislation. From its inception, the railroads' lobbying
was based on a single objective: "[T]o impede truck and bus competition
by the erection and enforcement of legal barriers. '22
18. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
19. Id. at 129. For background to the controversy, see Investigations of Railroads, Hold-
ing Companies, and Affiliated Companies: Additional Report of the Committee on Interstate
Commerce Pursuant to S. Res. 71-Some Educational Legislative, and Self-Regulatory Activi-
ties of United States Railroads, S. REP. No. 26, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1941) [hereinafter
Wheeler Report]; The Railroad-Trucker Brawl, FORTUNE, June 1953, at 137.
20. Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 775-
77 (E.D. Pa. 1957). Long-distance trucks established themselves as worthy competitors during
World War I, when railroads were nationalized to ensure speedy transportation of military
troops and war supplies, thus forcing the suspension of shipment of other freight. See D.
ROBYN, BREAKING THE SPECIAL INTERESTS: TRUCKING DEREGULATION AND THE POLI-
TICS OF POLICY REFORM 12 (1987). The railroads returned to private control by 1920, but by
then trucks had been accepted as an alternative form of transportation. Id. By 1938, railroads
lost at least two billion dollars in revenue to trucks. Wheeler Report, supra note 19, at 8. It
was not until the end of World War II, however, when the interstate highway system was
created and truck sizes were increased, that trucking presented serious competition to trans-
port by railroads. Id. at 15.
21. The committee consisted of truck manufacturers, railroad officials, and officials of
automobile, but not truck, federations and associations. Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 775.
22. Id. at 776; see also Wheeler Report, supra note 19, at 8 (describing how the railroads'
publicity campaign was a "program planned to impede truck and bus competition by the erec-
tion and enforcement of legal barriers") The Wheeler Report subsequently condemned the
railroad's lobbying effort for being "more concerned with the selfish interests of a few rather
than the needs of the transportation industry as a whole." Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 776.
By the 1940s, however, the trucking industry established its own national and state orga-
nizations to lobby for increased road weight legislation. The truckers' lobby, aided by in-
creased demand for long-haul transportation during the war, scored some initial successes in
raising the minimum weight limits in some states. Id. at 777. In Pennsylvania, for example,
the 1941 weight limit of 18,000 pounds per axle was increased to 20,000 pounds, first as a
temporary war measure, but then as a permanent legal limit. Id. To counteract the truckers'
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A key player in the lobbying strategy was Carl Byoir & Associates, a
New York public relations firm retained at a yearly fee of 250,000 dollars
plus expenses. 23 The Byoir firm launched a massive lobbying campaign
to generate public resentment against the trucking industry and to create
demand for legislation to "penaliz[e] the truckers either by limitation of
size and weight or imposition of user taxes which would make their oper-
ation unprofitable."' 24 The Byoir firm, experienced in the art of manipu-
lating public opinion for industry,25 created an antitruck lobbying
"kit"-a composite of statistical information,26 magazine articles, 27
films, 28 and other sources containing half-truths, distortions, and false-
successes, the railroads embarked on a new ambitious round of concerted action to defeat pro-
trucking legislation by creating a demand for antitrucking legislation. Id. at 777-78.
23. The firm had two accounts with the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, which
represented a group of 24 eastern railroad lines, for $75,000 each per year including all ex-
penses incurred as well as the salaries of all Byoir personnel working full time on the accounts.
It was reported that the total cost incurred by the railroads was in excess of $500,000, a sub-
stantial expenditure when measured in 1950s dollars. See The Railroad-Trucker Brawl, supra
note 19, at 198.
24. Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 778.
25. While a Byoir spokesperson was reported to have said at the time of the Noerr litiga-
tion that "presenting the facts is our business," NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 1953, at 78, the firm
apparently did more than just present the facts. The Byoir firm was found guilty of violating
the antitrust laws involving a similar public relations campaign to further an illegal conspiracy
to restrain trade on behalf of the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company. See United States v. New
York Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (D. Ill. 1946), affTd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949). The public relations campaign for the railroads was also condemned by a Senate com-
mittee report on the railroad industry issued in October 1941. See Wheeler Report, supra note
19; see also Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 776, 817.
26. The Byoir firm attempted to give its negative publicity campaign an aura of legiti-
macy by supporting its assertions with statistics and data from various research studies of the
trucking industry. Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 780. While the statistics were apparently drawn
from bona fide research studies, the studies themselves were conducted by the Byoir firm or the
railroads to ensure the desired outcome. One such study was conducted by the New Jersey
Citizens Tax Study Foundation, a supposedly independent public interest group that was actu-
ally headquartered in the Byoir offices and whose executive director and most dominant mem-
ber was on the Byoir payroll. Id. Not surprisingly, by using a questionnaire designed to make
a weight-distance tax of long-haul truckers seem the best possible source of tax revenues, the
study found public support for the measure. Id. In another study, Dr. John Sly, head of
Princeton Surveys, worked closely with a Byoir ally in preparing a questionnaire that included
questions slanted in such a way as to bring about the desired response. Id. at 781. The district
court also found that the railroads indirectly paid for a report conducted by an allegedly in-
dependent research group that in fact received substantial financial and directorial support
from the railroads. Id. at 782. Further statistical support for its campaign against the truckers
came from allegedly distorted interpretations of objectively gathered material. Id. at 791.
27. Some of the more renowned articles generated by the campaign included antitruck
articles in Harpers, the Saturday Evening Post, Country Gentleman, and the National Grange
Monthly. Id. at 781-89.
28. The Byoir firm produced and distributed a number of propaganda films about the
trucking industry. One widely distributed film was an edited version of a documentary pro-
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hoods about the trucking industry. This "kit" then was utilized in con-
junction with a media campaign in a number of key states to generate
hostile public reaction against the trucking industry, and to create de-
mand for antitruck legislation. 29
A grassroots campaign aimed at convincing state and local legisla-
tors that the voting public favored antitruck legislation was launched in
conjunction with the media campaign. To accomplish their purpose, the
railroads, aided by the Byoir firm, set up "dummy" groups to be used as
citizen-fronts to create the false impression that the voting public was
overwhelmingly in favor of antitruck legislation. Allegedly disinterested
persons were paid to declare their support for such legislation. 30  In-
duced by the Interregional Council on Highway Transportation about the results of a Mary-
land road test conducted to determine the extent of damage, if any, to the state's highways
caused by trucks. The edited version of the film, narrated by a competent Washington news
commentator, created the impression that big trucks were responsible for damage to the state's
highways. Omitted from the edited version of the film were statements indicating that high-
way damage was the result of "fine silt or clay soil subgrade" used in the construction of the
roadways, not vehicle weight. In reviewing the edited version of the film, the district court
found that: "It]he profound impact ... of the short film was that big trucks per se were the
sole cause of damage to the highways, [and that] important language which would have made
clear the results of the test, particularly with respect to [the road conditions was] entirely
eliminated." Id. at 793. The district court labelled these actions a "deliberate distortion of a
fine scientific achievement." Id. at 806. The Byoir firm made the film available free for media
distribution, and copies were given to movie houses and television stations, which gave the film
significant airtime. Id. at 793.
29. Editors of local and national magazines and newspapers were given the kit and en-
couraged to write stories hostile to the trucking industry. Id. at 796. At the same time, the
Byoir firm flooded the media with a barrage of pictures depicting sensational truck accidents,
as well as pre-prepared photo montages of sports and public figures with horror shots of truck-
ing mishaps. Id. at 781, 786-89. A document recovered by the railroads from the Byoir firm,
see infra note 37, indicated that the Byoir firm was seeking to accomplish three objectives:
"[first to] crystallize the resentment of virtually every motorist over the delays, inconveniences,
and perils of modem highway travel resulting from commercial heavy truck operation over
public roads; second to arouse the public generally to the need for more equitable and produc-
tive methods of financing public highways; and third, to make the public conscious of the
benefits they themselves will attain from such methods." The Railroad-Trucker Brawl, supra
note 19, at 200.
30. Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 781, 786. Through the use of these "third-party tactics," the
railroads were able to distort segments of the truth into falsehoods and thereby exploit the
benefits of inadequate information to the voting public as well as governmental officials. The
district court called the use of these tactics the "Big Lie," the "use of dramatic segments of
truth distorted ... into complete falsehoods." Id. at 799. The "third-party tactic" was de-
scribed by the Supreme Court in Noerr as "giving propaganda actually circulated by a party in
interest the appearance of being spontaneous declarations of independent groups." Noerr, 365
U.S. at 140. The apparent goal was to stimulate an outpouring of antitruck publicity through
bogus grassroots lobbying coupled with a direct lobbying effort aimed at voters, legislators, and
other governmental officials. Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 780. The Byoir firm thus had two public
relations strategies: first, a strategy aimed at the general public to stir up public resentment
against the trucking industry, and second, a propaganda strategy aimed at convincing govern-
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dependent public interest groups either were induced to support anti-
truck legislation by contributions, or were infiltrated by employees sym-
pathetic to the railroads' cause and then manipulated to provide support
for the railroads' interests.31
The truckers also engaged in extensive lobbying to obtain favorable
trucking legislation and to counteract the railroads' opposition cam-
paign.3 2 The railroads' publicity campaign, however, was far more sig-
nificant in terms of effort as well as expenditures. 33  Moreover, the
railroads' petitioning activity, unlike that of the truckers, was highly suc-
cessful. In Ohio, the Byoir firm's propaganda campaign obtained the aid
of the Director of the Ohio Department of Highways and the Governor
of the state in publicly supporting the railroads' opposition to the truck-
mental decisionmakers that public opinion was in fact against truckers. Both campaigns uti-
lized "third-party tactics" and other misleading propaganda devices designed "to take
dramatic fragment of truth, and by emphasis and repetition, distort it into falsehood." Id at
813-14.
31. Byoir personnel infiltrated pre-existing special interest groups, such as the Grange,
the Citizens Tax League of Rochester, N.Y., and the Citizens Public Expenditure Survey, Inc.
To gain entry into these organizations, the Byoir organization gave substantial donations to
these groups, paid off key personnel in the groups for the use of their name and position, and
enlisted the aid of sympathetic members already installed in these groups. Id. at 782. Thus,
the railroads were successful in persuading these groups to disseminate antitruck literature and
adopt resolutions that took a hard line against the trucking industry, and in lobbying for
tougher measures and penalties for violators of the weight-distance tax imposed on trucks by
some states. Id at 783. The firm even employed a 99-year-old great-grandmother, Bessie Q.
Mott, who was a professional "club woman" to lobby women's clubs, notably the State Feder-
ation of Women's Clubs of New York, on behalf of the railroads' cause. TheRailroad-Trucker
Brawl, supra note 19, at 200. Her fee was $500 a month, plus expenses. Id. at 203.
32. Most of the truckers' lobbying effort was focused in Pennsylvania. Noerr, 155 F.
Supp. at 803. Like the railroads, the truckers used a variety of propaganda techniques to lobby
various state legislatures for pro-truck legislation. The truckers solicited legislators to support
bills increasing the weight of trucks; had industry representatives write and make personal
contacts with legislators without disclosing their ties with the trucking industry; and distrib-
uted news releases of legislators' statements in support of their position. Id. at 803. In at least
one instance, the truckers prepared a manual suggesting that the railroads had not paid their
"fair share" of taxes. Id.; see also Noerr, 365 U.S. at 134 n.10.
33. While the truckers' campaign was based primarily on direct lobbying activity that
sought to obtain favorable legislation, the railroads' effort was almost entirely a negative
"grassroots" effort designed to ruin the good will of a competitor. Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 799.
The inability of the trucking industry to obtain favorable legislation may stem from the fact
that the industries' lobbying group was not as strong as that of the railroads'. The large
number of trucking operators may have posed serious collective action problems creating ob-
stacles for effective interest group petitioning. See infra notes 150-02 and accompanying text.
The trucking industry may also have been at a disadvantage since its industry was subject to
potential competition from substitute transporters such as railroads. Indeed, there is persua-
sive evidence suggesting that subsequent ICC regulation of the trucking industry enabled the
industry to enjoy greater monopoly power by eliminating competition of alternative carriers.
See Bailey & Baumoul, Deregulation and The Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALEI ON
REG. 111, 133-34. (1984).
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ing industry, ultimately leading to the imposition of a thirty percent in-
crease in fees and weight-distance taxes on truckers. 34 In New York and
New Jersey, the Byoir firm successfully influenced local and state legisla-
tors to enact significant antitruck legislation, including a New York
Mileage Tax Bill, which imposed a substantial mileage tax on trucks. 35
In Pennsylvania, the Byoir group successfully persuaded the Governor to
veto the "Fair Truck Bill," which would have increased the weight limit
for trucks in that state.36
Finding their access to the long-haul freight market was threatened
by state regulations, and discovering the true nature of the railroads' lob-
bying efforts from documents obtained from the Byoir firm, 37 the truck-
ers turned to the courts for relief. The truckers38 filed suit in district
court alleging that the railroads, 39 acting through the Byoir firm, had
violated the first and second sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act by
engaging in a massive publicity campaign explicitly designed to destroy
the goodwill and competitive position of the long-haul trucking industry.
The railroads' counterclaim raised similar antitrust allegations against
the truckers.
The district court sustained the truckers' complaint and dismissed
the railroads' counterclaim. The district judge emphasized that the de-
fendant railroads did more than just attempt to influence the passage of
new legislation or enforcement of the new laws. In the district judge's
opinion, the sole purpose underlying lobbying by the railroads' interest
group was to damage the truckers' business in every way possible, with
34. Id. at 785.
35. Id. at 784.
36. Id. at 794-99.
37. Much of the sensation caused by the railroad-trucker "brawl" was based on "pur-
loined" documents obtained by a secretary from the office of her former employer at the Byoir
firm. See The Railroad-Trucker Brawl, supra note 19, at 139. This secretary bundled over 200
Byoir documents relating to their publicity campaign against the truckers and shipped them to
the American Trucking Association in Washington, with a cover letter explaining their impor-
tance. Id. at 139. Many of these documents became evidence in the subsequent antitrust liti-
gation brought by the truckers against the railroads. Whether the secretary was fired or
resigned is unknown, nor is her motivation for sending the documents to the truckers known.
Id.
38. The complaint was filed on behalf of 41 Pennsylvania truck operators and their trade
association, the Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129.
39. Named as defendants were 24 eastern railroads, an association of the presidents of
those railroads known as the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, and the Byoir public
relations firm. Id.
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or without legislation."0 Finding that the district court's decision was
based on substantial evidence, the Third Circuit affirmed. 41
When the Noerr litigation reached the Supreme Court there was lit-
tle settled law on the question of whether the Sherman Act applied to
joint lobbying efforts by competitors seeking to induce governmental re-
straints of trade. There were, however, existing antitrust doctrines rele-
vant to the question. In 1943, the Supreme Court had decided in Parker
v. Brown 42 that the Sherman Act did not warrant the invalidation of a
state regulatory program as an unlawful restraint of trade. Similarly, in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 43 the Court held that Congress
did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to an alleged monopoly
grounded on a seizure of property pursuant to a sovereign act of a foreign
state.4" While the "state action" doctrine of Parker and the "act of
state" doctrine of American Banana suggested that governmental acts of
state were immune from the federal antitrust proscriptions, those cases
involved substantively different problems of "antitrust federalism" and
"foreign relations." It was also unclear whether the analysis of these
40. See id. at 142. According to the Supreme Court, the district court conclusions were
based on findings showing that the defendant railroads had resorted to "the negative approach
of injuring the competitor rather than adjusting their facilities to meet the growing needs of
competition." 155 F. Supp. at 816.
The railroad's counterclaim against the truckers was dismissed because the district court
viewed the petitioning activity of the truckers as legitimate lobbying for beneficial legislation,
aimed at influencing legislative decisions on the merits rather than influencing decisions on the
basis of falsehoods for the predatory motive of destroying a competitor. The district court
found that "there [was] one very important distinction in the use of the [lobbying] technique
by the parties:
lTihe [truckers] always used [propaganda]for the affirmative purpose of seeking legis-
lation which would be beneficial to themselves rather than to burden the railroads....
[T]he [railroads] did not go out and seek to meet the new mode of competition by
adjusting their facilities to the public demand, but rather sought to destroy the good
will built up by this new competitor through the campaign as outlined. This public
relations battle of bogus organizations and distortion offacts and vilification was not a
climate of competition into which the defendants were injected. They created it.
Id.
41. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d 218 (3rd
Cir. 1959).
42. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In an earlier decision, United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc.,
307 U.S. 533, 568-73 (1939), the Court held that when a restraint of trade is the result of valid
governmental action, as distinguished from private action, no violation of the antitrust Act
could be sustained.
43. 213 U.S. 347 (1909); see also United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)
(the fact that control over production was aided by a foreign legislature does not prevent
punishment in the U.S.).
44. American Banana was justified on the ground that the challenged conduct took place
abroad and was approved and facilitated by a foreign government. American Banana, 213 U.S.
at 357-59.
April 1990]
cases would apply when competitors utilize illegitimate and improper pe-
titioning to influence governmental action.
Moreover, although little case law had been decided concerning the
right to petition, it was beyond dispute that the right to seek favorable
governmental action was deeply embedded in first amendment jurispru-
dence.45 The Supreme Court, however, had never concluded that this
right was absolute. In United States v. Harriss,46 the Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 4 7
which regulates federal lobbying expenditures, on the ground that the
right to petition government is subject to the limitation of overriding gov-
ernmental interests.48 In upholding Congress' authority to regulate lob-
bying activities of special interest groups, the Court emphasized that the
rights protected by the first amendment must yield to the right of govern-
ment to protect the deliberative process of government from the pres-
sures of special interests.49 The Supreme Court, however, had never
defined the right of petition in the context of a case involving the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. Nor had the Court declared or defined the precise
scope of the Act's competition policy as applied to attempts to restrain
trade in the governmental sphere.
In this context, the Court's decision in Noerr is truly remarkable.
While the question posed in Noerr was a difficult one, the Court treated
the case as if it were an easy one, involving an obvious solution: antitrust
judges should not regulate "genuine" political activity designed to influ-
ence governmental action. The Court thus reversed both the district
court and the Third Circuit on the ground that the Sherman Act fails to
cover railroads' petitioning activity. Justice Black delivered the Court's
opinion in conclusive terms: "[w]e think it equally clear that the Sher-
man Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating to-
gether in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or
a monopoly."'50
45. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), the Court held that the right to
petition was implicit in "[t]he very idea of a government, republican in form." Id. at 552. See
generally B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS-A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 198 (1971).
46. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
47. 2 U.S.C. § 261 (1946).
48. The Act requires, inter alia, that persons engaged in lobbying activities keep "detailed
and exact" accounts of contributions; render receipts of money spent to the donor; file with the
clerk of the House of Representatives a complete account of donations received worth 500
dollars or more; and provide the contributor with an accounting of expenditures made on her
behalf. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 262-266 (1946).
49. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625.
50. Noerr 365 U.S. at 136.
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While the decision in favor of the railroads was unanimous, it lacked
a unified principle or harmonious analysis-at least four reasons were
given for the decision. Justice Black first emphasized the "essential dis-
similarity" between agreements to petition government and the tradi-
tional agreements condemned by the antitrust laws.51 Focusing on the
consequences of limiting petitioning activity under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, Justice Black reasoned that a contrary holding would "sub-
stantially impair the power of government to take actions through its
legislature and executive that operate to restrain trade."52 Moreover, in
his view, the effort to apply the antitrust laws to the lobbying activities of
special interests "would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regu-
late, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would
have no basis whatsoever in the legislative history of that Act. '53 Fi-
nally, Justice Black concluded that a contrary construction of the Act
would raise important constitutional questions, given that lobbying activ-
ity implicates the constitutionally protected right to petition government.
According to Justice Black, "[t]he right of petition is one of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute
to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms." 54
Justice Black also underscored some additional points. First, he as-
serted that the district court's finding that the railroads' lobbying effort
was motivated to destroy the truckers as competitors was legally incon-
clusive.5 5 According to Justice Black: "It is neither unusual nor illegal
for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about
an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors. ' 56
Moreover, Justice Black saw a broader principle at stake:
A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from
taking a public position on matters in which they are financially inter-
ested would thus deprive the government of a valuable source of infor-
mation and, at the same time, deprive the people of their right to
petition in the very instances in which that right may be of the most
importance to them.57
51. Id.
52. Id. at 137.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 138.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 139.
57. Id. at 139-40. Justice Black apparently thought that it would be inconsistent to con-
demn the railroad for using the third-party tactic while at the same time dismissing the rail-
roads' counterclaim against the truckers. According to Justice Black, the record was
"undisputed that the truckers were as guilty as the railroads of the use of the technique." Id.
at 141. While it is true that "both sides used, or wanted to use, fronts and/or the propaganda
technique," see Noerr, 155 F. Supp. at 816, there were substantial findings in the district
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In Justice Black's view, if the Sherman Act established a code of
ethics, it was "a code that condemns trade restraints, not political activ-
ity.' ' 58 Hence, he stated with amazing confidence that the Court's deci-
sion "restored what appears to be the true nature of the case-a no-
holds-barred fight between two industries seeking to control a profitable
source of income."' 59 In his view, deception, fraud, misrepresentation,
and competitive injury are expected when business competes in the gov-
ernmental sphere. Apparently, Justice Black believed that antitrust pro-
scriptions could be tailored specifically for commercial markets, and that
politically motivated activity in political arenas could be left safely to the
regulation of the political marketplace of ideas.
Justice Black acknowledged, however, the possibility of an excep-
tion to the Court's immunity doctrine. 60 In dictum, he stated that
"[t]here may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly di-
rected toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor. ' 61 The railroads' publicity
campaign was not found to fall within this exception because "[n]o one
denie[d] that the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence leg-
islation and law enforcement practices. '62
This was a stunningly surprising conclusion, given the extensive
findings of the district judge that were affirmed by the Third Circuit.
court's opinion that the railroads' propaganda campaign was designed to destroy a competitor,
and that the railroads' negative propaganda campaign was both qualitatively and quantita-
tively different when compared to the meager publicity campaign waged by the truckers. No-
err, 365 U.S. at 142.
58. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140.
59. Id. at 144. As Justice Black explained:
Inherent in such fights, which are commonplace in the halls of legislative bodies, is
the possibility, and in many instances even the probability, that one group or the
other will get hurt by the arguments that are made .... And that deception, repre-
hensible as it is, can be of no consequence so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.
Id. at 144-45.
60. Justice Black suggested that antitrust immunity might have been denied in Noerr if
the district judge's findings of predatory intent included "specific findings that the railroads
attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers." Id. at 142. Concerted
refusals to deal or agreements between competitors to boycott other competitors have been
found to be unlawful under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941). In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959), the
Supreme Court held that a concerted refusal to deal could be a per se violation of section one
of the Sherman Act. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW § 10.1 (1985). In Noerr, Justice Black found that the record failed to sustain such a
claim. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 142.
61. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
62. Id.
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While the railroad characterized its publicity campaign as a "genuine"
effort to influence legislation, the truckers' complaint alleged, and there
was evidence supporting those allegations, that the campaign was moti-
vated solely by the railroads' desire to injure the trucking business and
destroy it as a competitor. According to Justice Black, however, the
sham exception can be established only if the petitioning was for the ex-
clusive purpose of harassing competitors without the hope or expectation
of obtaining favorable governmental action. The exception would apply
only when a petitioning campaign is conducted without a genuine intent
to influence governmental action.
Of course a producer group seeking to restrain the trade of a com-
petitor through governmental action would always "genuinely" want to
influence governmental action. What better way to eliminate competi-
tion then by having the government impose a barrier to competition of
rivals? By limiting Noerr's sham exception to cases lacking a genuine
intent to influence governmental action, Justice Black created an excep-
tion that simply makes no sense in the legislative context. 63 The fact that
governmental process is involved, or that lobbying is characteristically
"political," fails to explain why the courts should immunize profit-moti-
vated forms of political activity seeking predatory market objectives that
attempt to influence governmental action through subversion and cor-
ruption of governmental process.
Without question, the political activity in Noerr was connected in-
trinsically to profit-maximizing objectives to alter the market structure
through legislation by creating a barrier to competition. Certainly the
railroads' petitioning was not a "genuine" effort to provide legislators
with disinterested and objective information about the trucking industry
so that legislators could render better and more intelligent regulatory de-
cisions. The railroads' goal was to use government process as a conduit
for effectuating a barrier to the competition posed by the trucking indus-
63. Noerr's sham exception might apply in cases where a producer group petitions gov-
ernment for purely strategic purposes, without any genuine desire to influence governmental
action. For example, a producer group might seek to increase the cost of rivals by forcing
them to incur the added financial burden of conducting their own petitioning to counter false
and misleading petitioning information. However, why would a producer group ever limit its
petitioning effort to strategic cost objectives, when doing so risks the possibility of sham liabil-
ity, and when the very same objectives can be achieved more effectively through a successful
attempt to influence regulatory action? Even if a producer group has risked sham petitioning,
there would be serious evidentiary obstacles in proving sham liability. As Professors Areeda
and Turner have noted, the difficulties involved in proving Noerr's sham exception in the legis-
lative context are so insurmountable that "there is very strong ground for conclusively ignor-
ing as unprovable an allegation that a defendant sought legislation solely to harass and without
hope of success." P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 41 (1978).
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try. Justice Black's political activity distinction thus became the justifica-
tion for a major loophole in the antitrust laws. Private petitions are seen
as "political," even when petitioning parties understand that their activ-
ity is economic or commercial in nature.64
In Noerr, Justice Black assumed that political freedoms trump anti-
trust values. Justice Black underestimated the possibility that demo-
cratic and competitive values might also be at risk when private interests
seek to subvert the deliberative processes of government in order to harm
the economic interests of competitors. Corporate resources may, on a
given issue, be sufficient to dominate policy decisionmaking and judg-
ment. Protecting the right of special interests to petition government
through abusive propaganda practices may undermine the democratic
process upon which market and political freedom depend. Antitrust and
politics, in Justice Black's view, involve totally different worlds.
(2) United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington 65
In Pennington, the United Mine Workers sued the president of the
Phillips Brothers Coal Company to recover royalty payments due under
the Welfare and Retirement provisions of the National Bituminous Coal
and Wage Agreement of 1950.66 The 1950 agreement resulted from pro-
tracted collective bargaining negotiations between the union and the ma-
64. Economic theory would suggest that the railroads' interest in Noerr was motivated by
the desire to errect a barrier to competition. For example, economists have recently recog-
nized that the railroad industry is more "contestable" (i.e., more competitive) than has been
traditionally recognized because there is strong competitive pressure from other modes of
transportation, such as trucks. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 33, at 125. Economic theory
of contestable markets suggests that the railroads' lobbying campaign was motivated to stem
the strong competitive pressure of trucking.
"Contestability analysis tells us that even in markets in which such costs are substantial,
pricing power may be held in check by the availability of substitute suppliers whose cost struc-
ture is compatible with contestability." Id. A market is contestable, if entry and exit are easy.
Id. at 111. The trucking industry is perhaps the most contestable of industries because of the
availability of a vast number of actual and potential substitute transporters. Id. at 133.
More generally, the supposedly bright line Justice Black drew in Noerr between political
and business activity is far from clear. Since the market is structured by baseline entitlements
established by economic and legal regulations, including those established by the antitrust
laws, the distinction between political and market activity is untenable. See generally Sun-
stein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at 874. A legal doctrine that assumes market and
political activity are somehow dichotomous is ill-suited to determine whether concerted efforts
to influence government should be subject to antitrust regulation. Indeed, by insulating preda-
tory market conduct from antitrust laws merely because a group of competitors genuinely
attempt to influence the political process, the Court has allowed private business to reap the
benefits of predatory market objectives through legislatively created, but privately engineered,
restraints of trade.
65. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
66. See Pennington v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1963).
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jor coal producers that ended in labor strife in the mines. Both the union
and the large coal producers concluded that excess supply caused by
over-production was the industry's major problem, and the 1950 agree-
ment was their solution to this "problem. '67
To "solve" the over-production problem, the union agreed to permit
large coal producers to use labor-saving technology (which meant fewer
jobs for its members) in exchange for increased wages and royalty pay-
ments to the union's welfare fund.68 The union also agreed to seek the
same higher wage rates from all other producers, regardless of their abil-
ity to pay. The problem of over-production was to be "solved" by the
imposition of a wage scale that only the large operators could afford.
Since smaller coal operators had a labor intensive scale of operation, they
would no longer be competitive due to an increased cost of production.
The large producers who could absorb the higher wage scale as a result
of labor-saving technology, would produce coal at a lower cost, and thus
enjoy the competitive benefits of capital-intensive production. The 1950
wage agreement established a classic "barrier to entry"-a device econo-
mists consider essential to successfully secure a monopoly advantage. 69
To achieve their objective, the union and two of the large coal-pro-
ducing companies successfully lobbied the Secretary of Labor for a high
minimum wage for coal miners under the Walsh-Healey Act.70 At the
same time they lobbied the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 71 to cease
purchasing coal from mines not paying the minimum wage. By securing
a high minimum wage from the Secretary of Labor, the union and large
coal operators erected a barrier to market competition that small, labor-
intensive producers would never be able to surmount.
In its complaint, the union asserted that Phillips Coal breached its
promise to make welfare and retirement payments under the 1950 agree-
ment. In its answer, Phillips alleged that the 1950 agreement constituted
an illegal restraint of trade under the first section of the Sherman Act. In
response, the union alleged that the agreement was exempt from the anti-
trust laws as a result of the antitrust exemption for labor unions. The
67. For an analysis of the industry, including an economic analysis of the facts relevant to
the Pennington litigation, see Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington
Case in Perspective, 82 Q.J. ECON. 85 (1968).
68. Pennington, 325 F.2d at 807.
69. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659-60; see also Williamson, supra note 67, at 96.
70. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970). Section 35(b) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to deter-
mine a minimum wage for employees of governmental contractors. Id. § 35(b).
71. The Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1970), established the
TVA as an independent government corporate entity to engage in regional development.
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district court sustained a jury verdict against the union and the Sixth
Circuit court of appeals affirmed.72
When the Pennington litigation reached the Supreme Court, the par-
ties and the Court primarily emphasized the labor exemption issue,
which was complicated as well as perplexing. 73 The Noerr issue thus took
second stage to the drama surrounding another, quite different problem.
Nevertheless, the Court's decision on the Noerr issue was significant be-
cause it extended the Noerr result to cover joint lobbying efforts to influ-
ence executive officials who exercise commercial functions. Indeed, the
Pennington result conflicts with the distinction Justice Black drew be-
tween agreements to lobby for legislation and agreements traditionally
condemned by the Sherman Act.74
Moreover, in finding that both the court of appeals and the district
court had failed to take "proper account" of Noerr, Justice White an-
nounced a rule derived from an extremely broad reading of Noerr: "No-
err shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public
officials regardless of intent or purpose. ' 75 According to Justice White,
72. Pennington v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
73. A sharply divided majority of the Supreme Court held that the 1950 wage agreement
was not exempt from the antitrust laws. The case was thus remanded to the district court for
determination of the substantive antitrust issues raised against the union. Pennington, 381
U.S. at 669. Pennington, and another case decided the same year, Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), are best known as labor-antitrust exemp-
tion cases. For nearly a century, the law concerning the scope of the antitrust exemption for
labor unions has been in a "state of flux" because the Supreme Court has been unable to
develop a consistent theory to distinguish between union activity that is subject to antitrust
sanctions and union activity that is subject, if at all, only to labor law and its remedies. See,
e.g., Cox, Labor and The Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv. 317
(1965). Pennington and Jewel Tea failed to end the uncertainty surrounding the labor exemp-
tion issue since both decisions spawned three opinions to which a trio of justices subscribed.
74. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; see also Fischel, supra note 7, at 86. In Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), decided one year after Noerr, the
Court held that Noerr immunity failed to protect an antitrust conspiracy action brought
against an American producer of vanadium and its subsidiary, a purchaser of vanadium prod-
ucts for the Canadian government. While the alleged conspiracy could be seen as an attempt
to influence governmental action (of another government), the Court refused to apply Noerr
because the activity involved "private commercial activity, no element of which involved seek-
ing to procure the passage or enforcement of laws." Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 707; see also
Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (holding that the Sherman Act applies to private parties
selling to a state government). In following the Court's Continental Ore decision, a number of
lower federal courts have found a "commercial exception" to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
holding that attempts to influence government officials are not immunized from antitrust lia-
bility when government officials are found to be acting in a commercial capacity. See, e.g.,
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970) (holding
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was designed only to insure uninhibited access to poli-
cymaking discretion of governmental officials).
75. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
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"[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition" because "[s]uch
conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader
scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act."'76
The Court's Pennington decision explicitly recognized the legitimacy
of interest group influence, even when the government acted as an eco-
nomic agent. Pennington thus cuts against the rationale Justice Black
established in Noerr for immunizing private attempts to influence the
political or "policy" decisions of government. Pennington also failed to
explain why the distinction between political and commercial activity did
not apply.77 Finally, the Pennington Court did not explain why its Noerr
immunity rule, fashioned specifically in light of the legislative context,
makes sense in the executive context.7 8
B. California Motor Transport: The Constitutionalization of Noerr?
The Warren Court's Noerr-Pennington doctrine reached a point of
constitutional apogee during the early years of the Burger Court. In Cal-
ifornia Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited,79 the Burger Court faced
a controversy between two trucking firms doing business in California.
The plaintiffs operated intrastate and the defendants operated interstate.
The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to oppose all appli-
cations by plaintiffs for operating rights to engage in interstate trucking
before the California Public Utilities Commission or the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.80 The plaintiffs' allegations, like the common-law
actions of abuse of process and malicious prosecution, asserted that the
defendants raised protests and objections to every application regardless
of the merits, and adverse decisions were appealed to the highest possible
76. Id. The Court did not consider whether the first amendment required defendant's
antitrust immunity.
77. See also Fischel, supra note 7, at 84.
78. Executive officials administer the law, adjudicate claims under the law, and some-
times, by establishing and enforcing policy, make the law. The lines separating these functions
are most often quite indistinct in the executive context. See, eg., Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v.
Joor Mfg., 827 F.2d 458, 468 (9th Cir. 1987). While Noerr immunity might make sense in
cases when executive action involves law making, see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 44 (Supp. 1989), it is far from clear whether Noerr should immunize executive
action when executive officials are acting to administer established legal policy. The notion
that interest group lobbying serves to immunize the exercise of political power of special inter-
ests seeking to influence the administration or enforcement of legal policy seems flatly inconsis-
tent with the ideals of a representative democracy emphasized by Justice Black in Noerr
79. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
80. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp., 432 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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forum.8 1 The plaintiffs claimed that the resulting conspiracy had the
purpose of restraining and monopolizing the highway common carriage
business in California and elsewhere. The district court dismissed the
action on the ground that relief was barred by the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine.82 The Ninth Circuit reversed.8 3
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, agreed that
Noerr-Pennington failed to bar relief.8 4  According to Justice Douglas,
it would be destructive of the rights of association and of petition to
hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the
antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal
agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view re-
specting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis
their competitors.8 5
The complaint in California Transport was found to state a valid cause of
action because it raised allegations sufficient to raise a claim under No-
err's sham exception.8 6
In California Transport, Justice Douglas suggested, without actually
deciding, that Noerr-Pennington was constitutionally required, but that
the contours of the protection afforded might be quite different when ap-
plied in different governmental spheres. Antitrust immunity was seen to
involve special concerns in the adjudicatory sphere because judicial law-
making required a process free from the unethical and corrupting influ-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court of appeals stated that the "fundamental reason" for immunizing peti-
tioning activity before the legislative and executive branches of government under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine does not apply to judicial and administrative adjudicative processes be-
cause governmental action does not contemplate the policy determination involved in adopting
or enforcing laws. Because governmental officials lack the power to make such determina-
tions, the court concluded that "[i]t would be pointless to limit the reach of the Sherman Act"
in this sphere. Id. at 758. The court further concluded that even if the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine does apply, relief was not barred because the real purpose of the defendants' joint
activity was to restrain competitors directly, rather than through the medium of governmental
action. Id. at 760-61.
84. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510-11.
85. Id.
86. While Justice Douglas concluded that the first amendment granted the petitioners a
right to petition courts or administrative bodies, he also stated that such right "does not neces-
sarily give them immunity from the antitrust laws." Id. at 513. That statement is impossible
to reconcile with Douglas's statement quoted in the text. Supra text accompanying note 85;
see also Fischel, supra note 7, at 88. The statement is also at odds with Noerr. As Justice
Stewart retorted in his concurring opinion: "It is difficult to imagine a statement more totally
at odds with Noerr. For what that case explicitly held is that the joint exercise of the constitu-
tional right of petition is given immunity from the antitrust laws." California Motor Transp.,
404 U.S. at 517 (Stewart, J., concurring). It is, however, highly unlikely that Justice Douglas
intended to limit Noerr, given that his decision actually extended Noerr immunity to a new
context-attempts to influence adjudicatory bodies. Fischel, supra note 7, at 88.
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ences of private interests. Unethical conduct condoned in the political
arena was not immunized in the adjudicatory process. Hence, petitions
before adjudicatory bodies were entitled to a different (lower) degree of
immunity protection than that afforded petitions before legislative
bodies.87
California Transport is an ironic decision. While the Court implied
that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was premised upon a constitutional
principle applicable to petitioning activity before all branches of govern-
ment, the decision also acknowledged the likelihood of antitrust liability
for certain forms of unethical petitioning in the judicial setting. More-
over, while "sham" petitioning in the legislative arena may be as indefen-
sible as bad faith litigation,88 antitrust liability for legislative lobbying
was extremely unlikely since the Supreme Court was more willing to con-
done such activity, even with a predatory, anticompetitive motive.89
Justice Douglas apparently feared that unethical forms of interest
group influence might undermine the judiciary's pivotal function of
maintaining an "objective" process for institutional settlement. As the
primary arena for dispute resolution, the judicial sphere of government
requires, in Justice Douglas's view, special protection against improper
forms of interest group influence. Thus, courts were allowed to adopt an
exception to Noerr that would deny antitrust immunity to interest groups
seeking to influence judicial outcomes through sham litigation.
87. For example, in reviewing the railroads' political campaign in Noerr, Douglas noted
that while deception, misrepresentation, and unethical tactics are normally objectionable, the
Noerr Court was mindful of the special nature of the deliberative process of "political"
branches of government. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512 ("Congress [had] tradi-
tionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to problems relating to the con-
duct of political activities ... caution [that] would go for naught if [the Court] permitted an
extension of the Sherman Act to regulate [such] activities [in the legislative context]." (citing
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141)). Douglas also noted that "misrepresentations, condoned in the polit-
ical arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process." Id. at 513. Insofar as
administrative or judicial processes are concerned, Douglas was of the view that unethical
conduct "cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of 'political expres-
sion.'" Id.
88. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 63, at 40.
89. Clearly, bad faith petitioning can more readily establish antitrust liability in the adju-
dicatory setting given Justice Douglas's views of the special nature of judicial and administra-
tive proceedings. Commentators, however, have voiced concern that the "sham" exception
has become an exception without boundaries. Professor Areeda, for example, has noted that
the "sham principle calls for frivolous or otherwise unreasonable action in the use of govern-
mental machinery, and this test will not often be satisfied." P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 9
(Supp. 1982). More recently, Areeda and Hovenkamp have been critical of courts and com-
mentators who use the term "sham" as "a catchall for any activity that is not afforded Noerr
protection." P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 16.
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It was the need to legitimate judicial lawmaking that explains Jus-
tice Douglas' view that unethical conduct in the adjudicatory arenas of
government should be subject to antitrust regulation, and why an excep-
tion to Noerr for litigation was deemed necessary. If special interest
groups were allowed to ply the judicial branches of government with un-
ethical forms of influence, such conduct might serve to undermine the
pivotal function performed by adjudicatory bodies. 90 If adjudicatory
bodies are captured by special interests, or if they are utilized to accom-
plish purely private interests, the effectiveness of judicial review is under-
mined, thus calling into question the role of the judiciary in maintaining
a "sound process" for institutional settlement of disputes. 91 The delicate
balance of power resulting from interest group struggle in legislative are-
nas thus was seen to depend on a system of judicial review that stands as
a guardian over procedure, but remains aloof about the "political" out-
comes of government. In this way, California Transport is consistent
with the central premises of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 92
What the Supreme Court failed to consider was the real possibility
that it may be easier to corrupt the legislative spheres of government
because, unlike the adjudicative spheres, legislative bodies may lack ade-
quate internal controls to check the raw political power of corporate in-
terests utilized to dominate and influence the electoral, referendum, and
legislative process. 93 The dynamics of interest group representation is
90. See, e.g., Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240
(9th Cir. 1982) (falsehoods and misrepresentations not acceptable in the adjudicatory sphere
because judges and administrators, unlike legislators, must rely on the parties for the accuracy
of information to render decisions), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
91. Legitimating judicial lawmaking was a central concern of the legal process theory
associated with the highly influential work of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks that dominated
legal thinking during the fifties and sixties. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (10th ed. 1958); see also infra
notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
92. While Justice Douglas concluded that Noerr immunity generally applies to adminis-
trative adjudicatory bodies, he nevertheless held that the complaint in California Motor
Transp. properly stated a claim for relief because the allegations raised a bona fide claim under
the sham exception. According to Justice Douglas, the allegations in the truckers' complaint
in California Motor Transp. were sufficient to bring the case within the sham exception since
the plaintiffs had alleged that the "power, strategy, and resources of the petitioners were used
to harass and deter respondents in their use of administrative and judicial proceedings so as to
deny them 'free and unlimited access' to those tribunals." California Motor Transp., 404 U.S.
at 511. In Douglas's view, antitrust liability is necessary to prevent competitors from abusing
judicial-type process to "bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribu-
nals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process." Id. at 512. Contrary to the view of some
commentators, see, for example, Fischel, supra note 7, the Court's decision should not be read
as constitutionalizing Noerr.
93. See, e.g., C. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989);
Baker, supra note 13, at 646.
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likely to be both qualitatively and quantitatively different in the legisla-
tive context because the representation and regulatory process is more
vulnerable to the political influence of special interests.94 The economic
power of interests can deny effective representation of certain interests
having unequal power or representation in governmental processes. If
governmental process is exposed only to certain interests and policy per-
spectives, minority interests and opinions will likely not be considered.
Consequently, certain interests can more easily manipulate the delibera-
tive process of government for private advantage. In the pluralist sys-
tem, however, the courts are blind to these problems because judges are
supposed to refrain from interfering with the ongoing political struggle
occurring in the legislative spheres of government.
C. The Warren Court's Vision of Interest Groups, Political Freedom, and
Antitrust
By the mid-1970s, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine had become an
"unassailable" bedrock principle in antitrust law. The doctrine came to
signify an important civil liberties exception to antitrust regulation, one
that appeared to stand on solid, albeit unexamined, constitutional
ground. Conventional wisdom of antitrust scholars argues that the doc-
trine is premised upon "powerful reasons. '' 95 The doctrine is thought
necessary to protect the constitutional privilege of citizens to petition
their government. Commentators argue that genuine efforts to influence
governmental action cannot be grounds for an antitrust violation because
"the government's decision to act reflects an independent governmental
choice, constituting a supervening 'cause' that breaks the link between a
private party's request and the party's injury."'96 It is believed that a
94. Empirical studies of the legislative process have suggested that fragmentation and
decentralization of power have strengthened the role of organized interests in the legislative
process. While the actual degree of influence depends on a "configuration of a large number of
factors," interest group influence can be decisive in the legislative process. D. SCHLOZMAN &
J. TIERNEY, supra note 2, at 317. Studies of the regulatory process suggest that regulatory
efforts have mainly resulted in massive redistributions of income from one interest group to
another. See, eg., Bartel & Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at
OSHA's Impact, 28 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7-10 (1985); Costello, Electing Regulators: The Case of
Public Utility Commissioners, I YALE J. ON REG. 83, 104 (1984). Linneman, The Effect of
Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flammability Standard, 23 J.L. & ECON. 461,
473-78 (1980); Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211,
213 (1976).
95. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 12.
96. Id. Hence, Areeda and Hovencamp have argued that the Noerr result rests on a
"powerful reason: the antitrust injury of which the antitrust plaintiff complains was proxi-
mately 'caused' by the government itself." Id. Issues of causation are seen by them to compel
the result in Noerr because they believe the courts will never know if "the injury of which the
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contrary rule would improperly cast the courts in the untenable position
of second-guessing the motives or behavior of legislators simply because
improper lobbying influence was brought to bear on the legislative
process.97
antitrust plaintiff complains was proximately 'caused' by the government itself." Id. Accord-
ing to Areeda and Hovencamp, judges will never be able to know for sure if impermissible
petitioning activity was the cause in fact of legislation action since it is always possible that
individual legislators may have voted for the particular legislative outcome anyway. Id. Fi-
nally, Areeda and Hovencamp argue that principles of policy argue in favor of such a view. To
allow the court to inquire into the motives of legislation would, in their view, be condoning too
much interference in the legislative sphere of government; necessitating improper judicial in-
quiry into motives and behavior of legislators. Id. at 65.
Areeda's and Hovencamp's idea of causation is highly positivistic in that it assumes that
there is a stable and determinant basis for reaching conclusions about legal causation. Their
arguments are premised upon a debatable factual interpretation that focuses on a particular
contingent event-governmental action-as the crucial causal link to antitrust injury. Their
analysis ignores the existence of other events, such as producer subversion of the governmental
decisionmaking process, as an equally plausible cause of antitrust injury. Their characteriza-
tion of causation is also justified by a policy argument that makes sense if one assumes that
their interpretation of "what happens" in these cases is accepted as the only possible interpre-
tation. Different factual interpretations, drawn from different policy perspectives, support dif-
ferent normative conclusions about what judges "ought" to be doing in the government
petitioning cases. See Horowitz, The Doctrine of Objective Causation, in POLITICS OF LAW 201
(D. Kairys ed. 1982); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 61 (1956).
Alternative factual interpretations and policy conclusions are surely possible, especially if
one focuses on the danger posed by the potential abuse of unregulated power exercised by
interest groups in the legislative sphere. See supra note 2. If producer groups are able to
subvert the deliberative process of government and thereby dictate legislative outcomes, then
the courts would be justified in finding that attempts to instrumentally use economic power to
capture governmental regulation, rather than governmental action itself, is the legal cause of
plaintiff's antitrust injuries. Evidence of political subversion, rather than governmental action,
could have been seen as the cause of the antitrust injury in Noerr. Rather than breaking the
chain of causation, governmental action was merely a conduit of a private conspiracy to re-
strain trade. The Noerr Court thus could have condemned the conduct of a producer group
without inquiring into the motives or behavior of legislators.
97. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 63, at 49 (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(Cranch) 87, 130 (1810)); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 208-21 (1962). In
Fletcher, the notorious Yazoo Land Fraud case, Chief Justice Marshall upheld a highly suspi-
cious land grant made by the Georgia legislature, one that was influenced in part by bribery,
on the ground that the courts should refrain from questioning the motives of legislators, no
matter how corrupt those motives might be. Yet, Marshall's decision in Fletcher is hardly
beyond criticism; the Court might have held the original grant in Fletcher was invalid because
the grant was the result of legally proscribed conduct independent of legislative motives-
bribery of legislators. Indeed, Areeda and Turner recognize that Noerr should not apply to
legally proscribed conduct. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 63, at 47 ("To predicate
antitrust sanctions on an outright bribe, for example, is not to deprive the government of
anything useful, to chill permissible behavior, to intrude upon legislative functions, or other-
wise to sail on uncharted waters."). Evidence calling into question the legitimacy of the legis-
lative process should itself be reason for the exercise of judicial review. Professor Bickel's
theory of judicial restraint expressed in The Least Dangerous Branch is not to the contrary, for
Bickel's theory of the judicial review assumes that the legislature is democratic and institution-
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The conventional wisdom in support of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine makes perfect sense if one accepts the Warren Court's political vi-
sion of interest group politics. This vision assumes that legislative
outcomes influenced by private interest groups warrant respect and that
unethical conduct in the legislative arena is irrelevant for antitrust pur-
poses. Petitions that seek to influence governmental action thus are insu-
lated from antitrust regulation because it is thought that petitions, even if
anticompetitive in purpose or effect, are essential to uphold political free-
doms. 98 The Supreme Court assumed that interest groups-are essential
to political freedom because they create and preserve a marketplace of
ideas.99 Private anticompetitive conduct that normally would be pro-
scribed by the antitrust laws is left unchecked because it is assumed that
the antitrust injury of private plaintiffs is "caused" by governmental, not
private, action. And whatever the factual link may be, the courts are
admonished not to second guess the motives and behavior of legislators.
The Warren Court's approach to government-petitioning cases, and
the justifications that have developed to support that approach, are heav-
ily laden with presuppositions about the impropriety of judicial regula-
tion of interest group lobbying in the legislative context. Interest group
activity is insulated from antitrust regulation because such activity is
political, and not market-oriented. Paradoxically, it was the logic of the
market that served to justify the Warren Court's belief that private inter-
est group activity is necessary to preserve political freedom. Marketplace
ideas have served as legal constructs for structuring both political and
market activity, though the underlying justification for establishing anti-
trust immunity is premised upon a contrary view-that petitioning activ-
ity in the legislative sphere is political, not market activity. The effort to
draw lines between market and political activity has created a highly ma-
nipulable legal doctrine from which lawyers have generated contradic-
tory arguments.
ally competent to make value choices. For a critique of Professor Bickel's theory of the legal
process, see Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 (1988).
98. Political freedom, as distinguished from personal freedom, entails the right of citizens
to participate in the political process as a necessary condition of self-realization of personal and
economic liberty. As Professor Michelman has defined the term, "[b]y 'political freedom' I
mean the redemption or achievement of personal freedom from or through the institutional-
ized social power that regulates social conflicts, given a perception of need for some form of
such power." Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 15, at 1494 n.2.
99. The marketplace of ideas theory has also served as the Court's logic for finding that
profit-oriented speech of corporations and their political action committees are entitled to first
amendment protection. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding
statute that prohibits corporate speech unconstitutional); C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 221-23.
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The Warren Court left future generations with a federal policy di-
lemma. By refusing to intervene in the political arena, the Court has
tacitly allowed special interests to influence, and potentially to determine,
the quality and character of governmental policy. Interest group peti-
tioning threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the deliberative process
of government, thereby frustrating the ability of government to establish
economic regulations serving the public interest. The danger posed by
the exercise of unrelegated corporate power in the legislative spheres of
government was overlooked due to optimism that sustained the Warren
Court's understanding of interest group politics. The problem was that
the Supreme Court had internalized a flawed understanding of the actual
nature of the legislative process.
The dilemma posed by the exercise of unregulated power of interest
groups might have been avoided had the Court adopted an alternative
perspective; one that accepts the notion that both competitive policy and
political freedom require regulation of certain abusive and harmful forms
of corporate interest group lobbying. This pessimistic perspective would
question the view that interest groups invariably establish a marketplace
of ideas that advances rather than hinders political freedom. In adopting
such a perspective, judges might then decide that some forms of anticom-
petitive corporate petitioning cannot be justified as protected political ex-
pression, especially when government is a mere conduit for a private
conspiracy in restraint of trade. In such cases, plaintiff's antitrust inju-
ries would be "caused" by private, not governmental action.
The policy underpinnings of Noerr-Pennington, however, reflect the
Warren Court's commitment to a different understanding of special in-
terest group politics, one that optimistically accepts the perspective of
political pluralism. '00 According to pluralists, the influence of powerful
private groups over legislative and administrative processes is not an evil,
100. In political science, the term pluralism has a rich meaning. See R. DAHL, A PREF-
ACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS (1952);
D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); see also infra note 109. Interest group
pluralism has dominated the thinking of political scientists for much of this century. See A.
BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967); W. BINKELEY & M. Moos, A GRAMMAR
OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1950); R. DAHL, supra; V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRES-
SURE GROUPS (4th ed. 1958); D. TRUMAN, supra; see also W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra
note 15, at 46-56. Political pluralists must be distinguished from those who merely celebrate
diversity in society. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 15, at 1507; see also Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 32 (using the term "pluralist" to define a political conception of government
distinct from that associated with democratic pluralism). There are thus various meanings of
pluralism (normative and analytical, pluralism as dispersed power, pluralism as dispersed pref-
erences) that must be distinguished from ideas of political pluralists. See, e.g., Miller, Plural-
ism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 734, 734-36 (1983).
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but rather an affirmative requisite for advancing the public interest.
From the pluralist's perspective, the results of the political process nor-
mally should be respected. Once it is established that a legislature has
made a rational policy decision, the courts' duty is to enforce the statu-
tory purpose. It should make no difference that special interest groups
influence the legislatures' deliberative process. Disparities in influence
are expected in politics, and the fact that one interest prevails over an-
other is the nature of a pluralist democracy.
In the 1960s, there was substantial academic opinion supporting the
Warren Court's Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Most political scientists of
that time subscribed to the view that the political process reflects a
healthy equilibrium of private power. Because organized interests were
thought to be necessary for both effective representation and the ad-
vancement of the public interest, it was thought that the role of the judi-
ciary should be limited to ensuring that all groups have access to the
political process and to upholding agreements worked out among com-
peting interests. The overall political objective was to maintain the bal-
ance of group pressure in government. In the Noerr, Pennington, and
California Transport cases, prevailing conceptions of pluralism en-
couraged the Court to see federal competition policy under the Sherman
Antitrust Act as "at war" with the central premises of a democratic gov-
ernment. There is now a growing consensus that seriously questions the
Noerr doctrine and the underlying pluralistic perspective it reflects.
II. Modern Interest Group Theory and Antitrust: Reassessing
the Policy Underpinnings of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine
The policy underpinnings of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine can be
criticized. A group of competitors or a single firm seeking to utilize the
machinery of government to obtain, maintain, or strengthen monopoly
power might employ a host of tactics, strategies, and ploys. 10 Legisla-
tive lobbying by corporate interests is the paradigmatic case. Large lob-
bying expenditures by a group of competitors can be used to "drown
101. Collaborators or a single firm might seek to perfect an antitrust purpose through
overt measures such as bribery, collusion, campaign contributions, promises of campaign sup-
port, or by indirect, less obvious means, designed to overwhelm the process and stifle effective
lobbying by others. Overt measures involving bribery and collusion represent the easy cases,
since such tactics are illegal in and of themselves. The difficult cases involve the pursuit of
anticompetitive objectives through covert, less obvious means. See generally P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 63, at 36-37.
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out" opposing views of rivals. 10 2 An aggressor may seek to exploit its
strategic position as market leader, devoting greater expenditures to lob-
bying, thus enjoying superior access to the political process. A single
firm or a group of competitors might adopt a predatory lobbying strategy
to exploit cost asymmetries by manipulating governmental process to in-
crease rivals' cost of doing business. 0 3 A related strategy might involve
pressing for governmental decisions that impose barriers to entry by
making it difficult for actual and potential competitors to compete. 1° 4
Joint lobbying even for legitimate purposes also creates the possibility
that concerted action will provide an inviting opportunity for competi-
tors to conspire for anticompetitive purposes. 10 5 Finally, free rider and
collective action problems suggest that consumers may be unable to or-
ganize opposing lobbies to make their wishes known on most public pol-
icy matters, thus leaving the field open to special interest groups to
inordinately influence decisionmaking. 10 6
Petitioning in the legislative context can be a means for producer
groups to capture the legislative process to achieve benefits at the expense
of others.10 7 Perhaps the most effective and dangerous capture strategy
involves control of information in the deliberative process. In controlling
the flow of information on complex issues, predators can effectively
" 'distort congressmen's thinking on an issue' ,,108 by inundating legisla-
tors with misleading, incorrect, or misrepresented information. Lies,
102. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 283 (1988). The most recent empirical investigations of D. SCHLOZMAN &
J. TIERNEY, supra note 2, at 317, indicate that interest groups have substantial resources that
can determine legislative outcomes especially when the interest group is seeking to block rather
than obtain legislation, when the group's goals are narrowly focused and involve low-profile
issues, when the group has substantial support from other factions, and when the group is able
to direct its influence in a favorable forum. Id. at 314-15, 398; see also Farber & Frickey,
Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 887.
103. Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 70-73; Klein, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incen-
tives in the Context of the Case Law, 6 INT'L. REV. OF L. & ECON. 241, 244 (1986).
104. See Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 73-5; M. TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 283.
105. Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 75-76.
106. The problems of free riding and collective action are traced to Mancur Olson's theory
of collective action. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see also Wiley, supra note 4, at 723-28.
107. See Wiley, supra note 4, at 715. In conceiving regulation as capture by producers,
Professor Wiley has seriously questioned the wisdom underlying the public interest concept of
regulation that has informed some of the pivotal Supreme Court decisions involving the con-
flict between state regulation and federal antitrust policy. Wiley argues that the Supreme
Court's state action decisions should more explicitly adopt a concept of regulation "as a prod-
uct not of broad political consensus but of the capture of lawmaking bodies by producer
groups seeking benefit at the expense of others." Id.
108. Macey, supra note 3, at 231 (quoting Easterbrook, What's Wrong With Congress
ATLANTIC, Dec. 1984, at 70).
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misrepresentations, and distortions are difficult to counteract when so-
phisticated means are used to cover and conceal the truth. It is even
more difficult to counteract the effect of repeated distortions imple-
mented by firms with large financial resources. Because the exercise of
overwhelming influence can neutralize the impact of competing lobbies
and petitioning efforts, the danger exists that petitioning will stifle the
deliberative process and render legislative decisionmaking less effective.
On the other hand, corporate involvement in governmental policy is
undoubtedly essential for intelligent decisionmaking. Policymakers need
to have input from the business community when business interests are,
or arguably might be, affected by contemplated legislation. Information
concerning corporate interests is an essential ingredient for government
officials exercising authority to render policymaking decisions, applying
discretionary criteria, and performing other sorts of legislative functions.
Therefore, undue restrictions on the right of corporate interests to peti-
tion government to influence government action would be unwise.
Obviously, a more selective analysis is required in the government-
petitioning cases. What is needed is an approach that carefully regulates
the offensive anticompetitive aspects of interest group petitioning while
preserving the essential function petitioning serves in a representative de-
mocracy. To develop a more intricate analysis of the petitioning of gov-
ernment cases--one that responds to and respects federal competition
policy as well as the values of political expression and debate-it is neces-
sary to re-examine the central premises and assumptions of Noerr-Pen-
nington in light of modern interest group theory.
A. The Theory of Interest Group Pluralism
Pluralism, in the 1960s, provided a conception of politics that opti-
mistically accepted the legitimacy of interest group influence in the polit-
ical process. 109 Since de Tocqueville, it has been recognized that special
109. While pluralists during the early 1960s accepted interest group influence in govern-
ment, they were optimistic about the role interest groups would play in government, believing
that "interest groups would not result in mere shifting, temporary majorities." Eskridge, supra
note 15, at 281 (describing the optimistic perspective of the pluralists in the 1960s).
Robert Dahl's study of New Haven politics is frequently cited for empirical support of the
optimism that pluralists project about how interest groups promote the public interest in poli-
tics. See R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOC-
RACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (1982) [hereinafter R. DAHL, DILEMMAS]. Modern
pluralist theorists argue that interest group factions work to disperse power and curb domina-
tion of the state through mutual control of diverse interests. See V.O. KEY, supra note 100, at
8; R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra, at 36 ("special interest groups can transform domination of
the state into a system of mutual controls"). According to the pluralist vision, the legislature is
an arena in which interest group conflict is played out. See A. BENTLEY, supra note 100, at
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interest groups, or "factions," are essential to the representative
processes of American government. 110 No one denies this fundamental
characteristic of large republics. Today, the question is whether interest
group regulation is needed to promote a more virtuous government or
whether such regulation is itself a threat to the effective functioning of
the political process.
Pluralists believe that interest group autonomy is a desirable feature
of American politics and that political ordering is essentially private ac-
tivity. In their view, interest groups must remain autonomous so that the
pursuit of self-interest will, like the "invisible hand" mechanism of the
market, lead to the aggregate social welfare."'1 Interest groups are seen
to have unified interests and engage in rational decisions similar to those
of "rational" people buying and selling products in the market."12
260-61. Legislative outcomes are said to "mirror the equilibrium of competing group pres-
sures." Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 884 (citing E. LATHAM, supra note
100, at 35). Today most pluralists are much less optimistic about the role of interest groups in
government; many raise doubts about the ability of government to "accommodate" special
interest groups. See, e.g., R. DAHL, DILEMMAS supra, at 166 ("organizational pluralism may
also play a part in stabilizing inequalities, deforming civic consciousness, distorting the public
agenda, and alienating final control over the public agenda by the citizen body").
110. R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 109, at 31. The problem of "factions" was a seri-
ous source of difficulty during the debates leading to the ratification of the Constitution. See
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 35-45; W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 38-40. Feder-
alists, such as James Madison, who supported ratification of the Constitution and the creation
of a strong central government, argued that the influence of factions would be mediated by
"checks and balances" and "separation of powers." Madison's The Federalist No. 10, for ex-
ample, can be seen as a "conventional pluralist document" advancing the belief that the prob-
lem of factions would be overcome in a large democracy where sufficient numbers would serve
as a "built-in check against the likelihood of factional tyranny." Sunstein, supra note 3, at 39-
40. The "Anti-Federalists" who believed in the republican ideal of "civic virtue" opposed
ratification because they believed that a decentralized government was necessary to control the
corrupting influence of special interest group factions over the deliberative processes of govern-
ment. The fear was that "[r]ule by remote national leaders would attenuate the scheme of
representation, rupturing the alliance of interests between the rulers and the ruled." Id. at 37.
Sunstein suggests the Federalists ultimately "achieved a kind of synthesis" of the two positions
by arguing that the "mechanisms of accountability" and "separation of powers" would ensure
that politics through interest group struggle would approximate the republican ideal of "delib-
eration and discussion about the public good." Id. at 47.
111. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 34. The commitment to democratic process is said to jus-
tify the idea that interest groups should be allowed to exercise independence and autonomy in
their activities. See also R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 109, at 32. According to the plural-
ist view, citizens are motivated to form different faction groups in order to participate in the
process of lawmaking. The participation of different factions within government is said to
strengthen solidarity and division, cohesion and conflict, by bringing to bear the full range of
constituents' interests in the deliberative process of government. Id. at 44. In this sense,
"[p]olitical ordering is ... assimilated to market ordering." Sunstein, supra note 3, at 33.
112. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1542. In adopt-
ing apragmatist philosophy, pluralists favor "a practical, functional inquiry which contextual-
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Pluralists favor an unregulated political process. Regulation of in-
terest group activity would, in their view, cause distortions in the market-
like mechanisms of the political process. 113 Because interest group lob-
bying is assumed to take place in a democratic process, it is presumed
that the ensuing political struggle between different competing interest
groups will establish the ultimate legitimacy of lawmaking. For this rea-
son, process-oriented legal pluralists believe that political lawmaking es-
tablishes the "ultimate authority over lawmaking by other institutions-
courts, administrative agencies and private parties."114 In thinking of
groups from an individualistic perspective, pluralists argue that the polit-
ical freedoms of citizens are rendered effective through group participa-
tion in the political arena.115 The possibility that excessive expenditures
of particular interest groups might "drown out" the views of others is not
considered to be a problem because in a pluralist system each side of an
issue is presumed to have the same opportunity to appeal for financial
support.1 16 The drowning out of some views on an issue is to be expected
when a particular view is adopted on the "merits."11 7
ized truth to social interest." Peller, supra note 97, at 575 (describing how Dewey's philosophy
of pragmatism influenced the pluralistic perspective of the 1950s legal process scholars). The
justice of political outcomes and the "truth" of social arrangements is "contextual and relative
rather than universal and absolute." Id.
113. Pluralists assume that the motivation of self-interest will lead to the maximization of
the public good. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 33.
114. Peller, supra note 97, at 571 (describing the process-oriented scholarship of Herbert
Wechsler). The process-oriented scholarship of Herbert Weschler, Alexander Bickel, Henry
Hart, and Albert Sacks was informed by pluralistic assumptions about the democratic charac-
ter of a legislative process structured by interest group representation. Hence, "a theory of
judicial review was pivotal to the competition of a systematic, process-oriented theory of
American law." Id.
115. See, e.g., R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 109, at 194-97; see also R. DAHL, A PREF-
ACE To ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985) [hereinafter R. DAHL, PREFACE]. Pluralists argue
that there is a constitutional basis for upholding the political autonomy of interest groups. The
constitutional link with interest group pluralism can be understood in terms of the belief that
the freedom of interest groups to participate in government is intimately connected to the
political purposes underlying the first amendment--"democracy's interest in governmental re-
sponsiveness to the electorate and in governmental access to as many sources of ideas and
information possible." Note, Application of the Sherman Act, supra note 9, at 849.
116. See, eg., M. TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 283.
117. Id. Inequalities in the existing distribution of wealth are either ignored or seen as
"natural." See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at 884 (discussing the pluralistic
premises of Buckley v. Valeo). In the pluralist system, "[n]eutrality is inaction, reflected in a
refusal to intervene in markets or to alter the existing distribution of wealth." Id. at 884
(discussing the pluralistic premises of the law of campaign financing under the Supreme
Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo). Inequalities caused by the existing distribution of wealth
are simply taken as being out "there," a baseline feature of the natural world that is beyond the
competence of the legal system to change or regulate. Id. Redistributive goals are not thought
to be a permissible governmental objective in the pluralistic state. Id.
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In legal theory, the pluralist perspective helped shape the influential
theory of legal process advocated by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.' 18
The legalprocess school of legal analysis accepted the pluralist concept of
politics in advancing a new legal methodology for doing legal analysis-a
methodology that promised an objective "process" for resolving subjec-
tive questions of "public policy."1 19 Underlying process theory is the
belief that a system of rational principles can be devised for legal analysis
that respects normative requirements for a just democracy without vio-
lating the law and politics distinction.
The jurisprudential project of process theorists also reflected the op-
timistic perspective of political pluralists who believe that majoritarian-
ism and rational policy are safe in a governmental process structured by
interest group politics.120 While Hart and Sacks acknowledged that most
legislation is enacted in response to the pressures of special interest
groups, they assumed that the legislative branch of government would
act pursuant to rational purposes.121 Hart and Sacks apparently believed
that legislative policy decisionmaking would be responsive and demo-
cratic so long as interest groups' influence was subject to a "sound pro-
cess" for reaching legislative enactments. 122 The courts would ensure
that the correct "procedures" are followed, but questions of "substance"
would be resolved through the political process of institutional
settlement. 123
118. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 91; see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 281-83;
Peller, supra note 97, at 568-72.
119. Legal process theory focuses on questions of institutional competence, reasoned elab-
oration, and democratic government. See, e.g., Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neu-
tral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 982-83 (1978); see also Minda, The Jurisprudential
Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44-46 (1989). Process theorists argue that the
power of common-law judges and administrative agency officials could be rendered consistent
with democratic principles through adherence to an objective legal process which limited judi-
cial choices to the level of "process," i.e., the level of procedure and jurisdiction. Questions
concerning "substance," would be resolved through adherence to the principles of "institu-
tional settlement" which specified the political competence of the various institutions of gov-
ernment to render decisions.
120. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 283.
121. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 91, at 162, 166-67; see also Eskridge & Frickey,
Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691,
695-96 (1987).
122. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 91, at 715 ("[T]he best criterion of sound legisla-
tion is the test of whether it is the product of a sound process of enactment."). Hart and Sacks,
however, ignored the possibility that interest group influence might corrupt the deliberative
process of government. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 121, at 697.
123. The "principle of institutional settlement" was invoked by the process theorists to
distinguish legitimate and illegitimate exercises of official power by determining the competent
institution capable of settling particular types of disputes. See Peller, supra note 97, at 568-72.
By focusing on jurisdiction and procedure, the crucial question for the process theorist was
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Hart and Sacks assumed that without some showing to the contrary,
the "legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable
purposes reasonably."1 24 Their notion of a deliberative legislative pro-
cess is extremely optimistic because they assumed that interest group in-
fluence could be mediated by an inherently democratic process.1 25
Process theorists following the Hart and Sacks paradigm have since ar-
gued for deference to the political process precisely because they assume
that the judiciary is incompetent to make the type of value choices that
can only be rendered by the "political process" of government. 2 6 ,Be-
cause there was no neutral way to resolve s uch questions, decisionmakers
in the judicial spheres are encouraged to enforce the legislative outcomes
dictated by interest group pressures.127
In first amendment jurisprudence, the pluralistic premises of interest
group theory share a strong affinity with the "marketplace of ideas"' 128
theory that has dominated the Supreme Court's views about political
speech. According to the "marketplace of ideas" theory, expression is
protected by the first amendment whenever it promotes discussion and
"Who decides?"-Le., "which institutions' determination would govern in case of conflict."
Id. at 570. Principles of institutional settlement were then developed to determine which insti-
tution "ought" to decide particular questions. Id
124. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 91, at 1415.
125. The flaw in Hart & Sacks theory of the legal process is that the theory embraced an
extremely naive and overly optimistic conception of the legislative process--one that failed to
appreciate the role of special interest groups in determining the content of legislation. See
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes In The Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 407, 435 (1989).
Of course, as Professor Sunstein has noted, this is not an "unsurprising omission in light of the
fact that most of the relevant literature has emerged in the last generation." Id
126. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 91, at 1414. This view was also the central
thrust of the theory ofjudicial review advocated by Herbert Wechsler in his broadside attack
on Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also Peller, supra note 97, at 564.
127. While some argued that judges should have a more active role in determining the
"reasonableness" of legislation, see, for example, Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appel-
late Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 399 (1950), it was generally accepted that the judicial role should be strictly limited.
See Sunstein, supra note 125, at 434-35. As Sunstein has argued, because there was no neutral
way to resolve value questions involved in legislation, judges were admonished to focus on the
"context of the statute's application rather than to its background and development." Id. at
435.
128. The classic statement of the marketplace of ideas, the notion that truth is discovered
through competition with falsehood, can be found in J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1947).
The marketplace of ideas concept filtered into first amendment jurisprudence as a result of
Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . ."). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). For a recent perceptive and compelling critique of the marketplace of ideas the-
ory in first amendment jurisprudence, see C. BAKER, supra note 93.
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enhances information dissemination necessary for robust debate and the
search for truth. 129 Political expression is protected by the first amend-
ment because restrictions on expression would suppress information and
discussion, undermine the market for ideas, and prevent the discovery of
truth. In the marketplace of ideas, everything worth saying on a subject
should be said.' 30
Since expression of widely different views is required to eliminate
the possibility of mistakes in judgment, suppression of expression is not
justified unless there is a clear and present danger or unless the expres-
sion lacks redeeming social values, as does obscenity. 13  Hence, it has
been said that "[f]or true pluralists, good politics can only be a market-
like medium through which variously interested and motivated individu-
als and groups seek to maximize their own particular preferences."' 132
The political vision of true pluralists supports Justice Black's fear in No-
err that antitrust regulation of the political activity of interest groups
might offend first amendment values.
B. Pessimistic Pluralists
By the mid-1960s, a subsequent generation of pluralists became pes-
simistic about the ability of government to accommodate special inter-
ests. 133  Some raised empirical objections concerning the ability of
interest groups to perform the representative function in government that
other pluralists had assumed would be performed by special interests
struggling for political favors. 134 Still others questioned the ability of in-
129. C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 194.
130. Id. at 24.
131. Id. at 8-9; see, e.g., Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J.
589.
132. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 15, at 1508.
133. For a review of the relevant literature, see W. ESICRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note
15, at 48-51 (discussing the work of M. OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965);
R. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (1960); Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975)). See also Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note
15, at 884-86 (discussing the work of R. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra; T. Lowi, THE END OF
LIBERALISM (1st ed. 1979); J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973)). The develop-
ment of the pessimistic strand of interest group pluralism is also discussed in D. SCHLOZMAN
& J. TIERNEY, supra note 2, at x-xii.
134. See, e.g., L. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS (1959) (systematic survey of
lobbyists conducted during the 1950s suggesting that interest groups did not play a central role
in governing); R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1963) (study of interest groups suggests that realities of organizational life make it unlikely
that interest groups can sustain effective influence over government). The more recent empiri-
cal study by Schlozman and Tierney discusses factors that are likely to enable interest groups
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terest groups to adequately present the multitude of interests within soci-
ety. 135 As: one critic put it: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the
heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." 136 Even the
founder of some of the most optimistic pluralistic theories of political
science, Robert Dahl, acknowledged that interest groups may use their
independence to "play a part in stabilizing inequalities, deforming civic
consciousness, distorting the public agenda, and alienating final control
over the public agenda by the citizen body. '"137
In recognizing that organized interest groups must be both autono-
mous and yet subject to legal controls, modem pluralist thinkers have
attempted to locate master problems in the theory of interest group plu-
ralism. Some have suggested that interest group pluralism might be pre-
mised upon a fundamental contradiction-what Dahl has called the
"dilemmas of pluralist Democracy." While Dahl accepts the notion that
independent organized interests are both inevitable and indispensable for
large-scale democracies, he also recognized that "independence and au-
tonomy... create an opportunity to do harm." 138
Dahl's modem notion of pluralism can be understood in terms of a
paradox basic to any pluralistic understanding of interest groups. In-
dependent interest group organizations are both necessary and threaten-
to influence legislation, while rejecting the notion that interest groups are all-powerful. D.-
SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 2; see also W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 15,
at 57-58.
135. See, e.g., T. Lowi, supra note 133, at 38-39; Walker, A Critique of the Elitist Theory
of Democracy, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 285 (1960).
136. R. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 133, at 35.
137. R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 109, at 166 (one of the founding fathers of modern
pluralist theory in the 1950s). As Robert Dahl now explains:
Independent organizations are highly desirable in a democracy, at least in a
large-scale democracy. Whenever democratic processes are employed on a scale as
large as the nation-state, autonomous organizations are bound to come into existence
Yet as with individuals, so with organizations; independence or autonomy (I use
the terms interchangeably) creates an opportunity to do harm. Organizations may
use the opportunity to increase or perpetuate injustice rather than reduce it, to foster
the narrow egoism of their members at the expense of concerns for a broader public
good, and even to weaken or destroy democracy itself.
Id. at 1. The pluralist perspective advanced by Professor Dahl in the 1980s thus appears to be
much more pessimistic than the one he advanced in the 1950s. See, e.g., R. DAHL, PREFACE,
supra note 115, at 16; R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?, supra note 109, at 1-3.
138. R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra note 109, at 1. Dahl argues that independent interest
group organizations are desirable because they "help curb hierarchy and domination of
majoritarian rule." Id. at 32. Dahl argues that autonomous interest organizations are inevita-
ble because they are "a necessary element in large-scale democracy, both as a prerequisite for
its operation and as an inevitable consequence of its institutions." Id. at 36. Dahl nevertheless
argues that independent organizations give rise to the possibility of harm. See supra note 109.
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ing to a representative democracy because without interest groups a
representative democracy cannot operate properly, and yet the very
existence of independent groups pressuring government is dangerous to
democracy.1 39 The simultaneous need for independence and control is
unavoidable in the pluralist system.
Today, modern pluralist thinkers have attempted to develop struc-
tures that manage and contain two diametrically opposed policies--one
seeking to affirm the independence of interest groups, the other seeking
to maintain regulatory control over their activities.1 40 For example,
Dahl has argued that the boundaries between the public and private
spheres of government should be restructured radically to permit public
ownership of private property to achieve the democratic ideals of a more
egalitarian pluralism. 141
Dahl and other modern pluralists now acknowledge that the distinc-
tion between private interest and public power has eroded as interest
groups have become more powerful in government. The erosion of the
distinction between public and private has made the task of drawing lines
or making choices between upholding the independence of private inter-
est groups or protecting the public interest from the threat of private
interest influence an incoherent and meaningless task. The pessimism of
modern pluralists serves to question the perspective of those who assume
that legal doctrines can be created to make sharp distinctions between
the exercise of private and public power.
Since the exercise of private power can be as coercive as any govern-
mental authority, and since private interests are largely unaccountable,
there is reason to question the wisdom of an antitrust doctrine that al-
lows private interest groups to influence governmental process without
governmental control. At least two related groups of modern pluralists,
public choice and capture theorists, offer criticism relevant for meaning-
139. For examples of this paradox in other areas of law, see Frug, The Ideology of Bureau-
cracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1288-92 (1984) (describing the paradox in the
relation between law and society as an example for examining similar paradoxes in administra-
tive law); Minda, The Common Law, Labor and Antitrust, - INDUS. REL. L.J. - (1989)
(forthcoming) (describing a similar paradox in the legal concepts of competition and
combination).
140. See Freeman & Mensch, A Republican Agenda for Hobbesian America, 41 U. FLA. L.
REV. 581, 597-600 (1989).
141. He would thus restructure privately owned, market-oriented economies toward pub-
lic ownership, transfer private ownership into public ownership, and generally call for the
establishment of a civic virtue committed to the public good. See R. DAHL, DILEMMAS, supra
note 109, at 166-205. Dahl was unable to conclude, however, that his remedies for restructur-
ing government would be sufficient to cure the "defects in the American system of organiza-
tional pluralism." Id. at 205.
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ful re-examination of the policy underpinnings of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.
(1) Public Choice Theorists
Public choice theory challenges the premises of interest group plu-
ralism by asserting an economic analysis of the political process. 142 Re-
jecting the "romantic and illusory set of notions about the working of
governments" projected by the pluralistic perspective, these theorists call
for a more hard-headed and rigorous political analysis, what Professor
James Buchanan calls "politics without. romance." 143 Accordingly, they
treat the political and legislative process as if it were a microeconomic
system subject to the disciplinary impulses of a market structured by the
individual pursuit of self-interest. 144 Interest groups are seen as "rent-
seekers" 145 who influence the political process to achieve their selfish eco-
nomic interests, and legislators are seen as motivated to advance their
own self-interest, especially their interest in re-election.
Perhaps the best description of public choice theory as it relates to
the new economic approach to interest groups and legislation is given by
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner:
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of government,
legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers
of favorable legislation. The price that the winning group bids is deter-
mined both by the value of legislative protection to the group's mem-
bers and the group's ability to overcome the free-rider problems that
plague coalitions. Payments take the form of campaign contributions,
votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright
142. See generally Minda, supra note 119, at 608.
143. Buchanan, supra note 15, at 11.
144. See Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983); Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 878.
145. "Rent-seeking" refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for
the use of an economic asset in excess of the market price) through government
intervention in the market. A classic example of rent-seeking is a corporation's at-
tempt to obtain monopolies granted by government. Such monopolies allow firms to
raise prices above competitive levels. The increased income is economic rent from
government regulation.
Macey, supra note 3, at 224 n.6. The standard definition of rent-seeking behavior assumes that
"rents" are the returns that accrue to producers above the marginal cost of production. See,
e.g., Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 878 n.36. Right-wing, conservative
public choice theorists, however, define rent-seeking to include both producer and consumer
group behavior seeking supra-competitive returns or benefits. See Kelman, On Democracy-
Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice
Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 230-35 (1988). Right-wing legal theorists utilize public choice
theory to advance their general ideological case against the modern welfare state. See, e.g., R.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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bribes. In short, legislation is "sold" by the legislature and "bought"
by the beneficiaries of the legislation.146
Public choice theorists reject the optimistic vision of the political
process of pluralism on various grounds. First, public choice theorists
utilize game theory to reveal how "political processes are fundamentally
chaotic and unpredictable, that almost anything can happen."' 14 7 Public
choice theorists also offer a theoretical justification for believing that
majoritarian rule will fail to accommodate conflicts of interest among
different special interest groups. Raising the paradox presented by "Ar-
row's Impossibility Theorem," these theorists have argued that "majority
rule may be unable to resolve the choice among three or more mutually
exclusive alternatives." 14 8 While legislatures may seek to skirt "Arrow's
Paradox" by adopting various "structures, rules, and norms" to elimi-
nate the necessity of choosing between three or more mutually exclusive
146. Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 875, 877 (1975). Judge Posner has since argued for a cautious approach to statutory
interpretation. See R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 286-93 (arguing that judges must seek to
implement legislative outcomes, but only if the compromise reached by legislation is reason-
able). Judge Easterbrook, on the other hand, appears to be less cautious in applying public
choice theory to statutory interpretation. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domain, supra note 15, at
544 (arguing that legislatures are unable to articulate clear policies because they do not act
purposefully); see also Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 880-82.
147. Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 901 (quoting Panning, Formal
Models of Legislative Process, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 669, 680 (1985)).
148. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). Profes-
sors Farber and Frickey, have used the following example to explain "Arrow's Paradox":
In some circumstances, majority rule may be unable to resolve the choice among
three or more mutually exclusive alternatives. For a simple example, assume that
three children-Alice, Bobby, and Cindy-have been pestering their parents for a
pet. The parents agree that the children may vote to have a dog, a parrot, or a cat.
Suppose each child's order of pet preferences is as follows: Alice-dog, parrot, cat;
Bobby-parrot, cat, dog; Cindy-cat, dog, parrot. In this situation, if pairwise vot-
ing is required, then majority voting cannot pick a pet, as the reader can verify.
Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 902. Arrow illustrates how "no method of
voting, or any other method of making social decisions, can avoid the possibility of such para-
doxical results." Id. However, there may be some situations that permit one to skirt the
paradox. As Farber & Frickey explain:
In the example above, a majority decision is possible if the children agree that a pet's
size is the only relevant factor and merely differ in their conception of the ideal size.
Such a case is an example of a population with 'uni-peaked preferences'; this situa-
tion avoids Arrow's result and allows consistent, noncyclical majority rule. Simi-
larly, in a legislature, voting paradoxes can be avoided if each legislator ranks her
choices on a liberal-to-conservative scale, and differs only in her preferred location on
the scale. Furthermore, Arrow's Paradox need not occur if the result involves more
than a head count. For instance, strength of preferences may be somehow consid-
ered or the legislators may agree to debate until one side persuades the other. These
escapes from Arrow's paradox may play a significant role in legislatures, particularly
in smaller groups such as committees.
Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 902.
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alternatives, 149 there are other technical problems that these theorists
raise in questioning the operation of political systems structured by inter-
est group pressure.
For example, drawing from Mancur Ols6n's work on collective
choice, 150 public choice theorists have argued that since rational individ-
uals can be expected to take a "free ride" on the efforts of others, it may
be difficult to organize large groups of citizens to advance the public in-
terest implicated in the allocation of public goods. "[I]f the group is
large, individual members have little incentive to participate because par-
ticipation is personally costly and contributes little to the group's
chances for successful joint action."1 51 Public choice theorists thus pre-
dict that political activity is likely to be dominated by small interest
groups seeking to advance their own special interests, frequently at the
expense of the public good.
Olson's collective action problem also casts doubt on the pluralist
assumption that interest group pressure yields a distribufion of legislative
choices that reflects the public interest. Public choice theorists, relying
upon Olson's work, argue that the market for legislation is inefficient
precisely because private organizations will fail to spring up and repre-
sent the needs and interests of certain groups within society. Because
free rider problems work to the advantage of small special interest
groups, the market for legislation is seen as dysfunctional in allowing too
much rent-seeking legislation at the expense of the public interest. Public
choice theorists thus pose a serious challenge to optimistic pluralists who
believe that interest groups press legitimate grievances and bring a vari-
ety of socioeconomic perspectives into political debate.1 52
Finally, public choice theorists also question the efficacy of the
"proceduralism" of legal process scholars who, following the process tra-
dition of Hart and Sacks, uncritically assumed that judges can devise
procedural standards to mediate and curb the dominating influence of
special interest groups in government. Public choice theorists argue that
the procedural mechanisms of the deliberative process actually "exacer-
149. Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 904.
150. M. OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
151. Wiley, supra note 4, at 724; see also Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15,
at 892. For a recent illustration of how pre-existing institutional structures may enable a large
group of producers to get around collective action problems see Miller, Public Choice at the
Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 83,
89-104, 130 (1989).
152. M. OLSON, supra note 150, at 126-3 1; see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 285. But see
Miller, supra note 151, at 30 (illustrating how a "mass of five million dairy farmers and many
thousands of factory owners and merchants" coalsed power to stamp out competition from
oleomargarine).
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bate the tendency of the legislature not to pass public goods legislation
but will not much impede its ability to pass rent-seeking laws."' 53 They
point to examples such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the his-
tory of which vividly illustrates how the proceduralism of legislation al-
lowed industry interest to draft, with little interference from Congress,
unreasonably high tariffs to protect against foreign competition. 54
These theorists give reason for doubting the validity of Justice Black's
optimistic understanding of how interest groups actually operate in a
representative government.
(2) Antitrust Capture Theorists
Drawing on public choice theory, a new breed of antitrust scholar
questions the public interest concepts of legislation that have informed
some of the pivotal Supreme Court decisions involving conflict between
state regulation and federal antitrust policy-problems that pose issues of
"antitrust federalism."' 155 In reviewing recent decisions that seem to nar-
row the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 156 Professor John Wiley
has argued that the Supreme Court's recent state action decisions appear
to move toward a concept of regulation "as the product not of broad
political consensus but of the capture of lawmaking bodies by producer
groups seeking benefit at the expense of others." '157 In developing a the-
ory of antitrust capture to explain these cases, Professor Wiley has lent
153. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 291.
154. Law of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (repealed in part and amended 1974); see
R. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF (1935); see also W. ESKRIDGE
& P. FRICKEY, supra note 15, at 40-46.
155. See Wiley, supra note 4, at 714.
156. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that anticompeti-
tive arrangements may be exempt from the antitrust laws if they are part of a state regulatory
regime. If a government-created restraint of trade is exempt from the Sherman Act as a result
of Parker, then it might seem logically necessary to confer a similar immunity for legitimate
means designed to induce the government to establish the restraint. See Note, Application of
the Sherman Act, supra note 9, at 848. The problem with such a suggestion is that whatever
constitutes a legitimate means is not self-evident; deference to representative processes should
not be required if those processes have been captured by special interests. See Wiley, supra
note 4, at 715, 723-28.
Subsequent decisions of the Court have in fact allowed federal antitrust law to preempt
state regulatory regimes that Parker v. Brown seemed to protect. See, e.g., Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40
(1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980);
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Flood v
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951). The relevant case law is discussed in Wiley, supra note 4, at 715-23.
157. Wiley, supra note 4, at 715.
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support to the view of public choice theorists who are critical of the pub-
lic interest concept of legislation underlying interest group pluralism.
Wiley's proposal for transforming the current doctrine of state ac-
tion under Parker is motivated by a desire to encourage antitrust deci-
sionmakers to take into account the dangers of regulatory capture.
Wiley concludes that public choice theory and studies of the regulatory
process, while failing to establish a comprehensive theory of regulation,
offer a persuasive description of the "mechanics and resulting evils of
regulatory capture."' 158 In drawing from such sources,1 59 Wiley proppses
a new approach to state action problems that respects both the antitrust
rationale of market efficiency as well as the concern for political legiti-
macy of the democratic process. He argues that state regulatory regimes
should be preempted by the federal antitrust laws whenever four criteria
have been satisfied: (1) the regulation restrains market rivalry; (2) the
regulation is not protected by an antitrust exemption; (3) the regulation
lacks a market efficiency justification, and (4) the regulation is the prod-
uct of producer capture "in the sense that it originated from the decisive
political efforts of producers who stand to profit from its competitive
restraint. 1 60
158. Id. at 725.
159. In addition to the public choice theory previously discussed, Professor Wiley also
relies upon case studies by economists, political scientists, and others of the left and right
political perspectives to support his view. See id. at 724 (citing R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT
AND ITS REGULATORS (1962); G. KOLKO, supra note 15; P. MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF REGULATION (1965); Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9
J.L. & ECON. 113 (1966); Moore, The Purpose of Licensing. 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961); Plott,
Occupational Self-Regulation: A Case Study of the Oklahoma Dry Cleaners, 8 J.L. & EON.
195 (1965); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1962)).
160. Wiley, supra note 4, at 743. The first two criteria (state action that restrains competi-
tion and state action not protected by a statutory preemption) merely restate requirements that
are already recognized in the state action doctrine under Parker. See, e.g., Spitzer, Antitrust
Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1293, 1300-01 (1988). The third criterion, that state regulation lacks a market effi-
ciency justification, expresses a concern that economists have raised in favor of antitrust regu-
lation. The underlying notion is that "[i]f the antitrust laws are aimed at fostering efficiency
and the state regulation promotes efficiency, then there is no conflict between the two and the
state regulation should not be preempted." Id. at 1318; see also Cirace, An Economic Analysis
of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 TEx. L. REv. 481 (1982).
Professor Cirace argues that efficiency should be the acid test for determining the appro-
priateness of federal preemption of state or local legislation when there is a conflict with fed-
eral antitrust policy. See id. at 515 (arguing that, except for a state-owned monopoly entitled
to a state antitrust exemption, "[flederal antitrust preemption should prohibit states or their
subdivisions from displacing competition unless substantial market failures, imperfections, or
instabilities are inherent in these markets, or competitive displacement is no greater than the
scope of the market inadequacies at which it is aimed .. "). Professor Cirace's efficiency test,
carried to its logical conclusion, would transform the Supreme Court's state action doctrine
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Professor Wiley's fourth criterion, the capture requirement, is cru-
cial to the preemption test he proposes. This requirement establishes the
basis for accommodating the conflicting policies posed by the state action
doctrine. The state action doctrine seeks to preserve the proper institu-
tional balance between state and federal regulatory policy under princi-
ples of antitrust federalism. Capture theory, however, justifies federal
court review of state and local regulatory policies when such policies lack
a broad political consensus, because these policies are captured by special
interest groups. Without the capture requirement, federal courts, in an
effort to enforce federal competition policy, would intrude too much into
state and local economic policy creating what Wiley calls the problem of
"antitrust imperialism."' 161
The capture criterion seeks to minimize problems of "antitrust im-
perialism" by restricting the power of federal judges to attack only state
regulations that advance private interests adverse to federal competition
policy. As Wiley explains, "[The capture] criterion is necessary if the
proposed preemption test is to accommodate both sides of the conflict
between state and local regulatory policy and federal antitrust policy.' 1 62
As critics of Wiley's proposal have stressed, 63 capture theory makes
facts surrounding the enactment and enforcement of legislation-such as
lobbying-highly relevant to the antitrust preemption analysis.
Legislative lobbying should be a highly relevant factor for proving
regulatory capture. 164 If capture were established and the other criteria
satisfied, preemption then would be the penalty for the plaintiff's peti-
tioning effort. Critics have argued that
the capture test is likely to chill protected activity more than would a
monetary penalty imposed directly on lobbying itself, for it applies
what for the lobbyist must be the ultimate sanction .... After all, why
lobby for a bill which, once it passes the legislature, must fail in the
courts because of [the] lobbying. 165
into a new form of federal antitrust regulation, allowing enormous federal review of state and
local policies. Such an approach would give rise to what Professor Wiley aptly calls the prob-
lem of "antitrust imperialism"-overintrusive federal intervention into state and local govern-
ment. See Wiley, supra note 4, at 764.
161. See Wiley, supra note 4, at 764.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political
Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 513 (1988); see also Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State
Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 629.
164. Cf Wiley, supra note 4, at 769 ("The most direct way to build into a preemption test
a filter sensitive to the problem of regulatory capture would be to examine the facts surround-
ing a regulation's origin.").
165. Garland, supra note 163, at 513.
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Surprisingly, Professor Wiley fails to defend his theory against those
who claim that capture theory calls for improper modifications of Noerr-
Pennington, or undermines the policies established under it.166 Clearly,
such a defense is possible. Why require courts to defer to the right to
petition government if it has been shown that the petitioning is part of a
scheme to subvert and capture the benefits of governmental process? If
there is reason to apply Wiley's preemption test to state and local legisla-
tion to guard against the problem of producer capture, there certainly is
reason to apply the capture rationale to questions of antitrust immunity
under Noerr.
To argue that the first amendment denies such a result is hardly
decisive. The right to petition government is not absolute; nor is every
form of expression entitled to first amendment protection. 167 What may
be describable as "speech" or "expression" may be untouched by the first
amendment. 168 Overriding governmental interests permit limits to the
166. However, in a footnote in his Capture Theory article, Wiley states: "For reasons of
free speech and access to government, a private actor's lobbying or petitioning activities gener-
ally cannot serve as the basis for antitrust claims." Wiley, supra note 4, at 773 n.280 (citing
Noerr, Pennington, and contrasting California Motor Transport). This statement may not indi-
cate the exact position Wiley holds on the relevance of capture theory to Noerr-Pennington
issues since the statement was made in reference to a discussion about remedies in the main
text of his article. The statement appears to be at odds with Wiley's capture test since he
acknowledges that the facts surrounding the enactment of legislation, which presumably
would include interest group lobbying, also would be relevant for establishing capture motive.
167. White v. Nicholls, 472 U.S. 479 (1985). Smith v. McDonald involved the application
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in a non-antitrust context. The litigation was precipitated by
a series of letters McDonald sent to President Reagan and other federal officials opposing
Smith's appointment as United States Attorney. Smith v. McDonald, 562 F. Supp. 829, 832
(M.D.N.C. 1983). The defendant sent copies of the letters to the President, to several mem-
bers of Congress, to Edwin Meese, then Chief Counselor to President Reagan and chairman of
his transition team, and to William Webster, Director of the FBI. Id. Smith, whose appoint-
ment failed, brought suit against McDonald alleging that the letters contained knowingly or
maliciously false statements. Id .at 832. McDonald claimed that the letters were absolutely
privileged as an exercise of his right to petition. Smith v. McDonald, 737 F.2d 427, 427 (4th
Cir. 1984). Under the common law of North Carolina, where the litigation originated, com-
munications to public officials are entitled only to a qualified privilege. Smith, 562 F. Supp. at
834. The district court and the Fourth Circuit denied McDonald's motion to dismiss the
action. The Supreme Court held that while the right to petition is "cut from the same cloth as
the other guarantees of [the first amendment]," White, 472 U.S. at 482; the right is not in-
tended to provide absolute immunity for libel actions. Id. at 484-85. The Court upheld the
standard that "the defendant's petition was actionable if prompted by 'express malice,' which
was defined as 'falsehood in the absence of probable cause.'" Id. at 485; see also infra text
accompanying notes 351-70.
168. See, eg., Schauer, The Aim and Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U.L.
REV. 562, 563 (1989) ("The defendant in a Sherman Act price-fixing case whose sole activity
consists of transmitting to a competitor the prices her company is about to charge is treated
the same way as any other antitrust defendant despite the fact that her activities were re-
stricted to speech used for the purpose of communicating information.").
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exercise of the right in some instances. Argumentative claims seeking to
advance the principles of representative government hardly seem decisive
becuase underlying Wiley's capture requirement is the desire to preserve
the political legitimacy of governmental process by curbing the abuses of
producer capture. Legislative influence resulting in producer capture
may undermine the political legitimacy of governmental action since spe-
cial interests, and not the electorate, dictate legislative outcomes. 69 The
Noerr doctrine may actually work to undermine the political legitimacy
of government by immunizing interest group lobbying aimed at dis-
torting the flow of information needed for intelligent policymaking.
C. Republicanism
Since interest group influence affects the nature and quality of the
deliberative processes of government, there is reason to question the wis-
dom of an antitrust immunity policy that permits the pursuit of private
interests in the "political" spheres of government to subordinate the pub-
lic good to the pursuit of private interests. A new group of legal scholars
who accept the pessimism of interest group pluralism, but oppose the
pluralistic tradition in American politics, have urged judicial interven-
tion to protect the political process from the abusive practices of power-
ful private interests. Professors Bruce Ackerman, Cass Sunstein, Frank
Michelman, Morton Horwitz, Suzanna Sherry, Mark Tushnet, and
others, 170 have taken a more optimistic stance in arguing in favor of a
169. See Wiley, supra note 4, at 768.
170. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, supra note 102; Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013 (1985); Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825
(1987); Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 15; Michelman, Traces of Self-Government,
supra note 15; Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15; Sunstein,
supra note 3; Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra 15. There is, of course, no unitary approach
that could be called the "republican approach." See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
supra note 15, at 1547-48. Nevertheless, one can seek to describe the general view all republi-
can scholars seem to embrace. Id. at 1548.
In developing the republican approach relevant to this Article, I have focused almost
exclusively on Professor Sunstein's scholarship because his scholarship focuses mainly on
problems involving interest group politics in the legislative branch of government. Other
republicans have focused on the deliberative process in other settings. See, e.g., Michelman,
Law's Republic, supra note 15 (judicial); Ackerman, supra (everyday politics). For this reason,
Sunstein's republican scholarship has the most to offer for understanding interest group
problems relevant to antitrust.
Sunstein's republican scholarship is subject to a variety of theoretical and political criti-
cism. For a criticism of Sunstein's view from the left, see Brest, Further Beyond the Republi-
can Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623 (1988); Mensch & Freeman,
supra note 140, at 581. For criticism from the right, see Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or
the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633 (1988); see also Fallon, Commentary: What Is
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civic republicanism, offering a political conception of interest group gov-
ernment that differs radically from the conceptions claimed by both opti-
mistic and pessimistic pluralists.
Republicans argue that the prerequisite of sound government should
be the development of a deliberative 7 process that subordinates private
interest to the public good. Interest group influence in the political pro-
cess is a problem to republicans because they believe that interest groups
can corrupt the deliberative process by promoting special interests at the
expense of the common good. In their view, pluralism "disregards the
sources and effects of bad preferences, [and thus] produce[s] unaccept-
able [social] results."' 172 While republicans accept the pessimism of pub-
lic choice theorists, they question the premise that the political process
can be understood as merely a strategic interaction aimed at reaching
bargains between competing groups.
Republicans argue that pluralists of all stripes mistakenly assume
that political actors have predetermined or exogenous preferences. The
pluralist system is interpreted by republicans as one of "aggregating citi-
zen preferences" under an approach which "takes the existing distribu-
tion of wealth, existing background entitlements, and existing preferences
as exogenous variables." 173 According to the republican understanding
of politics, preferences are not assumed to be exogenous (independent of,
prior to political activity), rather they are assumed to be shaped and de-
termined by the deliberative process itself.174 According to the republi-
Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); Kahn, Commu-
nity in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 37-43 (1989). Much of this criti-
cism has focused on the failure of Professor Sunstein to develop a comprehensive republican
theory. However, it is quite possible to be critical of Sunstein's particular republican theory
without rejecting what he has to say about interest group pluralism. See also infra text accom-
panying notes 200-03.
171. Republican legal scholars tend to distinguish between two different models of polit-
ical discourse: deliberative and strategic. As Professor Michelman has explained, deliberative
discourse "connotes an argumentative interchange among persons who recognize each to-
gether as equal in authority and entitlement to respect, jointly by them towards arriving at a
reasonable answer to some question of public ordering.., an answer that all can accept as a
good faith determination of what is to be done when some social choice is demanded by the
circumstances." Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument:
The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989). Deliberative dis-
course is neither a method of reasoning nor a cognitive quality; rather it refers to "a certain
attitude toward social cooperation, namely, that of openness to persuasion by reasons referring
to the claims of others as well as one's own." Id. Strategic interaction is the conception of
politics that republicans associate with interest group pluralists and public choice theorists.
172. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1544.
173. Id. at 1543.
174. Id. at 1549. Republicans argue that the deliberative process of government influences
and shapes the prevailing conception of law and politics. For example, Professor Michelman,
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can view, the political process of government requires political actors to
engage in conscious preference selection, but from a critical distance re-
moved from the competing claims of particular interest groups engaged
in political struggle.
Republicans accept the notion that interest groups must be allowed
to participate in the deliberative process of government and make known
their "existing desires" through that process.175 They argue, however,
that the deliberative process must be insulated from undue interest group
influence to allow policy decisionmakers to select preferences, to revise
existing choices "in light of collective discussion and debate, bringing to
bear alternative perspectives and additional information." 176 What is im-
portant to the republican vision of political deliberation, is not that
everything worth saying on a subject be said, but rather that everyone
have an opportunity to speak.
The republican commitment to an aspirational and critical under-
standing of politics, 77 motivates these theorists to advocate a reformist
theory of judicial review. These theorists argue that judges should create
"structural mechanisms" that "would insulate representatives, to a
greater or lesser degree, from constituent pressures, in the hope that they
will deliberate more effectively on the public good."' 17 8 Professor Sun-
stein thus argues that judicial power should be deployed strategically in
focusing on constitutional discourse in the Supreme Court, advances the notion of a "dialogic
tradition" in constitutional law adjudication that gives priority to political engagement as a
"positive human good" necessary for human self-realization. See Michelman, Law's Republic,
supra note 15, at 1503. For Michelman (and for Sunstein) "republican thought thus demands
some way of understanding how laws and rights can be both the free creations of citizens and,
at the same time, the normative givens that constitute and underwrite a political process capa-
ble of creating constitutive law." Id. at 1505. To these republicans, deliberative discourse is
essential for securing fundamental political rights. See, e.g., Michelman, Conceptions of De-
mocracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 452
(1989); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1548-51. It is not clear,
however, whether the deliberative republican ideal is truly distinctive from the theory of liber-
alism that posits that at least some fundamental rights are "grounded in a 'higher law' of trans-
political reason or revelation." Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican
Politics, 41 FLA. L. REV. 491, 492 (1989).
175. For republicans, deliberation is made possible by "civic virtue" in government to be
realized. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1541. "[C]ivic virtue is
necessary for participation in public deliberation, and it is instrumental to a well-functioning
deliberative process." Id. at 1541 n.8. The idea of civic virtue requires the subordination of
self-interest to that of the community. Id.
176. Id. at 1549
177. According to Sunstein, the republican understanding of law is "aspirational and crit-
ical rather than celebratory and descriptive." Id.
178. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 34.
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the legislative spheres of government to minimize the polluting influences
of interest group pressure. 179
Professor Sunstein's specific proposals dealing with campaign fi-
nance regulation are especially illustrative of the type of structural solu-
tions which republicans offer.180 The law of campaign financing
essentially has been deregulated as a result of the Supreme Court's first
amendment analysis in Buckley v. Valeo. 181 In Buckley, the Court was
called upon to review the constitutionality of a federal regulation that
imposed a campaign expenditure ceiling for contributions to candidates
and political parties. The government claimed that the regulation was
premised upon a rational and wise congressional purpose-to equalize
the ability of individuals and groups to influence outcomes in elections by
limiting the amount of political contributions permitted in federal elec-
tions. The regulation was necessary to level the disparities in influence
caused by unequal distribution of wealth in society.182 The government
also claimed that restricting the financial ability of some to further cer-
tain kinds of speech was necessary to promote first amendment interests
in diversity of expression.
The Supreme Court rejected the government's defense of the regula-
tion, finding that the government's claim that regulation might be neces-
sary to enhance the relative voice of others was repugnant to the first
amendment.18 3 Buckley holds that it is an impermissible governmental
purpose for Congress to attempt to equalize the deployment of wealth in
politics. Disparities in wealth, and consequently, the fact that certain
interests might drown out the voices of others, was seen as an acceptable
179. Professor Sunstein argues that "intimidation, strategic and manipulative behavior,
collective action problems, adaptive preferences, or-most generally--disparities in political
influence" attributable to interest group politics should be judicially regulated. Sunstein, Be-
yond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1550. As Sunstein explains his approach to
regulation:
Thus, for example, republicans will attempt to design political institutions that pro-
mote discussion and debate among citizenry; they will be hostile to systems that
promote lawmaking as 'deals' or bargains among self-interested private groups; they
may well attempt to insulate political actors from private pressure; and they may also
favor judicial review designed to promote deliberation and perhaps to invalidate laws
when deliberation has not occurred.
Id. at 1549.
180. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at 883-84; Sunstein, Beyond the Re-
publican Revival, supra note 15, at 1576-78.
181. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Polit-
ical Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (invalidating a congressionally imposed limit on in-
dependent expenditures made by political action committees in publicly financed presidential
elections).
182. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at 884.
183. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49; see also Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at 884.
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consequence of "free expression"-matters that are outside the scope of
relevant inquiry under the first amendment.184 The Buckley Court thus
relied upon the first amendment "marketplace of ideas" notion, with its
strong pluralistic overtones, to support its view that restrictions on the
speech of the wealthy was repugnant to free speech. 185
Several years later, a sharply divided Supreme Court relied upon the
same marketplace of ideas notion to invalidate state regulation placing
limits on corporate political expenditures for public referenda in First
National Bank v. Bellotti. 186 In Bellotti, a majority of the Court con-
cluded that corporate expression should be treated as a form of speech
for first amendment purposes. As a result of decisions such as Buckley
and Bellotti, corporate interest groups have been allowed to exercise un-
regulated political power with the predictable consequence that corpo-
rate political expenditures are more often than not significantly greater
than those of other interests.' 87
184. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at 884; see also M. TUSHNET, supra note
102, at 283.
185. The marketplace of ideas theory has also been an important component of the Court's
commercial speech doctrine. See C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 194.
186. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state statute prohibiting certain corporate political expenditures
held unconstitutional). The Supreme Court, in rejecting a state's attempt to limit the ability of
corporate interests to make expenditures on matters submitted to public referenda, relied upon
the marketplace of ideas theory in finding that "speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a
democracy" is no less protected because it "comes from a corporation rather than an individ-
ual." Id. at 777. The continuing vitality of Bellotti and the question concerning the power of
government to regulate corporate speech has remained in doubt. See, e.g., Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding a government
restriction on the ability of corporate entities to solicit funds for political speech); see C.
BAKER, supra note 93, at 222.
187. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 307-08 & nn. 2-4
(White, J., dissenting); Baker, supra note 13, at 647-48 n.8; see also C. BAKER, supra note 93,
at 222-23 (describing a 1979 public power referendum in Westchester County, New York, in
which a local public utility contributed $1.2 million to defeat the proposal-an expenditure
that was approximately eighty times the $16,000 spent by the consumer group promoting the
proposal). The continuing validity of the pluralistic premises of decisions such as Buckley and
Bellotti now remains in doubt, especially in light of the Supreme Court's most recent decision
dealing with the power of federal and state governments to restrict direct corporate expendi-
tures in political campaigns. In Austin v. Michigan State Chambers of Commerce, -
U.S.L.W. -, No. 88-1569 (March 27, 1990), the Court upheld, six to three, a Michigan cam-
paign finance regulation that prohibited corporations from making direct political contribu-
tions on behalf of political candidates. In rejecting a first amendment claim raised against the
Michigan legislation, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, concluded that the state had a
"compelling rationale" for restricting "the corresive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the corporate form." Id. at -. The Court's deci-
sion in Austin may thus signal a new pessimistic judicial attitude that rejects the optimistic
premises of the marketplace of ideas theory underlying subsequent corporate speech and cam-
paign regulation cases. The Court's decision in Austin was limited, however in that the Court
[Vol. 41
POLITICAL FREEDOM AND ANTITRUST
Without doubt, legal restrictions on campaign expenditures limit the
exercise of speech and thereby constrain the free marketplace of ideas.
Some believe, however, that such restrictions would bring about better,
more just political decisions. 18 8 According to Professor Sunstein, a re-
publican slant to the first amendment would require a different result in
Buckley for that very reason. 189 Buckley as well as Bellotti can be criti-
cized on republican grounds because they lack a compelling normative
justification for allowing naked interest group transfers. In Professor
Sunstein's view, the government should have the authority to regulate
maldistributions in the exercise of political power.
In adopting the language and the logic of the "marketplace of ideas"
concept of the first amendment, the Buckley Court assumed that the ex-
isting distribution of wealth is "natural"; the decision not to intervene in
the political process is conceived as "no decision at all."'190 Because plu-
ralists believe that self-interest motivation will lead to the aggregate good
of society, they assume that governmental intervention in the political
arena to equalize disparities resulting from differences in wealth would be
impermissible. Buckley and Bellotti thus permit deregulation of cam-
paign financing because market ordering is assumed to be the proper
mechanism for both commodities and ideas.
Professor Sunstein objects to the pluralistic premises of Buckley be-
cause those premises disable a useful measure designed to reduce the ef-
fects of income differences in the political process--differences that
left corporations free to make political exenditures through PAC's and other independent or-
ganizations, which raise money from stockholders and corporate officials.
188. See C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 21. Professor Baker argues that a liberty theory of
the first amendment, as distinguished from the marketplace of ideas theory, supports the con-
clusion that restrictions on corporate political speech are necessary to advance the value of
individual human liberty embedded within the first amendment.
189. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1577. As Sunstein
explains:
Under a republican approach to the First Amendment, campaign finance regulation
would be treated far more hospitably. At least some forms of regulation would be
seen as plausible efforts to promote rather than to undermine First Amendment pur-
poses, by counteracting the distortions brought about by expenditures on political
campaigns. A deliberative conception of the First Amendment, incorporating a
norm of political equality, would lead to a quite different analysis from the market-
place model, which has significant pluralist overtones. Above all, the Buckley
Court's hostility to redistributive rationales for regulation would dissipate.
Id. at 1577.
190. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 15, at 884 (describing the logic of the Court's
decision in Buckley). A very similar rationale based on the marketplace of ideas theory was
also instrumental in supporting a sharply divided Supreme Court to invalidate state regula-
tions on corporate speech in Bellott See C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 222.
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republicans find repugnant to the exercise of political freedom. 191 In his
view, the courts should reject "naked interest-group transfers" that redis-
tribute the benefits of legislation on the basis of raw political power, and
nothing more.192 Central to Sunstein's brand of republicanism is the no-
tion that "political equality depends on economic equality."' 193 Sunstein
sees both political equality and economic equality as indispensable to the
promotion of "civic virtue" in government. 194 Sunstein's republican
analysis has direct bearing on the issues raised by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.
The application of the antitrust laws to the lobbying activities in
Noerr involves issues closely analogous to those in Buckley and Bellotti
In Noerr, a private litigant sought to invoke federal law to curb the an-
ticompetitive consequences of a rival's well-financed political activity.
The plaintiff in Noerr, like the government in Buckley and Bellotti sought
judicially imposed limits on the deployment of economic power in the
political arena. In each case, limitations affecting the right to petition
government were disallowed under an interpretation of the first amend-
ment that gave preference to profit-oriented expression. In all three
cases, the Supreme Court assumed that disparities in free expression
caused by differences in economic power are accepted as part of the natu-
ral consequences of a representative government.
Noerr, like Buckley and Bellotti, reflects a view of interest group
politics that assumes that the public interest is achieved in a market-like
preference selection process. In each case the Supreme Court assumed
that political actors act strategically to realize preferences that are endog-
enous to the system. In each case the Court ignored the possibility that
expenditures for lobbying, like product advertising, can shape policy
decisionmakers' preferences in the same way that consumer preferences
191. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1552. Professor Sunstein
has thus argued that equalization of political participation is necessary to correct "a maldistri-
bution of private power that interferes with a well-functioning political marketplace." Sun-
stein, supra note 131, at 619. The justification for legal regulation of political expression is
premised on the view that maldistribution in political expression is a form of market failure
that must be "corrected in order to perfect the marketplace function of free expression." Id.
192. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 15. By implication, Sunstein's criticism
of Buckley should apply to the commercial speech doctrine of Bellotti that has allowed corpo-
rate interests to exercise unregulated political power. Both Buckley and Bellotti can be criti-
cized for allowing naked interest group transfers to go unregulated.
193. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1553. This does not mean
that Professor Sunstein believes in economic equality in the sense that everyone have the same
amount of scarce resources in society. Rather, the notion is that economic differences should
have as little weight as possible in politics.
194. Id.
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are shaped in the marketplace. 195 In this important sense, all three cases
promote a view of government that tolerates, if not encourages, the crea-
tion of legal policy standards indifferent to substantive equality and true
political freedom.
D. Implications-Interest Group Theory and Antitrust
The optimistic premises of the 1960s version of interest group plu-
ralism that characterize the policy underpinnings of the Warren Court's
Noerr-Pennington doctrine can be criticized in light of the theoretical in-
sights now offered by modem theories of interest group pluralism and its
alternative, republicanism. Public choice theorists offer strong reasons
for doubting the claims that optimistic pluralists once asserted about the
ability of special interest groups to generate socially-desirable policy out-
comes by accurately aggregating the social preferences of citizens. Ol-
son's collective action problem and Arrow's impossibility theorem reveal
serious theoretical flaws in the internal logic of pluralist theory: collec-
tive action problems, strategic behavior, agenda problems, and other dif-
ficulties that question the ability of interest groups to ensure that citizen
preferences are accurately represented. On the other hand, the behav-
ioral assumptions that public choice theorists make about political be-
havior are hardly convincing. Public choice theory has been criticized
for its unrealistic assumptions about political behavior, assumptions that
critics claim overlook important aspects of the nature of preference selec-
195. See, eg., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA
L. REv. 1 (1976); see also C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 194-224. It is worth noting that Profes-
sor Baker's analysis of the marketplace of ideas theory in the Supreme Court's commercial
speech decisions led him to conclude that "[t]he extension of first amendment rights to com-
mercial association would ... undermine the foundations of antitrust laws." Id. at 224.
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tion in politics. 196 Critics also claim that public choice theory fails to
perform empirically. 197
Antitrust capture theory is useful in illustrating how Olsonian cap-
ture can be used to expose and criticize the pluralistic premises of interest
group theory that are embedded within the state action doctrine and the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. On the other hand, because antitrust capture
theory is wedded to public choice theory, it too accepts a rather naive
theory of political behavior. I 98 Moreover, like public choice theorists,
196. See Kelman, supra note 145. The weakest point in public choice theory is the as-
sumption that political actors have exogenous preferences. This assumption appears to rest on
a naive theory of human behavior because the theory assumes that economic actors are mutu-
ally independent, capable of forming preferences that exist prior to the inquiry of the analyst.
See Minda, supra note 119, at 12 n.49 (discussing a similar behavioral assumption in the law
and economics movement); see also Kornhauser, Legal Rules as Incentives, in LAW AND Eco-
NOMics 27 (N. Mercuro ed. 1989). Public choice theorists assume that the pre-existing prefer-
ences of autonomous economic actors are the source of "objective" information about desires.
This assumption commits the public choice theorist to the view that rational, self-interested
calculation of individual cost and benefit is the key to understanding and evaluating political
behavior. See also Minda, Toward a More "Just" Economics of Justice-A Review Essay (Book
Review), 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1855, 1866-67 (1989). A more sophisticated behavioral claim
would require the public choice theorist to reject the assumption of exogenous preferences, a
theoretical move which Cass Sunstein has claimed must be made by any theory hoping to
coherently describe the true nature of interest group politics. See Sunstein, Beyond the Repub-
lican Revival, supra note 15, at 1543-44. Such a claim would require judges to reconsider
assumptions embedded in the Noerr doctrine about the independent nature of preference selec-
tion and political practice.
197. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 895. Sunstein, however,
argues that "[t]he empirical work points in both directions," citing evidence suggesting that
sometimes public officials respond to their own conception of the public interest. Sunstein,
supra note 125, at 449 (citing M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION
(1985); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. EcON.
REV. 279 (1984)). As Sunstein admits, there is enough evidence in support of public choice
theory to provide its advocates with evidentiary grounding.
198. Antitrust capture theory has been severely criticized for many of the reasons that
have led others to criticize public choice theory. See, e.g., Page, supra note 163, at 618; Page,
Capture, Clear Articulation, and Legitimacy: A Reply to Professor Wiley, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1343 (1988). For Professor Wiley's reply, see Wiley, A Capture Theory ofAntitrust Federalism:
Reply to Professors Page and Spitzer, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (1988). Critics claim that anti-
trust capture theory gives too much consideration to the goal of economic efficiency or that it
insufficiently explains the relationship between producer capture and political legitimacy. See,
e.g., Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Cap-
ture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (1988). Pluralists, such as Professor Page, criticize
Wiley's state action proposal precisely because Wiley rejects the optimistic premises of interest
group pluralism. See Page, supra note 163, at 629-32. These critics presumably favor a "do-
nothing approach" to interest group problems. But a "do-nothing approach" is unwise, espe-
cially in light of the overwhelming evidence establishing the influence of special interest groups
over the political process. See supra note 3.
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antitrust capture theorists such as Professor Wiley recognize economic
efficiency as the sum total of normative content in substantive justice. 199
The republican alternative offered by Professor Sunstein suggests
how a normative theory of interest groups may be utilized in developing
a restructured legal theory of interest groups-one that promises a
stronger moral and democratic justification.2 0° In rejecting the naive be-
havioral claim of public choice theorists, republicans make insightful
points about the relation between behavior and the prevailing legal and
political culture. Republicans argue that preference selection of political
actors is a function of the existing practices, legal and political, that have
defined the deliberative process of government. These analysts also make
powerful arguments for understanding how pluralism has worked to jus-
tify a system of law that accepts the consequences of disparities in wealth
as a natural and legitimate characteristic of politics. Obviously, the work
of these scholars, especially that of Professor Sunstein, bears relevance to
any serious reconsideration of the theoretical foundations of Noerr-
Pennington.
If legislation is to be understood in terms of "deals" or naked inter-
est group transfers, as public choice and antitrust capture theorists have
argued, then republicans offer a normative argument for advancing a the-
ory of judicial regulation that preserves the essential governmental func-
tion performed by interest group representation, while curbing the
potential abuses such representation may entail. Hence, even if public
choice and antitrust capture theory fail to explain the entire corpus of
political behavior-and they do-the criticism these theories offer is im-
portant to reveal the blind spots in traditional legal analysis inspired by
interest group pluralism.201 Contrary to the right-wing conclusions
drawn by conservative public choice analysts, public choice theory may
ultimately work to support the progressive governmental reforms advo-
cated by republican scholars.
While republican theory may be too inchoate at this time for the
development of a comprehensive legal theory,202 its normative criticism
199. Professor Wiley argues that the normative concerns of equality can be filtered into
antitrust discourse in advancing the dominant antitrust policy objective of advancing economic
efficiency. He claims that while sometimes there is conflict between the efficiency and equality
goals, they are more often than not "congruent." See Wiley, supra note 198, at 1335.
200. While republicans differ in terms of their institutional perspective, see, for example,
Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988), they accept the view that the inspi-
ration of political pluralism has worked to bring about legal results that undermine fundamen-
tal values that any legal system committed to democratic process, economic liberty, and
political freedom must respect.
201. See also Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 900-01.
202. For example, while Professor Sunstein's brand of republicanism offers the promise of
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is extremely important for understanding flaws in the pluralistic premises
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, already weakened by the descriptive
criticism of public choice theory. Anyone concerned about maintaining
the legitimacy of the legislative process must face the criticism of modem
theory and the reality that "[w]e live in a time of widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the legislative outcomes generated by the political process. '20 3
escape from the dilemmas of the pluralist system, Sunstein fails to detail an adequate design or
blueprint for the type of legal restructuring that republicans claim is required to achieve civic
virtue. At this time, all that has been offered is the promise of a new theoretical vision and
proposals advancing modest law reform. Critics on the left argue that Sunstein's republican-
ism does not go far enough in pushing the legal and political system to the goals of substantive
equality and real democratic decisionmaking. See Brest, supra note 170 (Brest's criticism is
more a quibble about the lack of a radical vision in Sunstein's brand of republicanism). Critics
on the right claim that Sunstein's republicanism lacks a coherent substantive understanding of
self-interest and that it is too quick in its rejection of the pluralist theory. See Epstein, supra
note 170 (highly dubious notion that there exists a set of fixed notions of libertarian and eco-
nomic philosophy that define a nonrepublican concept of law). Still others wonder whether
republican criticism will undermine the "authority" of law, or establish a theory that would
"found law in the destruction of the conditions of law." Kahn, supra note 170, at 85 (assumes
that it is possible to separate the republican values from authoritarian notions of law-an
implausible, and highly untenable, assumption).
The most troublesome aspect of Sunstein's republicanism, however, is his claim that a
universal "practical reason" can be designed to enable judges to discover substantively correct
results to legal problems. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1555.
The claim of a universal "practical reason," with its strong Hart and Sacks overtones, may
itself be too "pluralistic" to sustain the normative claims he makes about law. It is not evident
how the community of judges is supposed to develop the "practical reason" needed for discov-
ering civic virtue. Nor is it evident that there exists "out there" a shared consensus of the
common good. There may be no "objective" or "unsituated" perspective "out there" to make
Sunstein's notion of a "practical reason" operational. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 199, at
1600-01; Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1716-18 (1988). Professor
Sunstein believes, however, that judges should be able to discover determinant results by tak-
ing into account the limiting factors of context and culture. See Sunstein, supra note 125, at
441-42. In my opinion, Sunstein's argument on this point discounts the contingent nature of
legal descriptions that seek grounding in context or culture. While the meaning of the law
requires a culture-bound context, culture as a context is boundless. Culture is boundless in the
sense that any given cultural context is open to further redescription. Any attempt to describe
culture will always be subject to a form of criticism that asserts the existence of a different
description of context for establishing a different meaning of culture, criticism now made pop-
ular by the critical legal studies movement. See Minda, supra note 119, at 614, 622; see also
Minda, Crazy Quilts, 2 C.L.S. 54, 59 (Nov. 1989). This is not to suggest that agreement and
commitment are impossible, but that consensus must be won through political struggle. See
Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 256
(1989).
203. Macey, supra note 3, at 223. This is not to suggest that pluralism lacks advocates
who defend against the criticism of modern interest group theory. The pluralistic premises of
the Court's Noerr doctrine have been affirmatively defended by Professor Page. Page, supra
note 163, at 626-44. Page's defense is historical and political-he seeks to show how the plu-
ralistic premises of cases like Parker v. Brown and Noerr can be defended from the position
advanced by James Madison and the Federalists during the ratification debate regarding the
Federal Constitution. Federalists such as Madison were strong supporters of the interest
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The new theories of interest group politics collectively suggest that the
legitimacy of government has been threatened because private economic
power has been allowed to be deployed in the governmental sphere free
of any effective antitrust or other legal restraint. Each theory, in its own
way, reveals flaws in the policy perspective that have justified the deploy-
ment of private economic power in the political arena free of governmen-
tal restrictions.
III. Uncertain Doctrine-The Dilemmas of Pluralism
In recent years, the Supreme Court has exhibited cautious skepti-
cism in applying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to new contexts. While
the Warren Court displayed extraordinary confidence in creating the
doctrine, the Supreme Court has since become increasingly pessimistic
about the wisdom of allowing special interest groups to improperly influ-
ence government for anticompetitive purposes. The Court also has ex-
hibited a marked willingness to establish exceptions and limitations to
police the anticompetitive consequences of interest group petitioning and
to cut off defenses based on Noerr and the first amendment. Subsequent
application of these principles by lower courts has resulted in uncertain
decisionmaking and confusion.2°4 Like modem pluralists, judges have
become increasingly pessimistic about the pluralistic premises that shape
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
A. The Noerr Exception Takes on New Meaning-Sham Litigation
While the Supreme Court has recognized the applicability of the No-
err-Pennington doctrine to the judicial spheres of government, it also has
recognized that an exception to Noerr is required to allow antitrust liabil-
ity to be found in so-called "sham" cases-when litigation is brought on
frivolous and unreasonable grounds.20 5 The lower courts have developed
group pluralism. Republican theorists, however, have now seriously questioned the historical
position advanced by Page. Republican scholars have argued that a non-pluralistic, civic-re-
publican alternative existed at the time of ratification, and that this "republican" alternative
can better explain the constitutional form of government the drafters intended to create by
their founding document. See, eg., Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 15, at 1503-04.
Moreover, modem pluralist theorists as well as republican critics now question the underlying
assumptions that Madison drew in advancing the particular theory of interest groups Professor
Page has identified with the interest groups theory of the Supreme Court. See Page, supra note
163, at 626-44.
204. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 9, at 327-28.
205. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 63, at 41-42. Conversely, the "sham"
exception almost never justifies recovery in the legislative context. Id. This is because the
success of establishing antitrust liability under the sham exception varies depending on which
sphere of government is involved. As Areeda and Turner have concluded, "[i]t is difficult
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a new antitrust theory of regulation to curb the alleged abuses of sham
litigation. This new theory is the curious offspring of an exception to
antitrust immunity that has grown into a full-fledged theory of antitrust
regulation, one premised upon the view that competitors might utilize
litigation as a predatory strategy to destroy a competitor. 20 6
In theory, bad faith litigation might be used to deter the entry of a
competitor in the marketplace in restraint of trade. On the other hand,
the antitrust laws should not be invoked to regulate litigation or adjudi-
catory action that involves genuine, nonfrivolous, or otherwise reason-
able conduct. If the antitrust laws are utilized in this way, the purpose of
antitrust regulation as well as other legislative schemes that depend on
courts or agencies as enforcement mechanisms might be defeated. More-
over, since the private and social cost of litigation may diverge, the legal
theory of sham litigation, focusing as it does on private litigation costs,
may fail to take into account the total social value of litigation. A law-
suit may have a low probability of success and yet have a high social
value in being brought.
There is thus good reason to question the legitimacy of extending
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to litigation. First, it might be argued
that the theory of Noerr should not be invoked in the adjudicatory con-
text because Noerr only immunizes attempts to influence the policymak-
ing functions of government. Noerr should not apply because courts and
enough to identify bad faith resort to the courts. It is even more difficult in the administrative
context where the range of administrative discretion is often exceedingly broad." Id. at 42.
Ironically, the courts have been more willing to disregard Noerr-Pennington immunity and
apply antitrust liability in the judicial sphere under the "sham" exception.
206. For an attempt to develop an economic theory of predatory sham litigation, see
Klien, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context of the Case Law, 6 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 241 (1968). Klien argues that sham litigation can be explained in terms of a
"post-entry strategy" aimed at "raising [the] rival's costs" by forcing the rival to incur higher
litigation costs. Id. at 244. Professor Klien's theory of strategic behavior, however, is incom-
plete. In seeking to raise a rival's costs through litigation, the predator also would be incurring
greater litigation costs, which may or may not offset the rival's litigation costs. If the rival
wins the lawsuit on the merits there is always the possibility that the rival will be awarded
costs. If the litigation is brought for bad faith purposes, there is the possibility that a judge
would levy costs against the predator for bringing a bad faith and malicious lawsuit. Even
Klien recognizes that the social cost of allowing sham litigation is the cost of chilling legitimate
antitrust litigation-a cost that may far exceed the dangers of sham litigation. This is not to
suggest that an economic theory of sham litigation is impossible. Economic models of legal
disputes based on game theory and strategic bargaining theory have made substantial contribu-
tions to understanding the litigation process. See, e.g., A. M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND EcONOMICS ch. 14 (2d ed. 1989); Cooter & Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of
Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989). Unfortunately, the relevant
economic literature has failed to offer a satisfactory economic theory of litigation necessary for
establishing a more persuasive theory of sham litigation. See generally id. at 1094.
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administrative agencies acting in an adjudicatory capacity are thought to
render the type of "political" decisions rendered by legislative and execu-
tive bodies.207 The fear that antitrust regulation might inhibit political
debate may not represent a serious concern in the judicial spheres of gov-
ernment since the adjudicatory functions of government are thought to
be less political and certainly more limited in the type of petitioning
permitted.
The sham litigation cases, however, have led to judicial acceptance
of the idea that the private cost of litigation can itself be imposed on a
rival to accomplish predatory market objectives. In doing so, the sham
litigation issue has spawned considerable confusion and uncertainty. 208
One troublesome question concerns the proper standard for establishing
sham claims. In California Transport, Justice Douglas seemed to suggest
an objective standard that would require proof that the defendants had
brought a "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" to block a competitor's
access to adjudicatory tribunals.20 9 In a separate concurring opinion,
however, Justice Stewart seemed to suggest that a subjective standard
was required to establish that "the real intent of the conspirators was not
to invoke the processes of the administrative agencies and courts, but to
discourage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking
those processes. '210 The crucial difference between these two standards
is that they contemplate different elements of proof for establishing sham
claims. 211
For example, a particularly troublesome question is whether the
sham exception could be invoked to establish antitrust liability in a case
in which only one of a number of claims is challenged as a sham. Fol-
207. The notion that the courts do not render political decisions has now been discredited
by critical legal theorists. See, eg., Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1151 (1985).
208. See, eg., Calkins, supra note 9, at 327-28.
209. California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited., 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972).
210. Id at 518.
211. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 16-22. Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp argue that a subjective standard could condemn either more or less than an objec-
tive standard:
The subjective standard would condemn less where the antitrust defendant be-
lieved honestly, though unreasonably, that he had valid claim to the governmental
action he sought ....
The subjective standard would condemn more where the antitrust defendant
had a reasonable claim in the other forum but did not subjectively know it.
Id at 20. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp argue for an "objective" test that would evalu-
ate the intention of the actor based upon "the expectation of a reasonable person." Id How-
ever, the subjective/objective distinction on which Areeda and Hovenkamp rely is an
untenable distinction. See, eg., Frug, supra note 139, at 1363-68.
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lowing Justice Douglas' suggestion in California Transport, some courts
have concluded that a single baseless lawsuit cannot constitute a sham.212
Other courts have followed Justice Stewart's suggestion, finding that
even a single lawsuit instituted without reasonable cause can establish
sham liability. 213
An even more intriguing set of problems involves whether a suit that
has a basis in law or fact may establish sham liability. While most courts
agree that a successful judicial action is not a sham, regardless of mo-
tive,2 14 it is not clear whether an unsuccessful claim, or the success of one
claim in a pattern of unsuccessful suits, is sufficient to establish sham
liability. The Court emphasized in California Transport that a sham
claim could be established by proof that a baseless pattern of claims was
brought with or without probable cause.2 1 5
In Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works,2 16 Judge Posner of the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that sham liability can be established even if the
underlying lawsuit alleged to be a sham was in fact premised upon a
colorable claim.217 In finding that the common-law tort of abuse of pro-
cess does not require the plaintiff to show that the challenged litigation
was brought without probable cause,21 8 Judge Posner reasoned that "it is
212. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 687-88 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 904 (1983); see also Handler & De Sevo, supra note 8, at 29 n.135
(citing cases in which the courts limited the sham exception to cases involving repetitive litiga-
tion). In Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977), Justice Blackmun and Chief
Justice Burger concluded that a single lawsuit would not be sufficient to give rise to a sham
claim. Id. at 644. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens and three other justices concluded
that the sham exception could be sustained even if only one suit is pending. Id. at 661-62. In
Vendo the Court held that section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982), does not
authorize injunctions against allegedly sham suits pending in state courts. Id. at 645.
213. See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1154-55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 543 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978); National Cash Register Corp. v. Arnett,
554 F. Supp. 1176, 1177-78 (D. Colo. 1983); Handler & DeSevo, supra note 8, at 29 n.137.
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that this is the correct approach, since "a single
lawsuit can be instituted without reasonable cause and injure a rival." P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 27.
214. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 161 (3d Cir.
1984). Some courts, however, have concluded that "success is ... only one factor to consider
in determining whether an action is a 'sham.'" Sunergy Communities, Inc. v. Aristek Proper-
ties, 535 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Colo. 1982). Still others have suggested that success on the
merits "create[s] a presumption that the action was [not a sham]." Manpower, Inc. v. Foley,
212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 445, 449 (D. Mass. 1980); see Handler & De Sevo, supra note 8, at 31.
215. California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 515.
216. 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
217. Id. at 470-71.
218. Judge Posner concluded that "[tihe existence of a tort of abuse of process shows that
it has long been thought that litigation could be used for improper purposes even when there is
probable cause for the litigation; and if the improper purpose is to use litigation as a tool for
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premature to hold that litigation, unless malicious in the tort sense, can
never be actionable under the antitrust laws."'219 To conclude otherwise,
in his view, might contemplate that all nonmalicious litigation is immu-
nized under the first amendment-a result that would question the con-
stitutionality of the abuse of process tort.220
According to Judge Posner, liability for sham litigation should at-
tach only to litigation that would not have been brought but for the in-
jury that a rival suffers from litigation, regardless of outcome.221 In his
view, "[t]he line is crossed when [the plaintiff's] purpose is not to win a
favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and deter
others, by the process itself-regardless of outcome-of litigating. '222
Whether the underlying litigation was with or without probable cause
was irrelevant to Judge Posner's analysis. 223
suppressing competition in its antitrust sense... it becomes a matter of antitrust concern." Id.
at 472.
219. Id.
220. Thus, Judge Posner reasoned that California Motor Transport cannot be read to im-
munize all nonmalicious litigation even if based on probable cause. Handler and De Sevo
argue that Judge Posner's decision in Grip-Pak was based upon "improper assumptions about
both the doctrinal basis for the sham exception and the elements of the tort of abuse of pro-
cess." Handler & De Sevo, supra note 8, at 36. In their view, the Noerr decision was a statu-
tory, not a constitutional decision: "For the question of whether Congress intended to apply
the antitrust laws to petitioning conduct is vastly different, implicating vastly different con-
cerns, than whether that conduct is constitutionally protected." Id. at 37. Moreover, they
argue the tort of abuse of process requires both an ulterior motive and "a definite act or threat
that was not authorized by the process." Id. (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 121 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 & comment a
(1977)).
221. See Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 96-97. Other courts have followed an approach that
seeks to judge the good faith of litigation on the basis of whether the good faith desire of the
plaintiff was a "substantial" or "significant motivating factor." See Coastal States Mktg. v.
Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir. 1983). Professor Hurwitz argues that "[b]oth Coastal
States and Grip-Pak focus less on whether the petitioner's 'vexatious' incentives exceed his
'legitimate' ones than on whether his genuine intent is sufficient, in and of itself, to justify
immunity." Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 97.
222. Coastal States, 694 F.2d at 472. Professor Hurwitz suggests that Judge Posner's ap-
proach is consistent with that taken by the Supreme Court in Walker Process and other patent
cases. Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 96. Walker Process and its progeny did not, however, involve
Noerr-Pennington issues. Indeed, the similarity that Professor Hurwitz notes between these
different lines of antitrust precedent should be cause to wonder whether it makes sense for the
courts to create a special theory of antitrust for sham litigation cases.
223. See Coastal States, 694 F.2d at 472. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have argued
that Judge Posner's reasoning on this point was "very speculative." P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 25. Rather than adopting a categorical rule, Areeda and
Hovenkamp favor a "strong presumption... that successful litigation cannot be a sham." Id.
They posit three powerful reasons for rejecting Judge Posner's position. First, a successful suit
may be the product of "a serious misuse of discovery." Second, "the successful suit may have
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In Judge Posner's favor, it may be said that the common-law tort of
abuse of process provides an apt analogy for understanding the antitrust
theory of sham litigation. On the other hand, Judge Posner failed to
explain why a treble damage remedy under the antitrust laws is needed to
prevent abuse of judicial process. If the theory of sham litigation merely
tracks the tort of abuse of process, then tort remedies are available to
guard against such abuses. While the deterrent effect of treble damages
may discourage illegal conduct, it also may chill legitimate litigation
seeking to enforce important federal policies. Moreover, Judge Posner
failed to provide a meaningful standard to determine when an otherwise
legitimate litigation should be protected from antitrust liability as a form
of political expression protected by the first amendment. It is far from
clear when the line drawn by Judge Posner between legitimate, constitu-
tionally protected litigation and sham litigation would in fact be crossed.
Judge Easterbrook, in Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. Na-
tional Electrical Contractors Association,224 however, took Judge Posner's
analysis to its logical conclusion in finding that the Grip-Pak decision
established that sham liability depends on whether the lawsuit would be
cost-justified:
We elaborated further in [Grip-Pak], holding that a suit brought only
because of the costs litigation imposes on the other party also may fit
the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. We explained
... "many claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for
their own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning,
would be too low to repay the investment in litigation." If the ex-
pected value of a judgment is $10,000 (say, a 10% chance of recovering
$100,000), the case is not 'groundless'; yet if it costs $30,000 to litigate,
no rational plaintiff will do so unless he anticipates some other source
of benefit. If the other benefit is the costs litigation will impose on a
rival, allowing an elevation of the market price, it may be treated as a
sham.
2 2 5
According to the gloss Judge Easterbrook gave to Grip-Pak, anti-
trust liability for sham litigation can be imposed for bringing colorable
claims, if the results of the litigation cannot be justified in terms of a cost-
benefit analysis. In his view, antitrust liability attaches only to litigation
that cannot, after the fact, be cost-justified. Claims having a high market
been wrongly decided." Third, there is also the possibility that the antitrust defendant "con-
spired" with the other tribunal rendering the successful outcome. Id. at 26.
224. 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987).
225. Id. at 372; see also Calkins, supra note 9, at 360 (lawsuit is a "sham" unless objec-
tively cost-justified). Other courts have expressed a contrary view, reasoning that the existence
of probable cause raises at least a rebuttable presumption that an action was not brought for
sham purposes. See, e.g., Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1035 (1987).
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value would foster cost-justified litigation, while claims with a low mar-
ket value would not. Hence, most private antitrust lawsuits would be
cost-justified since the expected value of a treble damage remedy would
be greater than expected litigation costs, especially if those costs can be
recovered. Litigation seeking to vindicate non-pecuniary rights would
probably not be cost-justified since the expected value of a judgment
would be less than the expected cost of litigation. Under this test, even
nonmalicious litigation based on probable cause might give rise to anti-
trust liability if not cost-justified. Easterbrook did not explain why anti-
trust litigants should have the benefit of a federal antitrust claim for
sham liability in some, but not all of these cases. There appears to be
something missing in Judge Easterbrook's analysis of sham litigation.
What is missing is a persuasive rationale for defining sham litigation
purely on the basis of a marketplace analysis. Some litigants seek to vin-
dicate their rights at any cost.226 Moreover, even if litigation is not cost-
justified, it still might realize important social values. The value of estab-
lishing a legal right may far exceed immediate monetary recovery, espe-
cially when a litigant seeks a ruling necessary for advancing federal
statutory policies. Litigation seeking to enforce federal competition pol-
icy may confer societal costs or benefits by maintaining or curbing the
redistributive consequences of monopoly power. A purely economic test
for determining antitrust liability for sham litigation would have federal
competition policy turn on private determinations of costs and benefits
under the single normative standard of economic efficiency.
Such an approach would narrow the right to petition to cost-justi-
fied efficient conduct. It is one thing to hold Noerr inapplicable to judi-
cial and administrative settings; it is quite another to conclude that Noerr
applies in the adjudicatory setting, but only if litigation would be cost-
justified to the plaintiff. In basing the right of petition on an analysis of
private costs and benefits, Judge Easterbrook's construction of Grip-Pak
embraces a highly controversial theory of sham litigation;227 one that ig-
226. See also, Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 107. Noting, however, the great difficulty in fore-
casting costs and benefits, Hurwitz posits these questions:
How does one account for the legitimate strategic and psychological benefits of peti-
tioning, such as the personal satisfaction or formidable business reputation achieved
by vigorously protecting one's rights? In addition, how does one account for com-
plexities such as multiple causes of action or counterclaims; unpredictable litigation
strategies; narrow or expansive statutory interpretations; uncertainties about jury se-
lection, scheduling, discovery scope and results, evidentiary rulings, and the varying
goals, perspectives, and levels of risk aversion held by the parties and their counsel?
Id.
227. The common understanding of sham litigation assumes that antitrust regulation of
litigation is necessary to guard against predators who utilize strategic forms of litigation as an
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nores the potential chilling effect of sham claims in deterring legitimate,
nonmalicious litigation. The sham litigation test advanced in the Seventh
Circuit lacks an acceptable theoretical basis to warrant antitrust regula-
tion of litigation, especially litigation based on reasonable cause.
We do not expect litigants in judicial or administrative proceedings
to engage in the type of lobbying activities that occur in the legislative
setting because we expect judges to be unbiased and uninfluenced deci-
sionmakers. While special interest groups do engage in various sorts of
lobbying activities designed to influence adjudicatory decisions, 228 deci-
sionmakers in the judicial spheres of government attempt to insulate
themselves from such pressures, making legislative-type lobbying less
likely as a strategy of influence. Nor is it apparent that antitrust immu-
nity is needed in the judicial sphere to protect the Court's concern for
"democracy's interest in... governmental access to as many sources of
ideas and information as possible. ' 229 The rules of procedure and doc-
trines of legally relevant and admissible evidence presently limit the
entry-deterring strategy aimed at increasing a rival's costs by forcing the rival to incur greater
costs through litigation. See Klien, supra note 206; see also H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 60, at
158 (arguing that "[s]uch claims are best characterized as mechanisms for raising a rival's
costs disproportionately to those of the incumbent"). Unfortunately, economic models of liti-
gation have labored under an unsatisfactory state of strategic and bargaining theory that has
presented obstacles and resistances for the development of more persuasive theory to justify
the prevailing notions of sham litigation. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 206.
As an entry-deterring strategy, sham litigation may backfire. In seeking to raise a rival's
costs through litigation, the predator would also incur costs, which may or may not offset
those of the rival. If the rival wins the lawsuit on the merits there is always the possibility that
the rival will be awarded costs. If the litigation is brought for bad faith purposes, a judge
might sanction the predator for instituting malicious litigation. Finally, litigation may have a
low probability of success and still represent a high social value in being brought.
228. Non-litigation tactics available to special interest groups seeking to influence judicial
bodies are relatively limited, at least when compared to the variety of tactics and strategies
available to pressure groups lobbying the legislative or executive branches of government. See
D. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 2, at 360. Actions by interest groups seeking to
influence judicial outcomes without filing a lawsuit include picketing the courthouse, institut-
ing letter-writing campaigns, attempts to influence the selection of judges, and attempts to
shape opinion in the legal community about a particular issue or set of issues. Id. at 361.
Grassroots letter campaigns have met with mixed success. The recent letter campaign
spawned by the abortion controversy surrounding the Webster decision suggests the limits of
such a strategy. The practice of some sitting judges is not to read such material. For example,
Justice Black, in response to a similar letter campaign involving a stay of execution in a capital
punishment case, insisted that he would never read letters about a pending decision. Justice
Black announced that "the courts of the United States are not the kind of instruments that can
be influenced by such pressure." Id. (citing Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group
Activity, ANNALS 28-29 (1958)). The same pressure activities occurring in the legislative arena
may be more effective, as the outcome of the failed Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork
illustrates. See, e.g., E. BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989).
229. See Note, Application of the Sherman Act, supra note 9, at 849.
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sources of ideas and information possible in adjudication. Hence, while
adjudicatory branches of government are political forums in which or-
ganized interests are active, 230 such "petitioning activity" is already
highly regulated by a elaborate system of legal rules and procedures
designed to monitor competing claims and interests. In fact, courts and
administrative agencies are careful to minimize the type of pressure tac-
tics that lobbyists utilize in adjudicatory settings.2 31 Finally, judges have
had little difficulty in rooting out forms of sham litigation based on cor-
rupt or unethical predatory conduct.
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,232 for example, plaintiffs sought to block a rival's access to the
market by enforcing a patent privilege allegedly procured through fraud.
The Court found that the assertion of a fraudulently obtained patent
could constitute the offense of attempted monopolization. While judicial
process was utilized as an instrument for creating a barrier to entry in
Walker Process, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was irrelevant to the anti-
230. See D. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 2, at 358.
231. This does not mean that litigation should never be the basis for imposing antitrust
liability. Entry-deterring strategies that rely upon fraud and deception in the enforcement of
legal rulings to block a competitor's access to the marketplace can represent a serious antitrust
concern. Monopolies and cartels cannot exist over time unless they operate behind a barrier to
entry. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); see also H. HOVENKAMP, supra
note 60, at 150-51 (discussing vertical integration as a potential barrier to entry). The an-
ticompetitive potential for single-firm monopolization or concerted attempts to cartelize mar-
kets is not likely to be significant if entry to the market is easy. See, e.g., Dewey, Antitrust and
Economic Theory: An Uneasy Friendship (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 1516, 1521-22 (1978).
232. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). In Walker Process, the Supreme Court held that "the enforce-
ment of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman
Act .... " Id. at 174. Without mentioning Noerr, the Court determined that Sherman Act
liability could be sustained for attempting to restrain trade by enforcing a patent obtained
through fraud. Walker Process thus established a post-Noerr antitrust principle for applying
the Sherman Act to agreements seeking to use litigation as a pre-entry strategy to restrict a
rival's access to the market. A similar holding was reached in United States v. Singer Mfg.,
374 U.S. 174 (1963). But see Fischel, supra note 7, at 112 (arguing that Singer is no longer
good law in light of the Court's decision in California Motor Transport). For a contrary view,
see Bien, supra note 9, at 51 n.35. See also Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). In Woods, the defendants conspired to prevent the
plaintiff from competing in the production of gas from the Appling Gas Field in Texas. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendants had filed false production quotas with a state commission
that regulated the amount of allowable production for each firm. The Fifth Circuit held that
Noerr did apply to protect the defendants from antitrust liability because there was no attempt
by the defendants to influence the policies of a governmental agency. Id. at 1298. Thus, the
defendants filed false information to thwart the application of a rule previously promulgated.
Since Woods was decided before California Motor Transport, it is not clear whether the appel-
late court would have reached the same result today. On the other hand, one can argue that
Woods is controlled by Walker Process, not California Motor Transport, because both cases
involved attempts to thwart the legal application of a rule or right previously promulgated.
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trust issues since the defendant's counterclaim alleged and specifically
identified improper conduct representing a clear antitrust harm. 233 The
plaintiff seeking to enforce an invalid patent in Walker Process was
treated as any other antitrust defendant despite the fact that litigation
was used as the medium for restraining trade.
If there is a danger posed by sham litigation it is the real possibility
that antitrust treble damages may chill others from bringing legitimate
litigation serving important social values. The social cost of this chilling
effect may far exceed the dangers of sham litigation. In the case of anti-
trust litigation, the possibility of treble damage liability for sham anti-
trust claims may work to cancel the social benefits underlying the
deterrent effects of the treble damage remedy for other traditional sub-
stantive antitrust violations. A litigant may think twice before bringing
an antitrust or other legal claim if there is a possibility that the courts
might penalize colorable, but unsuccessful claims, as sham litigation.2 34
The threat of sham liability may magnify the incentives for "settlement
blackmail" by defendants who raise strategic sham claims to force plain-
tiffs to settle them. While bad faith litigation may entail serious dangers,
judges may be capable of monitoring competing interests and, when nec-
233. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 63, at 138 (arguing that "impropriety in
procuring an invalid patent should be deemed an 'exclusionary act' where the patentee misrep-
resented or improperly failed to disclose facts material to patentability, whether or not the
Patent Office thought them material"). Hence, it is irrelevant whether the "Patent Office
might have incorrectly issued the patent anyway." Id.
One might distinguish Walker Process on the ground that it was a special case involving
patents, but the existence of a patent hardly seems the basis for a meaningful distinction. A
more persuasive argument is that Walker Process is distinguishable from Noerr because there
was no attempt by the plaintiff in Walker Process to influence the policies of government. In
Walker Process, the plaintiff filed false information with the patent office with the intent of
monopolizing a market through subsequent enforcement of the patent. When the plaintiff
sought to enforce the patent claim in court, it attempted to establish a right previously promul-
gated. The defendants in Walker Process thus attempted to use litigation as a mere conduit for
perfecting a scheme to enforce a fraudulently obtained patent. There was no claim that litiga-
tion itself was the basis for the antitrust violation. The ex parte filing with the patent office
might be viewed as a form of adjudication. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra
note 78, at 48. That "adjudication" was nevertheless independent of the improper conduct
involved in Walker Process.
234. Empirical studies of private antitrust litigation indicate that antitrust litigation that
has a low probability of success will be discouraged from being brought. See Salop & White,
Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITI-
GATION 3, 19 (L. White ed. 1988). Sham litigation claims may increase the uncertainty of
legitimate antitrust litigation and thereby discourage such litigation. Moreover, the corre-
sponding fears of "extortion by litigation" has limits. "[T]he courts have discretion to make
plaintiffs who file frivolous claims liable for the defendant's expenses .... This sanction re-
stricts the credibility of [a sham] plaintiff's threat." Id. at 28. Nor is it "obvious which side
has the overall advantage" in such cases. Id.
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essary, can invoke a host of existing common-law and statutory remedies
and sanctions to curtail sham litigation.235 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
theory of sham litigation, premised as it is on ideas of cost-justified con-
duct, fails to explain why the judiciary needs special remedies to guard
against abusive litigation. What is needed is a more realistic and believa-
ble theory of sham litigation.
B. Retreat from the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine-Petitioning
Nongovernmental Bodies
The Supreme Court cast some doubt on the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine last term in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 236 In
Indian Head, the Court considered whether Noerr-Pennington immunity
protects attempts to influence the standard-setting process of a private
association for the alleged purpose of driving a competitor from the mar-
ket.237 The legal controversy arose out of the competitive struggle be-
tween two manufacturers of conduit utilized in construction. The
plaintiff, Indian Head, had developed a plastic conduit that threatened
235. A competitor suffering the effects of bad faith litigation could turn to other remedies
for relief. Both federal and state law provide considerable discretion for judges to sanction bad
faith and malicious litigation. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11. In Quadrozzi v. City of New
York, 127 F.R.D. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), a federal district judge recently sanctioned a law firm
under Rule 11 in a class-action antitrust suit for the costs incurred by its adversaries in re-
sponding to frivolous submissions admitted during trial. See Squiers, Sanctions Imposed On
Three Law Firms, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Judges are also authorized by federal
antitrust legislation to award prejudgment interest against parties who multiply issues or act in
other dilatory ways. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989). Antitrust judges are
also permitted to require attorneys personally to pay the costs and fees generated by dilatory or
vexatious conduct. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (West Supp. 1989). There are also established
standards defining unethical conduct in the judicial context. See MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY Canon 7 (1974). Moreover, as Judge Posner has recognized in the
Grip-Pak decision, sham litigation is closely analogous to the common law forms of abuse of
process and malicious prosecution. Finally, the courts have inherent authority to police the
conduct of litigants and attorneys appearing before them. See, e.g., National Hockey League
v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652
(2d Cir. 1983).
236. 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988).
237. The circuits were split on the question of whether the Noerr-Pennington doctrine ap-
plied to immunize petitioning activity before a private standard-setting organization. The
Ninth Circuit, in Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., 827 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987), va-
cated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2862 (1988), concluded that Noerr-Pennington "immunizes
proper lobbying.., of a private association engaged in promulgating an important model code
to influence legislative and executive decisions." Id. at 462. The Secorid Circuit, in Indian
Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1987), afl'd, 108 S. Ct.
1931 (1988), held that Noerr-Pennington does not immunize petitioning activities before
"quasi-legislative [Le., private standard-setting] bodies." The Court's decision in Indian Head
is important because it illustrates how judges have begun to question the basic distinction
drawn in Noerr between private market behavior and political activity.
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the market position of the defendant, Allied Tube, the leading manufac-
turer of steel conduit utilized in the building trades and specifically ap-
proved for electrical transmission by most construction codes. Indian
Head alleged that Allied Tube had conspired with other steel conduit
manufacturers to exclude its product from the market by improperly in-
fluencing a private standard-setting association to delay approval of In-
dian Head's plastic conduit.
The standard-setting association, the National Fire Protection Asso-
ciation (NFPA), promulgates the National Electrical Code,238 which es-
tablishes the product and performance requirements for the design and
installation of electrical wire.239 The Association's Code is routinely
adopted with little or no change as part of the building codes of a sub-
stantial number of state and local governments. 240 Indian Head claimed
that the defendants "packed" a crucial meeting of the Association with
230 persons recruited for the purpose of defeating a proposal that would
have granted Code approval for Indian Head's product.241 The Allied
Tube representatives dominated the meeting and blocked Code proposals
favorable to Indian Head by a vote of 394 to 390.242 The result was that
238. Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1934. The Court noted that NFPA's privately promul-
gated code is "the most influential [electrical] code in the nation." Id.
239. The Code is also used by private underwriters to certify products for insurance pur-
poses. Id.
240. Id. Indian Head was seeking to have the NFPA adopt a new Code standard that
would have approved the type of plastic conduit it manufactured. Id. at 1935. To obtain
approval, a proposal would had to have been adopted at the NFPA's annual meeting, during
which it could have been adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the membership present
at the meeting. The Code is revised every three years by the NFPA through a majority vote of
the membership in attendance at annual meetings. Id. at 1934-35.
241. These individuals were recruited to attend the meeting and to vote against their ad-
versaries' proposals, which they did, to the economic detriment of Indian Head. Id. at 1935.
Allied Tube allegedly paid over $100,000 for the membership, registration, and attendance
expenses of the persons it recruited to attend the meeting. Indian Head, 817 F.2d at 940.
These individuals "were instructed where to sit and how and when to vote by group leaders
who used walkie-talkies and hand signals to facilitate communications." Indian Head, 108 S.
Ct. at 1935. Few had any technical knowledge relevant to the plaintiffs' proposal, and none
spoke at the meeting to give reasons for opposing the proposal. Id. In order to ensure that the
plastic conduit would not receive National Electric Code (NEC) approval, Allied Tube in-
structed its representatives to vote against all proposals for approval without discussion. Id.
Allied prepared box lunches for its representatives so that they would not have to leave their
seats at any time during the meeting. Id. The Allied-controlled members were instructed to
remain in their seats during the meeting until two a.m., when the NFPA voted to reject a
proposed amendment that would have given the association's approval for the use of plastic
conduit. Id.
242. Indian Head, 817 F.2d at 941.
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Indian Head's plastic conduit could not be used in the vast majority of
construction work throughout the nation.243
Indian Head brought suit in district court alleging that the defend-
ants had conspired to restrain trade in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
awarding Indian Head damages of 3.8 million dollars, before trebling.244
The district judge granted Allied's motion for a judgment not with-
standing the verdict 245 finding that Noerr immunized Allied actions be-
cause the NFPA was "akin to a legislature," and because the defendants
had engaged in forms of petitioning activity "consistent with acceptable
standards of political action. '246 The Second Circuit reversed, holding
that Noerr did not apply to immunize petitioning activity before a private
standard-setting organization. 247
The federal circuits were split on the question posed in Indian
Head. 248 The Ninth Circuit, in Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Manu-
243. The economic loss to Indian Head was considerable, since it stood to lose not only the
prospective profits from sales of its product, but also the total investment in research and
product development of a socially valuable product. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected
Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1989).
244. Indian Head, 817 F.2d at 939. The jury, responding to special interrogatories, con-
cluded that Allied Tube's conduct was based, at least in part, on genuine safety concerns.
Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1935. The jury also found, however, that while Allied Tube had not
violated NFPA rules, it had subverted the decisionmaking process of the association. Id. Fi-
nally, the jury concluded that Allied Tube had failed to utilize the least restrictive alternative
for expressing its legitimate concerns of opposition to Indian Head's product. Id. at 1936.
245. The case was submitted to the jury for decision and the jury returned a treble damage
award of $3.8 million for lost profits resulting from defendant's unlawful actions. Id. at 1936.
246. Id.
247. Indian Head, 817 F.2d at 943. The Second Circuit justified its decision on the
"unique nature of petitions directed to the government" in Noerr, involving "concerns that do
not apply with equal force" to private organizations. Id. The court emphasized the fact that
private associations are not politically accountable to the general public and do not have parti-
san safeguards that check the power of private interest groups in the legislative setting. Id. at
944. The court also raised a number of "serious practical problems" that it believed would
arise if Noerr-Pennington applied to private organizations:
How many and which governmental bodies must enact a code before the organiza-
tion takes on a quasi-legislative nature? To what extent does a code have to be en-
acted? If the governmental bodies decide to amend a code before adopting it, how
extensive can the changes be before the members of the organizations lose Noerr-
Pennington protection?
Id. The Second Circuit was of the view that the difficulty of answering such questions was
itself reason for limiting Noerr-Pennington immunity to direct petitioning before governmental
bodies. Id.
248. There are reasons for concluding that private petitions before nongovernmental bod-
ies should be protected by the Noerr doctrine. Petitioning a nongovernmental body is no dif-
ferent from other forms of petitioning protected by the first amendment, especially when the
nongovernmental body is relied upon by a governmental body for information and technical
support. As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp note, "petitioning a private body may be the
April 1990]
facturing, Inc.,2 4 9 disagreed with the Second Circuit's position in Indian
Head, concluding that Noerr-Pennington immunity applies to protect a
private standard-setting organization promulgating Uniform Fire Codes
routinely adopted by governmental authorities. 250 In the Ninth Circuit's
view, private standard-setting organizations are functional partners in
the legislative process such that lobbying activity before such bodies
should generally enjoy the antitrust immunity the Supreme Court
granted to direct lobbying in Noerr. The court, however, acknowledged
that antitrust immunity would be denied if petitioning constituted a
"sham.", 25 1
In Indian Head, Justice Brennan, writing for a 7-2 majority, af-
firmed the Second Circuit's decision.25 2 The Court concluded that Noerr
immunity failed to cover the petitioning activity, not because Noerr was
limited to governmental petitioning as the Second Circuit had concluded,
but rather because the source, context, and nature of the petitioning war-
only effective means of reaching a public one." P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78,
at 76-77. On the other hand, because a private, nongovernmental entity was involved, there are
also reasons for questioning the applicability of an antitrust immunity doctrine designed to
protect political activity within the governmental sphere.
249. 827 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 2862 (1988). The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sessions in light of the Court's decision
in Indian Head.
250. In Sessions, the defendant manufactured metal tanks used for the underground stor-
age of hazardous fluids, including gasoline. Sessions, 827 F.2d at 460. Sessions, the plaintiff,
developed a technique for repairing leaks in such tanks while they were still underground.
Removing a tank to repair a leak was so costly that it would be cost effective to purchase a new
tank if Sessions' underground repair process were not available. The defendant was a member
of a crucial subcommittee of the Western Fire Chiefs Association, a private standard-setting
organization that promulgates uniform fire codes routinely adopted by state and local govern-
ments. Id. at 460-61. Sessions claimed that the defendant improperly influenced the associa-
tion to adopt a safety standard that precluded the use of Sessions' underground repair
technique. Sessions asserted that the defendant utilized deceptive and misrepresented facts to
subvert the organization's process and to otherwise exploit such process through the defend-
ant's membership on the association's subcommittee on safety. Id. at 461, 466, 467. The
Ninth Circuit held that Noerr-Pennington applies to the private standard-setting organization,
but that antitrust immunity would be lost if the petitioning activity was found to be a sham.
Id. at 462, 466-69. The court also concluded that any misrepresentations made by the defend-
ant in the pursuit of its legislative goals were "fully protected under Noerr-Pennington," but
that misrepresentations seeking to influence administrative action of member officials would
not be protected. Id. at 468-69.
251. Sessions, 827 F.2d at 466-69. Hence, while the Second Circuit in Indian Head was of
the view that Noerr-Pennington immunity should be restricted to direct petitioning of govern-
mental bodies, the Ninth Circuit was of the view that Noerr-Pennington should extend to peti-
tioning before "quasi-legislative" bodies performing a generally accepted role in the legislative
process. In the Ninth Circuit's view, such petitioning would be protected by Noerr unless the
petitioner utilized improper means for influencing governmental action. Id.
252. Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1942.
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ranted traditional antitrust scrutiny.253 The Court found that the nature
of the petitioning raised traditional antitrust concerns because it oc-
curred within a private organization comprised of competitors who were
biased by economic self interest in restraining the competition of poten-
tial rivals.254 After considering these factors, Justice Brennan concluded
that "the validity of [defendant's petitioning] efforts must, despite their
political impact, be evaluated under the standards of conduct set forth by
the antitrust laws that govern the private standard-setting process.9 255
Indian Head is significant because the Court announced for the first
time that the Noerr doctrine does not extend to "every concerted effort
that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action. '256 The va-
lidity of petitioning private trade associations in Indian Head was sub-
jected to antitrust sanctions, despite the incidental political effect of the
petitioning, and even though Allied's claim was acknowledged by the
Court to have "some force."'257 The Court rejected the Noerr immunity
claim because Allied and its conspirators had "other avenues" available
for exercising their right of petition through "direct lobbying, publicity
campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression. ' 258 The
majority also emphasized that its decision did not preclude Allied from
presenting the standard-setting organization with accurate scientific evi-
dence or to present its claims in a nonpartisan manner.259 What Allied
was precluded from doing, without exposing itself to antitrust liability,
was "staking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers shar-
ing their economic interest in restraining competition. '260 In opting for
a functional approach that rejects sham considerations, and instead fo-
cuses on the source, context, and nature of petitioning activity, the Court
established a new limit to the Noerr antitrust immunity doctrine.
While the result reached by Justice Brennan is sound, the analysis
he employed to reach that result was far from perfect. Unfortunately,
Justice Brennan authored a cryptic opinion in Indian Head. While he
253. Id. at 1936-38.
254. Id. at 1942.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1938 ("We cannot agree with petitioner's absolutist position that the Noerr
doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmen-
tal action.").
257. Id. at 1942. Justice Brennan stated that the Court had "no difficulty" concluding
that the challenged restraint involved private action since "the restraint [was] imposed by per-
sons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom [had] personal
financial interests in restraining competition" with the plaintiff. Id. at 1938.
258. Id. at 1942.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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agreed with the Second Circuit that the private association could not be
treated as a "quasi-public" body merely because "legislatures routinely
adopt the Code the Association adopts,"' 26 1 he accepted the view that
Noerr immunity might apply if the Allied's commercial interests "were
incidental to a valid effort to influence governmental action. ' 262 On the
other hand, Justice Brennan also concluded that Noerr immunity should
be denied if the nature and context of the conduct in question "can more
aptly be characterized as commercial activity with a political impact. 263
Since the antitrust problem in Indian Head involved subversion of the
decisionmaking process of the standard-setting organization by Allied, as
Justice Brennan acknowledged at the conclusion of his opinion, why en-
gage in the burdensome analysis of factors seeking to establish the com-
mercial character of conduct? Withheld was the key to determining
when the context and nature of the activity justifies denying Noerr immu-
nity to petitioning activity before a private standard setting process, and
the relevance of improper petitioning conduct. 264
261. Id. at 1937.
262. Id. at 1938. The Court thus rejected the absolutist position of the Second Circuit that
Noerr-Pennington immunity was limited to direct petitioning before governmental bodies. On
the other hand, the Court also rejected the equally absolutist position that "the Noerr doctrine
immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action."
Id. at 1938.
263. Id. at 1941. Indian Head was, of course, complicated by the fact that governmental
entities routinely adopt the code standards of the NFPA. Characterizing Allied Tube's con-
duct as commercial activity merely because the petitioning took place in a private context
would overlook the reality that Allied's petitioning was incidental to a genuine attempt to
influence governmental action. On the other hand, it was far from clear whether injuries to the
antitrust plaintiff were caused by governmental or private action. The exclusion of Indian
Head's product from the market was the result of governmental action, but that action was
influenced by the decisions reached by the private association. Justice Brennan was thus right
to recognize that Allied's "claim to Noerr immunity [had] some force," even though he was
also justified in expressing concern about the validity of Allied's conduct in the context of a
private association. Id. at 1938-39.
264. Indian Head creates unnecessary uncertainty. The plaintiff's allegation should have
been found sufficient to establish that the defendants' petitioning effort was based on a preda-
tory market design seeking to capture the benefits of a private standard-setting process. In
other words, Justice Brennan might have found, as the Ninth Circuit had concluded in the
Sessions case, that Noerr's sham exception denies antitrust immunity when petitioning seeks to
influence governmental action through subversion of the deliberative process of a private stan-
dard-setting organization relied upon by government for model codes. See Sessions, 827 F.2d
at 465. Justice Brennan, however, expressly rejected the Sessions approach. He found that the
petitioners' effort in Indian Head to stack the private standard-setting organization with biased
decisionmakers could not be characterized as sham petitioning, given that a number of state
governments had adopted the code standards of the NFPA as part of their local ordinances.
Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1938. In Justice Brennan's view, Noerr's sham exception is inappli-
cable in cases where a restraint of trade is the result of valid governmental action, id. at 1936
(citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 671), or where the challenged conduct
is based on a genuine attempt to influence governmental action. Id. at 1941 n.10.
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One wonders what relevance, if any, the Noerr doctrine now has in
cases involving petitioning before private standard-setting organiza-
tions.2 65 While Indian Head involved antitrust immunity, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion reads more like a decision dealing with substantive
antitrust violations. The Court concluded that Noerr immunity failed to
protect Allied's petitioning activity because the activity in question raised
a serious anticompetitive harm found in a context routinely regulated by
the antitrust laws.266 Since trade associations have been traditional ob-
jects of antitrust scrutiny, the majority saw no reason to extend Noerr
immunity to protect anticompetitive harms resulting from a conspiracy
to subvert the processes of a private standard-setting association. 267
Despite Justice Brennan's attempt to limit Indian Head to the con-
text of private standard-setting associations, 2 68 his opinion promises to
alter the development of Noerr-Pennington jurisprudence. In rejecting
the "absolutist position" that Noerr-Pennington immunizes every con-
certed effort genuinely intended to influence governmental action, Justice
Brennan has created considerable uncertainty not only about the reach of
the antitrust laws to standard-setting activities of private associations, 269
but also about the continued vitality of the Warren Court's immunity
265. Justice Brennan seemed to suggest as much when he stated that "[t]he issue of immu-
nity in this case thus collapses into the issue of antitrust liability." 108 S. Ct. at 1942.
266. In looking to context, Justice Brennan emphasized that "private standard-setting as-
sociations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny." Id. at 1937. He also empha-
sized that "members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain
competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious potential
for anticompetitive harm." Id. This did not mean, in Justice Brennan's view, that the stan-
dard-setting process of private associations will be prevented from performing legitimate gov-
ernmental functions for fear of antitrust violations. According to Justice Brennan, producers
and their private associations are still entitled to the protection of "full antitrust immunity" for
concerted attempts to influence governmental action through "direct lobbying, publicity cam-
paigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression." Id.
267. What distinguished Indian Head from Noerr, in Justice Brennan's view, was the fact
that the petitioning activity occurred in a context in which the nature of the activity gave rise
to potentially greater antitrust harms. The "relevant context" of a private association was
deemed important because members of such associations have horizontal and vertical business
relations that create incentives for conspiracies to restrain trade. Id. at 1937 (citing 7 P.
AREEDA, supra note 89, at 343).
268. In a footnote, Justice Brennan emphasized the limited nature of his decision: "Our
holding is expressly limited to cases where an 'economically interested party' exercises deci-
sionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that com-
prises market participants." Id. at 1942 n.13.
269. See Fellman & Durden, Association Standard Setting After Indian Head, ANTITRUST,
Fall-Winter 1989, at 24.
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doctrine itself.270 After Indian Head, it can no longer be said that Noerr
extends to every concerted effort to influence governmental action. 271
The uncertainty surrounding the future of the Noerr immunity doc-
trine prompted a strong dissent by Justice White, joined by Justice
O'Connor. The dissent argued that the majority's decision was flatly
inconsistent with the Noerr doctrine.272 In their view, petitioning con-
duct that is otherwise punishable under the antitrust laws either becomes
270. By emphasizing traditional antitrust analysis for judging the validity of the petition-
ing conduct in Indian Head, the Court suggests that Noerr immunity depends on whether the
nature and context of the conduct in question establish a violation of the antitrust laws. This
suggestion may create unnecessary uncertainty by encouraging decisionmakers to confuse anti-
trust immunity analysis with antitrust analysis applicable to substantive violations. Conduct
unprotected by Noerr does not necessarily translate into an antitrust violation; Noerr's immu-
nity protection may be denied, and unimmunized conduct may still be found not to constitute
a substantive antitrust violation. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 81-82 ("An important point, but
one that is easily lost sight of, is that the Noerr-Pennington line of cases concerns the scope of
an exemption from the antitrust laws. It must be emphasized at the outset that conduct unpro-
tected by Noerr does not necessarily constitute an antitrust violation."). If Indian Head is read
as establishing the principle that Noerr immunity is irrelevant if the nature and context of the
conduct violates the antitrust laws, then Noerr would collapse and cease to exist as a meaning-
ful doctrine.
271. While the Court's decision in Indian Head must be understood in terms of its particu-
lar facts, the language and tenor of Justice Brennan's majority opinion casts a spell of doubt
over the continuing validity of Noerr. Justice Brennan acknowledged this in Indian Head; in
concluding that if every genuine attempt to influence governmental action were immunized
under Noerr, then:
[C]ompetitors would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long as they
wished to propose that price is an appropriate level for governmental ratemaking or
price supports . . . . Horizontal conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher
prices or other economic advantages from the government would be immunized on
the ground that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to agree to
the conspirators' terms .... Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal
output restrictions on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the plight of
their industry and spur legislative action. Immunity might even be claimed for anti-
competitive mergers on the theory that they give the merging corporations added
political clout.
Id. at 1939. While some of Justice Brennan's examples seem to stretch to find a connection
with political activity and thus appear farfetched, the more general point he raises about the
necessity of focusing on the anticompetitive consequences resulting from the application of the
Noerr doctrine is important.
272. As Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, stated in dissent:
[T]he point here is that conduct otherwise punishable under the antitrust laws either
becomes immune from the operation of those laws when it is part of a larger design
to influence the passage and enforcement of laws, or it does not. No workable
boundaries to the Noerr doctrine are established by declaring, and then repeating at
every turn, that everything depends on "the context and nature of" the activity ... if
we are unable to offer any further guidance about what this vague reference is sup-
posed to mean, especially when the result here is so clearly wrong as long as Noerr
itself is reputed to remain good law.
Id. at 1944.
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immune from the operation of those laws when it is part of a larger de-
sign to influence the passage and enforcement of laws or the conduct is
nothing but a "sham. ' 273 According to Justice White, the sham excep-
tion denies Noerr immunity whenever the petitioning effort involves "fla-
grant abuse." 274 The majority, however, concluded that the dissent had
"distorted" the meaning of the sham exception in suggesting that it cov-
ers the activity of a defendant who "genuinely seeks to achieve his gov-
ernmental result, but does so through improper means."275
If one accepts the central premises of interest group pluralism, then
Justice Brennan was right to conclude that petitioning efforts to influence
governmental action cannot be characterized as a "sham." Under the
policy underpinnings of the Noerr doctrine, petitioning cannot be a sham
if the activity was genuinely intended to influence governmental action.
The contrary suggestion offered by Justice White in dissent, that the
sham exception should apply in cases where the petitioning effort in-
volved "flagrant abuse," however, also makes sense if one adopts the pes-
simistic view of modern interest group theorists. The disagreement
between the majority and dissent over the proper definition of the sham
exception may involve more than just semantics; the disagreement may
be the glimmer of a shift in judicial attitudes concerning fundamental
conceptions of the nature of interest groups and the role of antitrust reg-
ulation in the political arena.
Indeed, despite their differences, the majority and dissenting justices
in Indian Head agreed on a number of important issues.276 The majority
and the dissent agreed that Noerr immunity applies to genuine petition-
ing activity before private bodies, even if an anticompetitive purpose gen-
erated the activity. The justices also agreed that certain types of
petitioning abuses might support an antitrust violation. Both the major-
ity and the dissent suggested that the abuses in Indian Head were proba-
bly sufficient to sustain a finding of antitrust violation, though the
petitioning was before a private nongovernmental body.277 While the
273. Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1945.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1941 n.10. According to Justice Brennan, the sham exception of Noerr only
describes activity that was not genuinely intended to influence governmental action. Justice
Brennan also noted that the dissent's definition of sham exception, like that of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Sessions, was "no more than a label courts could apply to activity they deem unworthy
of antitrust immunity (probably based on unarticulated consideration of the nature and con-
text of the activity), thus providing a certain superficial certainty but no real 'intelligible gui-
dance' to courts or litigants." Id.
276. See, e.g., P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, § 206.2, at 80 (arguing that
the "dissenting and majority opinions [in Allied Tube] were closer than they seemed.")
277. See Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1941 n. 10; id. at 1945 (White, J., dissenting).
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justices disagreed on critical issues concerning the scope of Noerr immu-
nity and the sham exception, they agreed that improprieties and flagrant
abuses might justify antitrust intervention even if such conduct subse-
quently influences governmental action. Hence, the overall consensus of
opinion among the justices in Indian Head evinced doubt about the wis-
dom of allowing the private interest of producer groups to dictate ulti-
mate governmental policy through domination of private standard-
setting organizations, which can be seen to run counter to the optimism
of the Warren Court in its embrace of interest group pluralism.
C. Retreat from the First Amendment-Political Boycotts and the First
Amendment Defense
The first amendment rationale underlying Noerr-Pennington also
has weakened as the courts have begun to ponder questions concerning
the scope of protection to be afforded profit-oriented forms of political
expression. Beginning in the 1970s, the lower courts created what one
commentator has called a "new" Noerr-Pennington doctrine-"one offer-
ing immunity from civil liability for petitioning activity as long as the
petitioning is not a 'sham.' "278 This "new" Noerr-Pennington doctrine
has in fact worked to extend Noerr by establishing a unique first amend-
ment defense for petitioning activity in addition to Noerr's immunity de-
fense created for political activity. 279
By far, the most significant cases illustrating the development of a
first amendment defense for political activity have involved alleged
"political" boycotts directed against government or private parties.2 80
These cases have required the courts to determine if the first amendment
penumbra of Noerr extends to insulate political boycotts from the reach
of the antitrust laws, or any other law imposing civil liability. Initially,
the lower courts began to recognize a broad immunity principle for polit-
ically motivated activity challenged under the antitrust laws.
278. Note, Right to Petition, supra note 9, at 1256; see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.
Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Noerr immunity protects against tort liability for interference with
advantageous business relations). This new twist given to Noerr-Pennington was in part en-
couraged by the Court's decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731
(1983).
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board
lacked the authority to issue a cease-and-desist order to enjoin an employer's tort action
brought in state court against its striking employees. The Court concluded that California
Motor Transport established absolute immunity for genuine petitioning activity challenged
under state or federal law. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S., at 744.
279. See generally P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, § 113.1, at 3-9.
280. See, e.g., id. at 4-6.
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In Missouri v. National Organization for Women (NOW),2 8 1 for ex-
ample, the Eighth Circuit held that NOW's political boycott of conven-
tion sites within states that had failed to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) was immune from Sherman Act liability even
though the success of NOW's boycott was intended to inflict economic
harm in the offending states.282 In distinguishing Noerr, the NOW court
emphasized that the challenged petitioning activity in Noerr sought to
accomplish legislative objectives that would help the railroads "finan-
cially, economically, and commercially. '283 NOW's boycott was found
to be distinguishable because the ERA was not a "financial," "eco-
nomic," or "commercial piece of legislation," and because the basic ori-
entation of the parties in seeking to support or defeat the ERA was "not
one of profit motivation. '284 The court emphasized that NOW's political
activity did not involve the type of abusive or improper conduct engaged
in by the railroads in Noerr.285
The Eighth Circuit's decision in NOW often is cited for the view
that economic boycotts seeking essentially political objectives are im-
mune from the antitrust laws because neither "the Sherman [nor] Clay-
ton Act[] [was] designed to be applied to noncommercial activities." 286
NOW's boycott may in fact represent the paradigmatic case involving the
type of political activity that the Supreme Court intended to insulate
281. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). See Note, Protest Boycotts
Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 1131 (1980).
282. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1315.
283. Id at 1311.
284. Id. at 1312.
285. 620 F.2d. at 1315. The plaintiffs in NOW never claimed that the defendant NOW
had engaged in sham petitioning. The plaintiffs argument conceded that the sole purpose of
the boycott was to pressure state governments to ratify the ERA. Id. at 1314. The Eighth
Circuit thus found that NOW's boycott was "privileged" by the first amendment right of peti-
tion that the Supreme Court in Noerr had protected when the right "collides with commercial
effects of trade restraints" proscribed by the antitrust laws. .1d. at 1319.
286. H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRusT LAW § 10.2, at 280 (1985)
(emphasis added). See also P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, § 113.1, at 3-4.
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from antitrust liability under the Noerr doctrine. 28 7 The Eighth Circuit's
decision in NOW expressly endorsed such a view.288
A first amendment defense for political boycotts lacking commercial
objectives was recognized by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co. 289 In that case, African-American civil rights groups in
Mississippi instituted a boycott of white merchants who discriminated on
the basis of race. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld a massive com-
mon-law tort judgment of the trial court.290 The Supreme Court over-
turned the verdict on the ground that it impermissibly infringed
expressive conduct ordinarily protected by the first amendment. In find-
ing that the boycott involved constitutionally protected activity, Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, concluded that the "right of the States to
regulate economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition
against a non-violent, politically-motivated boycott designed to force
governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed
by the Constitution itself."' 291 Justice Stevens' Claiborne decision thus
287. The Eighth Circuit in NOW can be seen as establishing an immunity principle based
on statutory construction-the drafters of the Sherman Act never intended their legislation to
regulate noncommercial boycotts solely motivated by political objectives. However, it is rea-
sonably clear that the framers of the Sherman Act were deeply concerned about the abuse of
economic power as a social and political, as well as economic, problem. There is evidence to
support the view that the framers of the antitrust laws were concerned that the unregulated
exercise of economic power was a problem because such power would pose a threat to political
democracy. See Lande, supra note 16, at 98-99; Pitofsky, supra note 16, at 1060-65. The
problem, of course, is that debates about legislative intent on particular issues involved in the
government-petitioning cases are likely to be inconclusive given the ambiguity of the relevant
legislative record. On the other hand, it is extremely doubtful that the drafters of the antitrust
laws intended their legislation to regulate politically motivated or noncommercial forms of
"political" activity.
288. See NOW, 620 F.2d. at 1316. The court read the Supreme Court's decision in Noerr
as establishing a broad immunity principle that insulates "political" activity from antitrust
scrutiny. However, the Eighth Circuit's decision in NOW may be unique in that the plaintiffs
conceded that the defendants' boycott was for the sole purpose of influencing legislation. Id.
Indeed, NOW's boycott was premised upon what the court saw as a clear and unambiguous
political objective-to secure ratification of the ERA. Certainly, one would have to stretch to
argue that NOW's boycott was motivated by profit-oriented objectives. While it is conceivable
that some women members of NOW might reap economic benefits if the ERA were enacted,
the nexus between their economic interest and ratification was tenuous at best. See P. AREEDA
& H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, § 113.1, at 6. The possibility of realized financial gain for
NOW women was never established; and in any event, there would be no financial benefit from
ratification for the men who supported NOW's boycott. Id.
289. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
290. The trial court had sustained a judgment under both state tort and antitrust laws. See
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 890-92. The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to sustain
the judgment under state antitrust law that tracked the language of federal law, concluding
that the United States Supreme Court had "seen fit to hold [that] boycotts to achieve political
ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act." Id. at 894.
291. Id. at 914.
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turned on the fact that the boycott was based solely on political objec-
tives and motives.292
Claiborne Hardware was factually similar to NOW in that the par-
ticipants in both boycotts sought no special economic advantage for
themselves. What was not present was the possibility of a dual motive
boycott; one where the participants of the boycott seek both economic
and political objectives. It is quite possible that most boycotts would be
motivated by multiple purposes and diverse interests.293 Not everyone in
292. The Supreme Court, however, took a seemingly contrary position in a labor case,
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212 (1982), decided the same
term as Claiborne. See Bartosic & Minda, Labor Law Myth in the Supreme Court, 1981 Term:
A Plea for Realistic and Coherent Theory, 30 UCLA L. REV. 271 (1982). In Allied Interna-
tional, longshoremen protesting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan refused to handle cargo on
vessels from or bound for the U.S.S.R. The longshoremen did not seek any labor objective
from the boycotted employers, nor did their union have a dispute with them. The longshore-
men's boycott, like the civil rights boycott in Claiborne, was politically motivated to influence
public opinion about political issues of important concern. In Allied International, the issue
was whether the first amendment protected the boycott from liability under the secondary
boycott provision of federal labor law, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). The violation gives
rise to a damage suit under Taft-Hartley section 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). The Court, in a
unanimous decision, held that politically motivated boycotts by labor could be proscribed as
an illegal secondary boycott under federal labor law. While the civil rights boycott was upheld
in Claiborne on first amendment grounds, the Court in Allied International dismissed the first
amendment claim in a brief paragraph, concluding that "conduct designed not to communi-
cate but to coerce... merits still less consideration under the first amendment." Allied Int'l,
465 U.S. at 226-27. The Court defended its conclusion with the statement that: "The labor
laws reflect a careful balancing of interests... [and there are] many ways in which a union and
its members may express their opposition to Russian foreign policy without infringing upon
the rights of others." Id.
It is true that the different outcomes in the two cases might be explained in terms of
different conclusions judges have reached after balancing interests and making reasonable dis-
tinctions. On the other hand, judicial balancing and reasonableness in this area of the law has
covered a "strongly ingrained, habitual way of thinking," reflecting biases about the constitu-
tionality of regulation. See C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 126 (analyzing the ideology ofjudicial
balancing and reasonableness concerning the constitutionality of regulations of assemblies and
parades). Allied International may illustrate the unstated and unrecognized biases that judges
historically have exhibited against labor combinations. Labor boycotts have been feared
throughout much of legal history because of the power of labor combinations. See, e.g.,
Minda, supra note 139 (discussing the double standard in the law applicable to combinations of
labor and capital). A similar bias has been discovered in first amendment jurisprudence. See
Baker, supra note 13, at 656 (arguing that the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine
has reflected an "unprincipled preference for corporate over union speech"); see also C.
BAKER, supra note 93, at 223 n.143. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(regulation restricting corporate expenditures seeking to influence voting on referendum held
unconstitutional) with Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of similar limitations on labor unions in order to protect dissenting members). .
293. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, § 113.1, at 6. Hence, Professors
Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that the Eighth Circuit's decision in NOW might have come
out differently if evidence established that some of the participants in the boycott stood to gain
financially from the boycott. As they explain: "[S]uppose that the boycotters [in the NOW
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a political boycott shares the group's political aspirations; some may
have a financial interest in the activity. It is also conceivable that the
same individual may be motivated by differing motives: some altruistic
or political, others purely self-interested and economic. Untangling com-
mercial from political intentions may be difficult; judges may not be able
to agree on how to unravel intentions, especially in cases involving con-
certed activity driven by mixed motives and diverse interests. 294 The task
of untangling motives takes on Herculean dimensions when the partici-
pants of a boycott stand to gain economically from a boycott allegedly
designed to advance a political cause that benefits other interests. The
Supreme Court considered such an issue in Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Association v. Federal Trade Commission,2 95 a case involving a mixed-
motive political boycott by a nontraditional labor group.
In Trial Lawyers, a group of private criminal defense attorneys and
their association, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA),
agreed not to represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of
Columbia until the District increased the fees it paid for the lawyers'
services. Under the District of Columbia Criminal Justice Act (CJA),
lawyers appointed by the courts to represent indigent criminal defend-
ants earned fixed rates of compensation established by the legislature.2 96
These rates (thirty dollars per hour for court time and twenty dollars per
hour for out-of-court time) were widely regarded as excessively low. 297
case] included a hotel chain from a state that had already ratified the ERA. To the extent that
the boycott shifted business toward ratification states, the hotelier would gain economically
such that a First Amendment defense should presumptively be denied him." Id.
294. The possibility of multiple actors with different motives raises formidable problems
for judicial decisionmaking. Assuming such distinctions could be made in practice, the courts
would be warranted in denying first amendment protection only to those boycotters having a
financial or economic stake in the outcome of the boycott. When the participants have dual
motives, political and commercial, then the courts would be faced with determining which
motive dominates. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have suggested that in cases such as
these the courts should adopt a presumption that the boycott was based on an economic mo-
tive, justifying the denial of first amendment protection. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 78, § 113.1, at 7. The presumption would then be "defeated only when the eco-
nomic motives appear trivial in comparison with clearly established political motives." Id. It
is far from evident, however, that a motivation test based on the "weight" of motive is any
more workable. There is the very real danger that judges, forced by the necessity of rendering
a decision, might rely upon their own subjective intuition in assessing whether the commercial
motive underlying a political boycott is de minimis or substantial. Those judges who seek to
make careful distinctions would be faced with the burdensome task of analyzing the motives of
each participant in the boycott, only to discover that the value of political expression cannot be
easily weighed.
295. 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
296. Id. at 771. Most appointments went to approximately 100 lawyers ("CJA regulars"),
even though more than 1200 registered for CJA appointments. Id.
297. The fees were established by the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (18 U.S.C.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
POLITICAL FREEDOM AND ANTITRUST
While most politicians, including Mayor Barry, expressed sympathy for
the plight of CJA lawyers, legislative proposals to increase lawyer's rates
failed because governmental officials believed that the political climate
would not support increased governmental expenditures, especially in a
period of fiscal austerity. 298
After unsuccessful attempts to raise lawyer fees through direct lob-
bying efforts, CJA lawyers and their association voted to create a "strike
committee. 2 99 The committee thereupon agreed that the only "viable
way" of getting an increase in fees was to boycott new CJA appoint-
ments. 300 A petition announcing the lawyers boycott was distributed to
the media and public. Within ten days after the boycott, a number of key
officials in the District's criminal justice system publicly announced that
the District's criminal system was on "the brink of collapse."'301 The
mayor met with members of the lawyers' strike committee and promised
to support legislation increasing their rates.302 The CIA lawyers ac-
cepted the mayor's promise, ending the boycott.30 3 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) then filed a complaint against SCTLA and four of its
officers alleging that the lawyers' boycott constituted an illegal conspir-
acy to fix prices in violation of section five of the FTC Act, which prohib-
its certain "unfair methods of competition. ' 30 4 While the attorneys had
an obvious economic interest in their fees, they claimed that their boycott
was in pursuit of an underlying political objective: to improve the quality
of representation for their indigent clients.30 5 The attorneys argued that
higher attorney fees would allow them to provide their clients with better
representation by allowing each lawyer to give more time to fewer cli-
§ 3006A (1970)). Id. The average CJL lawyer made approximately $20,000 per year before
the boycott. Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 228. As early as 1975, bar organizations in the Dis-
trict began to express concern about the low fees paid to CJA lawyers. Id.
298. Id.; see also id. at 785 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
299. Id at 771.
300. Id. The aim of the boycott was to obtain a "$45 out-of-court and $55 in-court rate
schedule." Id.
301. Id. at 772.
302. Id.
303. The very next day the District of Columbia Council unanimously passed a bill in-
creasing CJA fees to $55 for court time and $45 for other time. Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d. at
231.
304. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). It is interesting to note that Commissioner Pertschuk dis-
sented from the Commission's decision to issue a complaint on the ground that it represented
an "unwise use" of the Commission's scarce resources and because he was of the opinion that a
violation of the Act had not been alleged. 110 S. Ct. at 773 n.7; see also Superior Ct. Trial
Lawyers Ass'n., 107 F.T.C. 562, 612-13 (1988).
305. 107 F.T.C. at 582.
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ents. They also asserted that higher fees would attract better qualified
lawyers.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected the lawyers' argu-
ments, but also denied the FTC's complaint, finding that there was "no
point" in imposing antitrust liability in that "no harm was done." Even
the victims of the boycott, officials of the District, acknowledged that the
net effect of the boycott was beneficial. 30 6  The FTC reversed, finding
that the boycott's purpose and effect was to raise prices and was illegal
per se. 30 7 The FTC concluded that there was substantial anticompetitive
harm caused by the boycott since the city was now required to pay an
additional four million to five million dollars per year in CJA lawyer
fees. 30 8 As a remedy, the FTC entered a cease-and-desist order "to pro-
hibit the respondents from initiating another boycott ... whenever they
become dissatisfied with the results or pace of the city's legislative
process. "309
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the FTC that the attorneys'
boycott constituted an illegal price fixing agreement. The court also
agreed that neither Noerr nor the first amendment immunized such con-
duct from antitrust liability, even if the boycott was also part of an effort
to influence valid governmental action. Judge Ginsburg reasoned for the
majority that under the Supreme Court's Claiborne Hardware decision,
motivation was the "crucial" factor for determining whether the boycott
was protected "political" activity.310  While acknowledging that
306. 110 S. Ct. at 773.
307. Id. In finding that Noerr failed to immunize the boycott, the Commission concluded
that Noerr only protects lobbying or publicity petitioning, not economic boycotts. In deter-
mining that the boycott was intended for economic, not political, objectives, the Commission
found that the boycott was "made up of competitors and the objective was profit." 107 F.T.C.
at 584 n. 108. In the view of the FTC, a political boycott is one "motivated by political, social,
religious or other noncompetitive purpose, and the members of the group lack[ed] a significant
interest in the goal of the boycott." Id. Noerr was also found to be distinguishable on the
ground that the anticompetitive effects of the boycott resulted directly from the action of the
boycotters, and not, as in Noerr, from independent governmental action. According to the
FTC, Noerr failed to cover the lawyers' boycott because "[t]he restraint was on the govern-
ment, not by the government." Id. at 597. The fact that the government, and not consumers,
was the target of the boycott, was deemed irrelevant. The FTC concluded that "[tlhe mere
fact that the government, as the only purchaser of [attorney] services, was the target does not
protect their boycott from regulation." Id. at 599.
308. 110 S. Ct. at 773.
309. Id.; see also 107 F.T.C. at 602.
310. 856 F.2d at 245. There was Supreme Court precedent to support Judge Ginsburg's
reading of Claiborne Hardware. For example, in Indian Head, Justice Brennan found Clai-
borne to establish the principle that politically motivated, as distinguished from purely profit
motivated, boycotts are protected by the first amendment. Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1941.
In finding that Claiborne Hardware failed to protect the petitioning of the private stan-
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"[d]istinguishing between political and economic motives is a daunting
task, ' 311 the majority affirmed the FTC's finding of illegality because the
lawyers' boycott was found to be "motivated primarily by economic self-
interest., 3 12
Since the boycott in Trial Lawyers was found to involve both "ex-
pressive" and "nonexpressive" elements, Judge Ginsburg held that the
lawyers' conduct could be regulated only if a "sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest in regulating the nonspeech expression can justify in-
cidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms," and then only to the
extent needed to protect governmental interests.313 The FTC's finding of
a per se violation thus was reversed and the case remanded for proof of
market power.3 14
dard-setting organization in Indian Head, Justice Brennan stated that the civil rights boycott
in Claiborne "was not motivated out of a desire to lessen competition or to reap economic
benefits... and the boycotters were consumers who did not stand to profit financially from a
lessening of competition in the boycotted market." Id.
311. Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 246.
312. Id. Judge Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the Commission's conclusion that the
lawyers' concerted effort to raise the price of their services merited per se condemnation.
Judge Ginsburg argued that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), ruled against such a result. In O'Brien, the Court affirmed the conviction of a
Viet Nam war protester who burned his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Court-
house for the express purpose of advocating his antiwar views. The Court held that the gov-
ernmental interest in regulating the "nonspeech elements" of conduct justified the incidental
restrictions on first amendment expression. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. Judge Ginsburg read
O'Brien as establishing a general restraint upon the courts requiring them to apply the anti-
trust laws "prudently and with sensitivity" whenever expressive conduct was called into ques-
tion. Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 233-34.
313. Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 248. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, however, argue
that Judge Ginsburg's conclusion on this point may be seriously questioned. See P. AREEDA
& H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, § 113.1, at 8. They argue that "complex inquiries into
power in the actual case seemed unnecessary to vindicate First Amendment interests" since
"boycotts of this character are so likely to be anticompetitive that complex inquiries into mar-
ket power are not worth the cost." Id. at 8-9. On the other hand, Areeda and Hovenkamp
also recognize that a per se application of the antitrust laws in speech-conduct cases might
chill first amendment expression, thus suggesting the appropriateness of "a special rule al-
lowing the defendants to prove their de minimis market power." Id. For a discussion of the
relevance of market power to the petitioning of government cases, see infra notes 412-20 and
accompanying text.
314. Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 253. While Judge Ginsburg admitted that "power of some
sort was surely exercised," he concluded that political power was not the same as economic
power. Id. at 250-51. Judge Silberman, in a separate concurring opinion, rejected the major-
ity's motivation test for determining whether the boycott was protected as "political" activity.
He did so because he found that such an approach would be unworkable. Id. at 254.
Judge Silberman agreed with the majority that the case be remanded to the commission
for proof of market power. Id. However, Judge Silberman rejected Judge Ginsburg's eco-
nomic motivation test for determining the scope of first amendment protection for expressive
boycotts on the ground that the test was unworkable. As an example of the mischief that
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The Supreme Court ruled, six to three, that the trial lawyers' boy-
cott constituted a conspiracy to fix prices that was illegal per se under
section one of the Sherman Act. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the
Court reversed the appellate court holding that the per se rules of anti-
trust were inapplicable for evaluating the boycott,31 5 but affirmed the
lower court's findings that the boycott fell outside the immunity afforded
either by the Court's Noerr doctrine or by the first amendment. The no-
tion that a first amendment defense should be recognized for boycotts
having an "expressive component" was rejected on the ground that such
an exception would create a "gaping hole in the fabric" of the antitrust
laws. 31 6
In rejecting the trial lawyers' antitrust immunity claim, Justice Ste-
vens distinguished Noerr on the ground that the scope of antitrust immu-
nity afforded by Noerr was limited to petitioning campaigns directed
toward obtaining governmental action, when the consequence of the ef-
fort is a restraint of trade resulting from legislation. Justice Stevens rea-
soned that Noerr was inapplicable because the restraint of trade in Trial
Lawyers resulted from private, rather than governmental, action. In his
view, the boycott was the means by which the trial lawyers intended to
restrain trade since the economic consequence of their action would have
lasted even if no legislation had been enacted. 317 Finally, Justice Stevens
emphasized that the trial lawyers' antitrust immunity arguments were
"largely disposed of" by the Court's Indian Head decision, and specifi-
might result, Judge Silberman compared the Supreme Court's decision in Claiborne Hardware
with Allied International, and found these cases irreconcilable. Id.
315. The Court expressly rejected Judge Ginsburg's suggestion that the Court's O'Brien
decision forbade the application of the per se rule of illegality. See supra note 312. According
to Justice Stevens, Judge Ginsburg's antitrust analysis on this point fell victim to "two critical
flaws ... it exaggerates the significance of the expressive component in respondents' boycott
and it denigrates the importance of the rule of law that respondents violated." 110 S. Ct. at
779.
316. Id. at 780.
317. The Trial Lawyers majority thus read Noerr as establishing antitrust immunity for
boycotts seeking to influence governmental action only if conspirators intend to restrain trade
through legislation, as distinct from the petitioning activity itself. As Justice Stevens
explained:
[I]n the Noerr case the alleged restraint of trade was the intended consequence of
public action; in this case the boycott was the means by which respondents sought to
obtain favorable legislation. The restraint of trade that was implemented while the
boycott lasted would have had precisely the same anticompetitive consequences dur-
ing that period even if no legislation had been enacted. In Noerr, the desired legisla-
tion would have created the restraint on the truckers' competition; in this case the
emergency legislative response to the boycott put an end to the restraint.
Id. at 776.
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cally by Justice Brennan's statement that Noerr does not extend to "every
effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action. '318
Justice Stevens also rejected the claim that the boycott was pro-
tected by the first amendment as a form of political expression. Re-inter-
preting his own opinion in Claiborne Hardware, Justice Stevens
concluded that the crucial element in Claiborne was that the civil rights
boycotters "sought no special advantage for themselves .... [but in-
stead] sought only the equal respect and equal treatment to which they
were constitutionally entitled. ' 319 While the lawyers' boycott may have
been the result of "altruistic" motives, "it [was] undisputed that their
immediate objective was to increase the price that they would be paid for
their services. ' 320 Claiborne Hardware thus was distinguished on the
ground that first amendment protection for political boycotts was "not
applicable to a boycott conducted by business competitors who 'stand to
profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted
market.' "321
Hence, while Justice Stevens began his analysis of Trial Lawyers
with the cautious admonition that "[r]easonable lawyers may differ about
the wisdom of this enforcement proceeding, '322 he found little difficulty
in characterizing the lawyers' boycott as a "classic" restraint of trade
subject to the antitrust rule of per se illegality. Since the boycott was
based on an agreement among CJA lawyers designed to obtain higher
prices for their services through their own concerted action, the boycott
was characterized as a horizontal arrangement among competitors to fix
prices. Although the trial lawyers' boycott had "expressive compo-
nents," those components were found not to be unique since communica-
tion was seen to be the "hallmark of every effective boycott. ' 323 Justice
318. IdM (citing Indian Head, 468 U.S. at 503).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id
322. Id. at 774.
323. Id. at 779. For these reasons, the majority rejected the suggestion of the D.C. Circuit
that expressive boycotts were to be scrutinized with sensitivity to first amendment expression.
As Justice Stevens explained:
[W]e cannot accept the Court of Appeals' characterization of this boycott or the
antitrust laws. Every concerted refusal to do business with a potential customer or
supplier has an expressive component. At one level, the competitors must exchange
their views about their objectives and the means of obtaining them. The most bla-
tant, naked price-fixing agreement is a product of communication, but that is surely
not a reason for viewing it with special solicitude .... That expressive component of
the boycott conducted by these respondents is surely not unique. On the contrary, it
is the hallmark of every effective boycott.
April 1990]
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Stevens reasoned that the per se rule of antitrust applicable to price-fixing
applied, rendering claims of social justification or excuse irrelevant to his
analysis.324
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissenting in part,
agreed that the lawyers' boycott was subject to Sherman Act regulation
and was neither immunized by Noerr nor protected by the first amend-
ment. Justice Brennan's disagreement with the majority centered on the
narrow question concerning the appropriate antitrust standard to be ap-
plied for evaluating the legality of the Trial Lawyers' boycott.3 25 Empha-
sizing the critical role that boycotts play in political speech, he rejected
the approach of per se rules since they invariably disguise a presumption
of illegality. He emphasized that the danger posed by per se rules is that
the presumption of illegality ignores the possibility that boycotts might
"operate on a political rather than economic level, especially when the
Government is the target. 3
26
324. Justice Stevens accepted the respondents' claims that "the preboycott rates were un-
reasonably low, and that the increase has produced better legal representation for indigent
defendants ... [and] that without the boycott there would have been no increase in District
CJA fees at least until the Congress amended the federal statute." Id. at 774. As he explained:
"These assumptions do not control the case, for it is not our task to pass upon the social utility
or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements." Id.
325. Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissent, agreed with the majority and Justice Brennan
that the trial lawyers' boycott was neither immunized by Noerr nor absolutely protected by the
first amendment. 110 S. Ct. at 791. Justice Blackmun disagreed that the trial lawyers' boycott
should be judged under the per se rule of antitrust. Agreeing with Justice Brennan, Justice
Blackmun concluded that the trial lawyers were "not merely participants in a competitive
market for legal services" since they were officers of the court and were subject to being or-
dered by the courts to represent indigent clients under "pain of contempt." Id. at 792. In
Justice Blackmun's view, the relevant factors determining the power of the boycott were thus
"political, not economic." Id. On the other hand, Justice Blackmun disagreed with Justice
Brennan's decision to remand for a finding of market power. According to Justice Blackmun,
"[t]he Trial Lawyers' boycott ... was a dramatic gesture not fortified by any real economic
power" since the lawyers, as officers of the court, could not coerce the District to meet their
demands. All that the lawyers could hope to do is force a political decision, i.e., "put the
government in a position where it had to make a political choice between exercising its power
to break the boycott, or agreeing to a rate increase." Id. at 791-92. For these reasons, Justice
Blackmun concluded that he would affirm the D.C. Circuit's judgment insofar as the court
precluded application of the per se rule to the trial lawyers' boycott, but reverse as to the
remand to the FTC for a determination of market power. Id. at 792.
326. Id. at 785. Justice Brennan found that the per se rule of illegality was unwarranted in
Trial Lawyers, given "the possibility that the boycott achieved its goal through a politically
driven increase in demand for improved quality of representation, rather than by a cartel-like
restriction in supply." Id. Judge Ginsburg in the D.C. Circuit also had recognized this possi-
bility in concluding that "it [was] ... possible that, lacking any market power, [the trial law-
yers] procured a rate increase by changing public attitudes through the publicity attending the
boycott"; or that "the publicity surrounding the boycott may have served ... to dissipate any
public opposition that a substantial raise for lawyers who represent indigent defendants had
previously encountered." Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 251. In Justice Brennan's view, the ma-
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Although Justice Brennan was willing to find that the Trial Law-
yers' boycott involved "expressive" conduct deserving first amendment
protection, 327 he agreed with the majority that "a group's effort to use
market power to coerce the government through economic means may
subject the participants to antitrust liability. ' 328 Indeed, though the jus-
tices disagreed about appropriate antitrust standards and their applica-
tion to the facts of Trial Lawyers, all nine justices agreed that the
concerted attempt by lawyers to secure higher wages from government
by boycotting or withholding their services might subject them to anti-
trust liability. 329 Apparently, the Court was convinced that the attempt
to exercise power for profit-motivated objectives even when coupled with
political objectives raised an antitrust concern that justified antitrust regu-
lation of an expressive boycott.
Trial Lawyers thus establishes an important limitation on the first
amendment defense for political boycotts seeking to influence govern-
mental action: concerted activity among competitors to restrain trade by
use of a boycott cannot be defended on the claim that such activity was
intended to communicate a "political" message, even if the message may
be relevant and necessary to governmental decisionmaking. Trial Law-
yers must be seen as a retreat from the first amendment concern that the
Noerr Court expressed for insulating political activity from the antitrust
laws. On the other hand, Trial Lawyers is in keeping with the Court's
Indian Head decision rejecting antitrust immunity claims for anticompe-
titive conduct before a private standard-setting organization. In both In-
dian Head and Trial Lawyers, petitioning outside the legislative context
was subject to antitrust regulation even though political expression was
involved, and despite the fact that such expression was genuinely in-
tended to influence the governmental action.
jority was able to find that the boycott was a market driven attempt to cartelize the market for
lawyer services only by ignoring the long history surrounding the failed attempts of the trial
lawyers to influence the political process in the District to raise defense lawyers' compensation
and the "virtually unanimous support the trial lawyers enjoyed among members of the Bar, the
judiciary, and, indeed, officials of the City government." Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 785-86.
327. Justice Brennan stated that he was "surprised" by Justice Stevens' majority decision
finding that the expressive components of the boycott were not protected speech, since Justice
Stevens in Claiborne Hardware had declared that "[t]he established elements of speech, assem-
bly, association, and petition, 'though not identical, are inseparable' when combined in an
expressive boycott." Id at 789 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 911).
328. Id. at 783.
329. The disagreement between the justices thus centered on the relevant antitrust stan-
dard to be applied-per se or rule of reason as well as the necessity of remanding for determi-
nations of marker power. Justices Brennan and Marshall were of the opinion that the boycott
should be remanded for such a determination; Justice Blackmun concluded that such a re-
mand was unnecessary because the boycott lacked market power.
April 1990]
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Since at least one purpose of the trial lawyer's boycott was to secure
an economic advantage for the participants, the majority found that the
boycott fell outside the first amendment defense recognized in Claiborne
Hardware for politically motivated boycotts. The Court, however, failed
to explain what role, if any, balancing played in its analysis of the first
amendment defense. First amendment protection may be warranted
even if an economic interest is involved, if the economic interest is of a de
minimis nature or clearly outweighed by the importance of the political
message. On the other hand, if balancing is permitted, there is the dan-
ger that it may lead to highly subjective regulation with a resulting chil-
ling effect on protected forms of communication. 330
This is not to suggest that the first amendment distinction the ma-
jority drew between profit-driven and politically-driven boycotts was un-
sound in principle. Boycotts conducted by business competitors for
profit-seeking objectives have never been thought to be protected by the
first amendment, though such boycotts could be seen to involve elements
of expression.33I The fact that conduct may be described as "speech"
does not mean that the expression is protected for first amendment pur-
poses.332 Moreover, profit-oriented forms of commercial expression have
not warranted the same constitutional protection granted other forms of
expression.333 Justice Stevens was thus right in stating that "[e]quality
and freedom are preconditions of the free market, and not commodities
to be haggled over within it.''334
330. If one's right to engage in peaceful communicative activity can be known only after
the fact, te., after one's motive has been scrutinized by the government, the exercise of the
right will be profoundly discouraged.
331. See Schauer, supra note 168, at 563 ("The Defendant in a Sherman Act price-fixing
case whose sole activity consists of transmitting to a competitor the prices her company is
about to charge is treated the same way as any other antitrust defendant despite the fact that
her activities were restricted to speech used for the purpose of communicating information.").
332. Id.
333. This is because profit-oriented forms of commercial expression fail to implicate
human values and interests central to the type of liberty interests one normally identifies with
first amendment values. See C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 223 ("[E]nterprise speech rooted in
the profit-oriented requirements of the market or in instrumental attempts to use property to
exercise power over others fails in principle to exhibit individually chosen allegiance to per-
sonal values and, therefore, should be subject to regulation."). Moreover, the deliberative
processes of government require that human self-determination, rather than the instrumental
concerns of the market, be the generating force of communicative activity. "Permitting mar-
ket-determined political speech is arguably corrupting, particularly to a sphere devoted to
human self-determination, since this speech need not reflect anyone's substantive political
views." Id. at 219.
334. Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 777. Persuasive critiques argue that profit-oriented forms
of expression differ fundamentally from other protected forms of expression found to be essen-
tial for securing individual liberties and political freedoms. A liberty-based theory of the first
[Vol. 41
POLITICAL FREEDOM AND ANTITRUST
While there may be principled reasons for denying profit-oriented
forms of expression the benefit of a first amendment defense, those rea-
sons do not apply to the trial lawyer's boycott because much more than
the lawyers' interest in higher fees was at stake. When workers seek
higher wages they also are seeking to gain control over what happens to
them at the workplace; what is at stake are substantive and democratic
values that transcend the desire for money.335 The trial lawyers boycott
could be seen as an effort on the part of lawyers to assert their interest in
participating in the process of decisionmaking affecting their workplace
interests as well as their professional duties as lawyers. Those interests
and duties were intimately connected to the interests of indigent clients
who presumably stood to benefit from better paid legal counsel. The
profit-motive perspective rooted in the logic of the marketplace fails to
take into account the true nature of the lawyers' interests affected by the
boycott. The flaw in Justice Stevens' analysis of the first amendment de-
fense in Trial Lawyers is that the lawyers' interest in higher fees does not
easily fit into the profit-motivated objectives that justify the regulation of
commercial forms of expression.
Of course, if one conceptualizes the lawyers as mere market partici-
pants motivated by profit-making objectives, then their boycott would
"fit" the Court's profit-motivated model and thus justify the denial of the
lawyers' first amendment defense. Under a marketplace conception, the
boycott would represent a classic restraint of trade-an instrumental at-
tempt by a competitor group to use economic power to raise the market
price of their services. Such a boycott would be "flatly inconsistent" with
the purposes to be achieved by the antitrust laws. Since price-fixing was
an objective of the trial lawyers' boycott, the presumption of antitrust
illegality under the per se rule would seem warranted. Whatever polit-
ical objectives were involved, they would seem incidental when compared
to the forbidden nature of price-fixing conduct; and in any event, they
amendment argues that profit-oriented expression of producer groups deserves less first
amendment protection because "[t]he enterprise's determination of which values to promote
does not depend on either individual or collective visions about what humanity should be but
is instead based on the technical requirements of profit maximization." C. BAKER, supra note
93, at 219. A republican theory of the first amendment argues that profit-oriented expression
should be treated less hospitably since regulating this form of expression may be necessary to
counteract the distortions caused by wealthy speech. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1577
(discussing the republican approach to the campaign finance regulation); see also Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255 ("The First Amendment
does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and
communication by which we 'govern.' ").
335. See C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 223.
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would be irrelevant as a redeeming consideration under the per se rule of
illegality.
There are, however, good reasons for questioning the majority's
characterization of the trial lawyers' boycott. As Justice Brennan noted
in his dissent, the FTC's findings regarding the effect of the boycott left
open the possibility that the boycott achieved its goal, not through a car-
tel-like restriction of supply, but rather through public pressure brought
to bear on a political process paralyzed by the fear that public opinion
would fail to support the lawyers' objective-legislation for higher attor-
ney fees. 33 6 There may have been no less coercive methods of petitioning
available to the trial lawyers for communicating their message.
The problem facing the trial lawyers was that they had engaged in a
long history of attempting to influence governmental action through
more direct petitioning efforts; but those efforts failed because the polit-
ical environment was not conducive to such efforts.337 Direct lobbying
and other more traditional forms of petitioning failed to influence gov-
ernment decisions because public officials (the Mayor, the City Council,
and ultimately the federal government itself) were unsure how public
opinion would react to an increase in attorney fees in the face of a fiscal
crisis. 338 Public opinion failed to react to the subject because the issue of
attorney fees affected only the class of indigent clients. While public offi-
cials acknowledged the lawyers' position, the lack of a political consensus
favored the status quo. The problem was that direct lobbying was
doomed unless and until a political climate was created that would en-
336. Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 785. If Noerr establishes the principle that "no violation
of the Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of
laws," Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135, as Justice Stevens for the majority agreed it does, see Trial
Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 776, then Noerr should have granted the Trial Lawyers' boycott the
same degree of antitrust immunity afforded the petitioning activity of the railroads in Noerr.
In both cases, a private group was seeking to influence governmental action by changing public
attitudes through publicity attending petitioning activities.
337. Justice Brennan emphasized this fact in concluding that the trial lawyers' boycott
"persuaded the consumer of the Trial Lawyers' services-the District government-to raise
the price it paid by altering the political preferences of District officials." 110 S. Ct. at 785.
338. Justice Brennan recounted the largely ineffectual efforts of the trial lawyers to influ-
ence governmental action prior to calling for a boycott. Id. at 785-87. Judge Ginsburg noted
that the Mayor was highly sympathetic to the Lawyers' cause, but that he "indicated that there
was no money to fund an increase." Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 230. Finally, Justice Brennan
also noted that the governmental decision that the Trial Lawyers were seeking to influence was
complicated because it called for political decisions that involved "the Mayor, City Council,
and because of the unique status of the District of Columbia, the Federal Government as
well." Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 785.
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able governmental officials to vote for an increase in CJA lawyer fees
without fear of voter opposition. 339
The trial lawyers' boycott may have been the only effective means
for promoting the interests of the class of indigent clients whose interests
would be promoted by higher lawyer fees.34° Indeed, the class of eco-
nomically disadvantaged clients lacked a representative group to advance
their interest in having better paid and thus more effective legal represen-
tation. The lawyers' boycott may have been the only effective means for
representing the interests of indigent clients before the D.C. legislature
because an Olsonian collective action problem prevented direct represen-
tation of their interests. Since the class of indigent clients would be large,
free rider problems would present an obstacle to their own effective joint
representation. Individual members of the indigent class of clients would
have little incentive to support joint action since participation would. be
costly when compared to the alternative of taking a free ride on the ac-
tion of others. The trial lawyers, on the other hand, had an interest in
representing their clients' interests before the District, but their effort
was doomed in the absence of a grass roots political consensus. If this is
true, then the trial lawyers' boycott should have been seen as legitimate
political activity necessary to solve an Olsonian collective action
problem.
There remains the possibility that the Trial Lawyers decision may be
explained by the emphasis the Court placed upon the unique status of the
government in the underlying dispute. The result in Trial Lawyers might
be understood in light of the fear, expressed by Justice Stevens' majority
opinion, that a contrary decision would leave government vulnerable to
extortion by suppliers of the goods and services they need. 341 In finding
that the "overwhelming testimony demonstrated that [the boycott] al-
most produced a crisis in the administration of criminal justice in the
District," Justice Stevens concluded that the boycott was "flatly inconsis-
tent with the clear course of antitrust jurisprudence. ' 342 The civil rights
boycott protected in Claiborne Hardware might be distinguished on the
339. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent: "Taken together, these facts strongly suggest
that the Trial Lawyers' campaign persuaded the city to increase the CJA compensation level
by creating a favorable climate in which supportive District officials could vote for a raise
without public opposition, even though the lawyers lacked the ability to exert economic pres-
sure." Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 787.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 776. As Judge Ginsburg explained in Trial Lawyers: "Congress surely did not
mean to leave governments so vulnerable to extortion by the suppliers of the goods and serv-
ices they need." Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d. at 240.
342. Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 782.
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ground that the boycott was brought against a private rather than a gov-
ernmental entity.
Privately organized boycotts are obviously coercive events that raise
unique dangers especially when they result in work stoppages of essential
governmental services. The Supreme Court may have felt compelled to
deny first amendment protection to the trial lawyers' boycott to protect
the vulnerable position of the District, dependent as it was on the rendi-
tion of lawyer services, as well as societal interests adversely affected by
the disruption of those services. In Trial Lawyers, however, the govern-
ment had it within its power to terminate the boycott without acceding
to the trial lawyers' demands. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent, "the
government [had] options open to it that private parties do not ... the
boycott was aimed at a legislative body with the power to terminate it
any time by requiring all members of the District Bar to represent de-
fendants pro bono.' ' 343 Hence, even if one were convinced that the
Supreme Court was justified in placing greater emphasis on the fact that
the employer in Trial Lawyers was a governmental entity, there were al-
ternatives available to the government for protecting its own interest as
well as the public interest. It was not necessary to sacrifice the interests
of the participants in the boycott,344 as well as their indigent clients, to
protect governmental interests. In Trial Lawyers, individual liberties and
political freedoms were never fully considered since the Court adopted a
marketplace framework of analysis applicable to profit-oriented
expression. 345
343. Id. at 790. Justice Blackmun, in his separate dissenting opinion, also emphasized
that the District could have ordered members of SCTLA to represent indigent defendants pro
bono. Id. at 791. For this reason, Justice Blackmun was of the opinion that the trial lawyers'
boycott "was a dramatic gesture not fortified by any real economic power." Id.
344. See, e.g., County Sanitation Dist. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, 38 Cal.
3d 564, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, 699 P.2d 835 (1985) (public employee strikes held unlawful under
state law only if the strike was found to pose an "imminent threat to public health or safety").
Hence, while the right to strike and picket has never been accorded absolute first amendment
protection, see, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
306 (1926); see also Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited
Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4 (1984), the withholding of personal services and the association
of individuals for purposes of concerted activity for mutual aid and self-protection is surely an
exercise of personal "liberty" warranting constitutional protection even if the participants
stand to gain economically from such activity. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 578 (10th ed. 1986). While governmental interests may at
times justify limitations on personal liberties, the constitutionality of governmental limitations
should be sustained only after it has been determined that the exercise of individual liberty
would pose an imminent threat to important governmental interests.
345. Indeed, if the trial lawyers' boycott is seen as a case involving an attempt of a labor
group to secure better wages, then the majority's decision would take on a different dimen-
sion-one that rests upon a principle that can be seen to conflict with the "clear course" of
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There are thus good reasons for questioning the application of anti-
trust sanctions to the trial lawyers' boycott. In denying the trial lawyers
the most effective, and arguably the only means of influencing govern-
mental action, the Supreme Court sacrificed the interests of lawyers and
their indigent clients to the needs of government. An unfortunate conse-
quence of the Court's decision is that the trial lawyers may now be forced
to accept whatever wages the District may offer in the future,346 and the
interests of indigent clients in having better paid lawyers will go unrepre-
sented in the District. This possibility was ignored by the majority be-
cause the Court's analytical focus was narrowed by a theory of Noerr and
the first amendment that accepts the logic of the marketplace as an un-
problematic medium for ordering political and commercial activity.
IV. An Antitrust Approach for Limiting Business Predation in
the Governmental Sphere
The notion that the courts should place greater antitrust limitations
upon the right of corporate interest groups to petition government is
neither radical nor unworkable. The idea can be seen to fit within a long
tradition that has justified antitrust intervention in order to correct mar-
ket failures. 347 Markets fail for many reasons, but the reason most fre-
labor jurisprudence. The historic development of federal labor law and policy has been shaped
by the recognition that labor combinations acting unilaterally to secure economic interests
through strikes, boycotts, and other forms of concerted activity should be shielded from anti-
trust liability applicable to restraints of trade imposed by business combinations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). See generally Forbath, The Shaping of the
American Labor Movement, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1159-79 (1989). In rejecting the com-
mon-law bias exhibited against labor boycotts, federal labor policy has firmly rejected the no-
tion that concerted activities of workers should be analyzed under market-based concepts that
treat labor as merely another commodity placed in market competition. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 6 (1982) (Clayton Act) (providing "[t]hat the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce"). In Trial Lawyers, the Court may have unwittingly endorsed the devel-
opment of doctrinal standards that are inherently biased against interests of workers in their
attempt to secure better terms and conditions of employment, a trend that has come to charac-
terize the modem development of labor and antitrust law. See Minda, supra note 139.
The Supreme Court might have avoided these problems by deciding Trial Lawyers as a
matter of statutory construction, similar to the way the Eighth Circuit decided the NOW case,
by holding that the drafters of the Sherman Act never intended the federal antitrust laws to be
applied to boycotts of nonproducer groups seeking to secure better wages and working condi-
tions. In other words, the Court might have found that a labor exception protects the trial
lawyers' boycott from antitrust proscriptions.
346. In principle, such a result would seem to violate due process standards under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments on the ground that it is arbitrary and capricious for government
to sacrifice the employees' interest in a fair wage by depriving them of the joint product of their-
labor. Cf A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 673 (9th
ed., 1981).
347. See, eg., D. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 3, 10-12 (1989). The notion of
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quently cited is externalities. 348  A production externality such as
pollution is the classic example given by economists for market failure.
But externalities need not arise only in production; externalities can arise
in politics as well.349 Public choice and antitrust capture theory, for ex-
ample, provide persuasive reasons for understanding how rent-seeking
behavior of special interest groups creates external effects in the represen-
tative process by silencing certain interests and causing distortions in
governmental deliberation. Legislation that fails to take into account the
total social costs and benefits affected would fail to reflect the public in-
terest; the result would be the enactment of either too much or too little
legislation, or simply the wrong legislation. Republican scholars, focus-
ing on issues of substantive power and substantive powerlessness, argue
that legal intervention is required in the political arena in order to solve
market failure problems resulting from "maldistribution of private power
that interferes with a well-functioning political marketplace. ' 350
Antitrust regulation of concerted attempts to influence governmen-
tal action for anticompetitive objectives can thus be grounded in tradi-
tional antitrust concerns and objectives. Combinations of producers,
seeking to accomplish predatory market objectives through subversion of
government process, engage in a form of nonprice anticompetitive con-
duct that potentially presents the most serious form of market predation.
Petitioning activity for such purposes represents an attempt to use gov-
ernment as an instrumentality for furthering a conspirators' plan to re-
strict trade. In regulating such conduct under the antitrust laws, the
courts would be policing anticompetitive conduct. The standards guid-
ing such regulation would be competition policy, not the general ethical
or moral standards of political conduct. Antitrust regulation of petition-
ing activity in the governmental sphere would transform the Sherman
Act into a new ethical code for regulating political behavior as such.
market failure, as a justification for legal intervention, is not limited to antitrust. One can
understand traditional justification for affirmative action, and legal interventions to ensure sub-
stantive equality, as being premised on the idea of market failure-the notion that -[1]egal
intervention is required because of a maldistribution of private power that interferes with a
well-functioning political marketplace." Sunstein, supra note 131, at 619.
348. An externality has been defined as "a commodity bundle that is supplied by an eco-
nomic agent to another economic agent in the absence of any related economic transaction
between the two agents." D. SPULBER, supra note 347, at 46. The existence of externalities
troubles economists because externalities are viewed as a source of inefficiency in markets. See,
e.g., D. DEWEY, MICROECONOMIcs 221 (1975); Minda, The Lawyer-Economist at Chicago:
Richard A. Posner and the Economic Analysis of Law, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 439, 461-66 (1978).
349. See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 231, at 1523. Political externalities distort the legislative
selection process, undermine the political legitimacy of government, and cause market and
political distortions in the distribution of goods and services and legal entitlements.
350. Sunstein, supra note 131, at 619.
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An effective antitrust immunity doctrine must respect certain legiti-
mate forms of political activity of producers because corporate involve-
ment in governmental policy is both essential and desirable for intelligent
policy decisionmaking. On the other hand, federal competition policy
must be capable of responding to predatory forms of producer expression
designed to bring about illegitimate barriers to entry or other improper
impediments to competition. A selective antitrust immunity doctrine is
warranted to correct political externalities. Of course, critics might ar-
gue that the first amendment establishes a "legal barrier" to a more vig-
orous antitrust enforcement policy. It was, after all, the possibility of a
first amendment question in Noerr that encouraged Justice Black to grant
the railroads broad immunity from antitrust prosecution.
A. General First Amendment Considerations
While the right to petition government enjoys constitutional protec-
tion, the right is not absolute, especially when the exercise of petitioning
interferes with the petitioning rights of others.351 One basis for conclud-
ing that the first amendment grants federal judges the power to regulate
petitioning activity under the Sherman Antitrust Act is that such regula-
tion may be necessary to curb exclusionary forms of petitioning that have
the effect of deterring others from exercising their right to petition gov-
ernment. One might argue, for example, that the railroads' petitioning
effort in Noerr was so extensive in its negative propaganda effect that it
effectively excluded the truckers from the political market. The use of
large petitioning expenditures by the railroads might have "drowned
out" the opposing voices of the truckers by establishing a financial "bar-
rier to entry" in the political arena.352 The first amendment, the argu-
ment goes, should not prevent the Supreme Court from invoking
antitrust laws against the railroads' petitioning activity because antitrust
351. See, e.g., id. at 605 ("A system that granted absolute protection to speech would be
unduly mechanical, treading unjustifiably on important values and goals: consider laws forbid-
ding threats, bribes, misleading commercial speech, and conspiracies."). The idea that the first
amendment compels the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is supported by Justice Douglas' decision
in California Motor Transport. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Justice Doug-
las' first amendment analysis in that case was not absolute, however, for he recognized the
need for an exception to protect other individuals in the exercise of their right to petition. The
sham litigation exception to Noerr was recognized in order to curb the deployment of "power,
strategy, and resources [(of special interests)] to harass and deter respondents in their use of
administrative and judicial proceedings so as to deny them 'free and unlimited access' to those
tribunals." California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511 (quoting plaintiff's complaint); see also
Handler & De Sevo, supra note 8, at 9.
352. Cf M. TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 283.
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remedies should be permitted to protect the petitioning rights of the
truckers.
A variant of this argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo. 353 There, the Court stated in dictum that "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment. ' 354 In Buckley, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of promoting a "public sphere" of unrestricted debate. There is
contrary dictum in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 355 however, suggesting
that governmental regulation may be justified to protect the "public
sphere" of government from expression designed to undermine govern-
mental process. In Bellotti, Justice Powell's majority opinion acknowl-
edged that "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing
corruption, and 'sustaining the active, alert responsibility of the individ-
ual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government' are inter-
ests of the highest importance. '356 Hence, even though Justice Powell
rejected a first amendment justification for governmental regulation of
commercial expression in Bellotti, he acknowledged that an important
exception might apply when commercial expression threatens the ability
of government to choose the most prudent policies.357
Because "corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views
may drown out other points of view," a first amendment rationale exists
to justify restricting corporate political expression if "corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic process, thereby deni-
grating rather than serving First Amendment interests. '358  The
353. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
354. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
355. 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see also infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
356. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-89.
357. See also Note, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and Its Relation to Pub-
lic Discourse, 99 YALE L.J. 925, 939-43 (1990) (authored by Paul G. Stern).
358. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789-90. Indeed, this very rationale was recently adopted by the
Court in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, see note 187 supra, in upholding the
constitutionality of state regulation restricting direct financial contributions of corporations in
political campaigns. In recognizing the "corrusive and distorting effects" of corporate expend-
itures in political campaigns, the Austin Court has called into serious question the pluralistic
premises of the marketplace of ideas logic that dominated the Court's thinking in cases like
Buckely and Bellotti. In fact, justice Powell's dictum in Bellotti may be too stringent. As one
commentator has noted, "[t]he state should only have the burden of showing that the audience
interests that justify protecting [political] advocacy are weaker than those warranting its regu-
lation." Note, supra note 357, at 941.
There are other first amendment decisions that the Court has rendered recognizing the
need to protect public debate against the exclusionary effect of wealthy speech. In NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), for example, the Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia statute
prohibiting the solicitation of legal business as applied to NAACP's practice of financing mi-
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Supreme Court should recognize that the first amendment allows govern-
mental regulation of political expression when the audience interest in
the expression is weak, and the governmental interest in protecting
against the silencing effect of unregulated economic power of the wealthy
is strong. Such an approach is supported by highly regarded authority.
Alexander Meiklejohn, for one, has advanced the position that the first
amendment was designed to protect the deliberative process of govern-
ment "so that the country may be better able to adopt the course of ac-
tion that conforms to the wishes of the greatest number, whether or not it
is wise or is founded in truth. ' 35 9 Others have recognized that the free
speech and press guarantees of the Constitution were designed to impede
rather than advance rent-seeking behavior of special interest groups.360
A more responsive theory of first amendment values, one that seeks
to protect individual liberty rather than marketplace interests, would
place greater need for controlling commercial expression in the political
arena.361 Dramatic differences in wealth and power can serve to shape
nority civil rights litigants. State legislation prohibiting barratry was invalidated because the
Court concluded that "under the conditions of modem government, litigation may well be the
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances." Id. at 430. A
similar principle could be found to justify granting first amendment protection to the civil
rights boycott in Claiborne Hardware. In Claiborne, the civil rights boycott was essential for
advancing equal respect and opportunity for an oppressed minority group. First amendment
protection was necessary to allow a minority interest group to exercise political freedoms es-
sential for substantive equality. See also Sunstein, supra note 131, at 620 (discussing how the
reasoning in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which required free reply
time on discussions of public issues on broadcast time under the FCC's fairness doctrine, con-
flicts with the reasoning in Buckley). According to Professor Sunstein, "Red Lion is based on
an understanding that government regulation intended to promote equality may further first
amendment interests-indeed, may even be required by them." Id. See generally Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107, 157-56 (1976) (developing a
constitutional and normative theory for granting disadvantaged groups equal treatment).
359. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 93-95
(1948), quoted in Macey, supra note 3, at 249.
360. See Macey, supra note 3, at 247-49 (discussing the first amendment scholarship of
Bruce Ackerman, the economic analysis of Buchanan and Tullock, as well as constitutional
text). According to Professor Macey, "[tihe first amendment's free speech and press guaran-
tees also support the hypothesis that the Constitution was designed to impede rather than
advance rent-seeking." Id. at 249. Cass Sunstein argues that the Constitution was designed to
impede the interest group dominance over the political process. Sunstein, Naked Preferences,
supra note 15, at 1689. C. Edwin Baker argues that "[o]nly the enterprise speech rooted in the
profit-oriented requirements of the market or in instrumental attempts to use property to exer-
cise power over others fails in principle to exhibit individually chosen allegiance to personal
values and, therefore, should be subject to regulation." C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 223.
361. Such a theory would seek support from recent arguments that have sought to justify
governmental regulation of pornography. Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Por-
nography and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13-17 (1985). The idea of such work is
based on claims asserting that "first amendment doctrine that refuses to examine issues of
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the preferences that are selected in the market-like ordering process of
government envisioned by pluralists.362 In Noerr, the railroads' publicity
campaign, conducted by a Madison Avenue publicity firm, was effective
precisely because it shaped the preferences of political actors by trans-
forming what they already knew about the trucking industry. The rail-
roads sought to shape preferences through manipulation and
misrepresentation of research data crucial to policy decisionmaking. The
railroads' petitioning created the preferences the railroads wanted by pol-
luting the deliberative process of government with misinformation and
deception. In doing so, the petitioning activity of the railroads had a
potentially corrupting influence on the deliberative process of govern-
ment, distorting the truth of relevant information, and thus subverting
the ability of government to render policy decisions that reflect the public
interest as opposed to the self-interests of the railroads.
In Noerr, the Supreme Court ignored these problems by adopting a
highly questionable conception of political expression. The concept of
political communication endorsed by the Supreme Court in Noerr was
based on the pluralistic understanding of political speech as appealing to
rational capacities: the perception that speech in the political arena
serves a truth-discovery function through the rational assessment of
ideas. The Court failed to consider that the means for expressing ideas
might seek to influence opinion by making appeals to cognitive as well as
noncognitive judgments.363 Cognitive judgments involve rational capaci-
ties that rely upon the discovery and understanding of facts and knowl-
edge about the world.36 Cognitive judgments can be influenced by the
force and persuasion of knowledge as well as through the dissemination
of misleading and false information. Noncognitive judgments do not de-
pend on rational capacities, but instead depend upon irrational emotion
and subjective passion.3 65 Noncognitive expression seeks to influence by
substantive power and substantive powerlessness might be thought to generate an indefensible
system of expression." Sunstein, supra note 131, at 618.
362. See Baker, supra note 195; see also C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 203; V. PACKARD,
THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957); M. TUsHNET, supra note 102, at 291.
363. For a discussion of the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive speech in ref-
erence to pornographic forms of expression, see Sunstein, supra note 131, at 603. See also
Finnis, "Reason and Passion": The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116
U. PA. L. REV. 222, 227 (1960). Professor Sunstein argues that speech that has "purely
noncognitive appeal [should be] entitled to less constitutional protection." Sunstein, supra
note 131, at 603 (footnote omitted); see also Sunstein, The First Amendment and Cognition: A
Response, 1989 DuKE L.J. 433.
364. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 131, at 603 n.87 ("The term 'cognitive' as used here
refers to whether the material is intended to or does in fact impart knowledge in any sense.").
365. Id. at 603 n.88. See generally Peller, supra note 207, at 1155-56 (describing irrational
and rational forms of legal reasoning).
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methods that are designed to shape and change attitudes independently
of rational reason.366
By refusing to consider the corrupting influence of the railroads' pe-
titioning campaign through cognitive as well as noncognitive forms of
communication, the Supreme Court endorsed a theory of the first amend-
ment premised upon a misconceived understanding of what constitutes
the nature of political expression. Political expression that seeks to influ-
ence either cognitive judgment through distortion of important facts, or
noncognitive judgment through appeals to inflammatory or subliminal
emotions, does not deserve the same level of first amendment protection
granted to other forms of political speech. The reason is that these forms
of "political" expression do not involve the communication of substan-
tive knowledge needed for governmental deliberation. Instead, they gen-
erate harms that threaten the deliberative process itself by preventing the
decisionmaker from reaching informed decisions.
If the Supreme Court in Noerr had recognized that certain forms of
political expression can harm democratic processes by undermining de-
liberative discourse, the Court might have concluded that the first
amendment compelled a different result. First amendment values of rep-
resentative government might have led the Court to conclude that the
petitioning activity of the railroads was "low-value" 367 speech that falls
short of the full first amendment protection afforded political expression,
especially when a group of commercial advocates intended to mislead
and distort cognitive and noncognitive judgments of the intended audi-
ence through misrepresentation and misleading advertising techniques.
The Court could have treated the railroads' political expression as a form
of false and misleading petitioning, or simply "sham petitioning," and
regulated it in the same way the FTC regulates misleading forms of prod-
uct advertising.3 68
366. See Sunstein, supra note 131, at 606. Professor Sunstein argues that noncognitive
expression such as subliminal advertising and hypnosis are entitled to less constitutional pro-
tection under the first amendment because such expression is not intended to communicate a
"substantive message" necessary for deliberation. Id.
367. First amendment scholars have recently argued for distinctions between "low-value"
and "high-value" speech. Expression found to have "low value" (e.g., pornography, fighting
words, obscenity, etc.) is not accorded the same full first amendment protection accorded
"high-value" speech. See Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 82 Nw. L. REv. 555 (1989).
While Professor Sunstein classifies political expression as "high-value" speech, see Sunsteiri,
supra note 131, at 604, he also acknowledges that speech can be classified as "low-value" when
important governmental interests justify regulation. Id. It is submitted that political expres-
sion found to be harmful to the deliberative processes of government should be treated as
"low-value" speech because important governmental interests underlie the need for regulation.
368. For example, in a recent case brought against the R.J. Reynolds Company, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission claimed that the Company's use of "advertorials" in advertising that
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Of course, much more than misleading advertising was involved in
Noerr. The activities of the railroads were designed to disrupt the ability
of state governments to render informed policy judgments. By control-
ling the flow of critical information in the legislative arena, the railroads
were able to distort policy thinking on the relevant issues, rendering the
process less likely to survey all the relevant alternatives. By controlling
the flow of crucial information, the railroads were able to engineer and
manipulate actual legislative choices. The substantive value choice ren-
dered in the political arena was facilitated by the deployment of market
power for the particular purpose of restraining trade.
Critics still might dispute the validity of these claims. For example,
it may be empirically unclear whether in Noerr the truckers were really
denied access or simply were not able to counteract the railroads' decep-
tive campaign with equal deception. In a pluralist system, drowning out
is not likely since each contending interest group can appeal for financial
support from the community to finance its petitioning effort. If truckers
were financially unable to raise sufficient funds to counteract the petition-
ing expenditures of the railroads, then it is likely that their views did not
have sufficient support in the community. Hence, critics might still con-
tend the truckers' voices were drowned out not because of the corrupting
effects of special interest influence, but rather because their views were
not accepted in the marketplace of ideas. In the pluralist system, drown-
ing out particular voices, even those of weaker groups, is expected be-
cause the market-like ordering principle of interest group struggle is
assumed to filter out certain ideas that lack support. The fact that cer-
distorted the results of a government-sponsored health test was an unfair method of competi-
tion. The case was settled before litigation was instituted. See Selling or Advising? Dispute
Settled on Tobacco Ads, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1989, at 50. The test, aptly named the "Mr. Fit"
test, conducted by the National Institutes of Health attempted to determine whether a reduc-
tion of three risk factors-smoking, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol levels-could
reduce the incidence of fatal heart disease. Id. The advertisements by Reynolds claimed that
the Mr. Fit Test proved that the scientific link between smoking and heart disease was only an
"opinion," a "judgment" but not "scientific fact." Id. Researchers, however, contended that
the ads twisted their findings. The FTC claimed that Reynolds had misrepresented the study
by omitting important findings of research. Reynolds argued that its advertisements were pro-
tected by the first amendment in that they purported to report on "scientific fact." Id. The
settlement offer was reported to provide "the Government and the health community with a
powerful new tool against the abuse of scientific information by the tobacco industry." Id. See
also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (state
regulation on advertising found to be permissible under commercial speech standards, when
product such as gambling casinos is found to be harmful). But see Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (advertising ban on pre-
scription drug prices violates first amendment commercial speech standards, because
governmental interest in establishing regulation does not outweigh public's right of access to
price information). See generally Schauer, supra note 168, at 566-67 (1989).
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tain groups have more financial resources to advance their views is not a
problem in the pluralist system because it is assumed that "each side of
an issue can appeal for financial support. ' 369
Modem interest group theory would, however, support a contrary
conclusion. Olson's collective action theory suggests that interest groups
will fail to adequately represent every interest since free rider problems
make large interest group organizations less likely to represent the inter-
ests of all affected parties. Arrow's impossibility theorem suggests that
there may be technical obstacles in the operation of majoritarian rule,
especially when several competing groups are advocating alternative pol-
icy proposals. Capture theory suggests that powerful interest groups are
likely to dominate legislative and regulatory processes to appropriate
economic benefits adverse to the public interest. Republican thought
suggests that there may be a "true structural barrier" 370 that prevents all
voices from being heard in a pluralist system of interest group politics.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed to offer any convincing
framework for differentiating appropriate from illegitimate forms of
political influence, especially when economic power is the vehicle for ex-
pression. 371 In Trial Lawyers, for example, the Court endorsed a highly
problematic economic motivation test for determining if an expressive
boycott was protected under the first amendment-a test that failed to
take into account the lessons of modem interest group theory.372 Since
the boycotters had an economic interest at stake, the Court simply as-
sumed that they lacked sufficient first amendment interest to be protected
against governmental regulation.373 It would have been better if the
Court had avoided a motivation-based test and instead focused on
whether political expression produced a harm that is both substantial
and imminent.374 A more principled first amendment analysis of polit-
ipal expression would have commenced with consideration of the inter-
369. M. TUSHNET, supra note 102, at 284.
370. See id. at 285 (arguing that capital markets in a pluralist system are likely to malfunc-
tion: "The capital market is likely to malfunction here because people have to choose between
spending money on political activity and spending it on personal consumption, and the rela-
tively less well off face a more stringent budget constraint that reduces their ability to invest in
a political activity.").
371. See, eg., C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 194-224.
372. See supra notes 336-40 and accompanying text.
373. See infra notes 319-21 and accompanying text. The distinction between political and
economic expression is often unclear and may ultimately depend on the political perspective of
the decisionmaker.
374. This is the standard the Supreme Court employed in determining the authority of the
government to punish political speech in Brandenberg v. Ohio, 295 U.S. 44 (1969) (per
curiam) (reversing conviction of Ku Klux Klan leader for advocating violence). See Sunstein,
supra note 131, at 602.
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ests and dangers served by such expression in terms of both facilitating or
undermining the deliberative process of government. 375 In cases involv-
ing petitioning before legislative bodies, the courts' focus should be on
whether the petitioning activity of a special interest group creates an im-
minent harm to the deliberative process of government that is likely to
undermine democratic processes. Evidence demonstrating that corrup-
tion and abuse in the manner in which expression was communicated
should be highly relevant to such an inquiry.
Critics who claim that the first amendment unambiguously compels
absolute antitrust immunity for political expression advance a conception
of the first amendment overlooking the need of government to regulate
political activity that threatens to undermine governmental processes. 376
Such a view is controversial given the obvious one-sided emphasis it of-
fers for protecting public discourse from regulation, and its correspond-
ing neglect of a legitimate need for protecting governmental process from
the corrupting effects of unregulated economic power.
B. General Antitrust Immunity Principles
A theory of antitrust immunity designed to protect legitimate polit-
ical petitioning by producer interest groups is needed. The first step in
devising such a theory must begin with the realization that governmental
process can be just another marketplace in which firms enter to compete.
In political markets, only those forms of competition that serve to raise
serious antitrust dangers should be objectionable under antitrust laws.
375. In Trial Lawyers, the Court also should have recognized a doctrinal distinction be-
tween boycotts involving producer and non-producer groups. Since commercial expression
seeking profit objectives falls within the category of "low-value" speech, see G. STONE, R.
SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1158 (1986); Sunstein,
supra note 131, at 302, there should be a presumption that producer boycotts are unprotected"
under the first amendment because it is unlikely that constitutionally permissible reasons sup-
port the expressive components of their boycotts. See supra notes 335-36 and accompanying
text (discussion concerning profit-oriented speech in Trial Lawyers). Non-producer boycotts,
those brought by consumer and labor groups, deserve greater protection, especially if collective
action problems prevent the participants from seeking less coercive and more traditional meth-
ods for communicating their message to government.
376. See Fischel, supra note 7. It is more likely the case that it is the pluralistic perspective
of those who defend Noerr on constitutional grounds, not the Constitution as such, that is the
basis of their first amendment defense of Noerr. Pluralism, after all, is already heavily embed-
ded in first amendment jurisprudence, as republican critics have revealed in their examinations
of cases like Buckley v. Valeo. See C. BAKER, supra note 93, at 225; see also Blum, The Divisi-
ble First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach of Speech And Electoral Campaign
Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1357-78 (1983) (discussing the dichotomous structure of
first amendment doctrine and Buckley v. Valeo). First amendment objections raised in opposi-
tion to any attempt to revise the Noerr-Pennington doctrine most likely turn back to assertions
about the pluralist system and the wisdom of market ordering.
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The most serious antitrust danger involving petitioning in the govern-
mental sphere occurs when government is used to erect barriers to entry.
A related danger involves the assertion of economic power to capture
legislative and regulatory benefits. A third danger is that economic
power may be deployed in the political arena to shape and control legis-
lative preferences by distorting the information needed for intelligent pol-
icy decisionmaking.
(1) Identifying Antitrust Harms
Political solicitations and petitioning by producer groups or by a
single firm should be subject to antitrust regulation only if it is estab-
lished that such activity presents substantial anticompetitive harms that
would not have occurred but for the challenged activity.377 Political ac-
tivity designed to distort policy decisionmaking in favor of one producer
group over another should also justify antitrust regulation.
This does not mean that every petitioning misrepresentation war-
rants denying antitrust immunity under the Noerr doctrine. To do so
would bring about what Justice Black in Noerr feared most: an antitrust
law that regulates ethical and moral conduct in the political arena. Mis-
representation occurring in the petitioning activities of producer groups
should be grounds for the imposition of antitrust remedies only if it is
established that the misrepresentations present the danger of trade re-
straints by rendering the political process vulnerable to capture by partic-
ular producer groups. This normally should depend on the nature and
degree of abusive tactics utilized by the petitioners. The limitation of the
antitrust laws should be applied to restrain petitioning activity only to
guard against forms of corruption and "flagrant abuse. ' 378 Hence, in the
absence of improprieties or flagrant abuses, producer groups or a single
firm should be allowed to petition government to enact legislation having
an anticompetitive effect in the marketplace.
Thus, most political activities of special interest groups-solicita-
tions, petitioning, boycotts-should continue to enjoy antitrust immu-
nity. In the NOW case, the Eighth Circuit correctly decided that NOW's
political boycott was immune from Sherman Act liability. The decision
was justified because NOW's activities were legitimate political activities
377. A number of courts have recognized that a knowing submission of false information
to a governmental body may give rise to antitrust liability. See Israel v. Baxter Laboratories,
466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (drug manufacturer); Woods Exploration & Producing Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 1971) (filing of false nomination
forecasts with railroad commission), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); see also P. AREEDA &
H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 62.
378. Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1945 (White, J., dissenting).
April 1990]
designed to influence governmental actions.379 NOW's campaign con-
sisted of direct solicitation by mailings, phone calls, and personal appear-
ances. 380 While the campaign had a substantial effect on convention
revenues, there was no evidence establishing that it was NOW's purpose
or effect to distort the deliberative process of policy decisionmaking or
otherwise misrepresent the nature of information crucial to policy deter-
minations. Finally, the fact that NOW's boycott was comprised primar-
ily of citizen nonproducer groups was a factor that warranted the court's
conclusion that the boycott was of a political character.
The boycott involved in the Trial Lawyers case is admittedly a more
difficult case since the boycott was brought against a governmental entity
and resulted in the termination of an important service performed by the
government (legal representation of indigent defendants). The lawyers'
boycott, however, was a peaceful exercise of concerted activity utilized
by citizens to express political grievances. The lawyers' boycott was also
necessary to represent the interests of indigent clients who lacked an ef-
fective representative group due to Olsonian collective action problems.
Finally, the lawyers' boycott did not involve abusive lobbying tactics
designed to subvert the deliberative process of government, nor was there
any attempt by the lawyers to capture governmental process for purely
private economic advantage. These factors should have favored antitrust
protection under the Noerr immunity doctrine.
NOW and Trial Lawyers should be distinguished from Noerr. In
Noerr, the railroads' petitioning was not "competition on the merits,"
because the railroads' petitioning involved flagrant and highly abusive
conduct that short-circuited the ability of the government to choose be-
tween the competing positions of political actors. Instead of focusing on
whether private or public action is the cause of the restraint, an antitrust
immunity analysis should seek to determine if competitor groups are en-
gaging in solicitation and petitioning activity that poses substantial harm
to the delicate function government performs in maintaining the process
of competition. A narrowly drawn category for sham petitioning should
be excepted from the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
379. The Eighth Circuit concluded that NOW's boycott was immune from antitrust liabil-
ity under the authority established by Noerr. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d. 1301, 1311-16
(8th Cir. 1980). The dissent argued that Noerr failed to establish an absolute immunity princi-
ple and that "a more comprehensive balancing of the important governmental interest" was
required. Id. at 1324 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
380. Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289, 293-94 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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(2) Judicial Recognition of a "Sham Petitioning" Exception
A selective antitrust approach to the government-petitioning cases
should seek to justify the application of the antitrust laws only when nec-
essary to restrain the exercise of economic power evidenced by impropri-
eties in the petitioning process that are found to threaten federal
competition policy. Such an approach can be developed from a "new"
understanding of Noerr's "sham" exception. As previously noted, 381 the
sham exception has been largely ineffective in protecting against preda-
tory conduct in the legislative arena, because the Supreme Court has
used the term to cover only activity that is not "genuinely intended to
influence governmental action. '382 In common usage, however, the
word "sham" means "something that is not what it purports to be; a
spurious imitation; fraud. ' 383 Petitions that distort and mislead legisla-
tive judgment ought to be "shams" because they are not what they pur-
port to be; they are "spurious," and perhaps even "fraudulent." In the
government-petitioning cases, the harm to be protected against involves a
form of petitioning conduct that "corrupts" governmental process.
While antitrust defendants should be allowed to use genuine efforts to
influence governmental action, antitrust immunity under Noerr should be
denied when lobbying and other forms of petitioning involve flagrant
conduct seeking to perfect an anticompetitive conspiracy.384
In ascertaining the actual scope of federal antitrust regulation under
a sham petitioning exception to Noerr, the courts should develop criteria
for identifying forms of abusive and improper behavior that can be used
strategically by special interests in each sphere of government to achieve
anticompetitive objectives. Antitrust regulation under the sham petition-
ing exception should not be misused for purposes of converting the anti-
trust laws into a general ethical code for policing political behavior. The
party seeking to deny the imposition of antitrust immunity should have
the threshold burden of establishing the sham petitioning exception.
An example of how the "sham" exception should be utilized is illus-
trated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Session Tank Liners. 385 In Ses-
sions, the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer of underground storage
tanks had misrepresented crucial information before the private stan-
381. See supra note 205.
382. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931, 1941 n.10 (1988).
383. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1208 (1975).
384. See, e.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711,
721-22 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding a jury instruction that denied Noerr immunity to lobbying
efforts based on "threats, intimidation, coercion, or other unlawful acts"), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 910 (1987).
385. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
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dard-setting organization that was highly relevant and material to the
deliberative action taken by the private association in adopting the safety
standard that blocked plaintiff's product from the market. Evidence also
suggested that the defendant's membership on a crucial subcommittee of
the private organization gave it the ability to capture the benefits of the
association's standard-setting process. The fact that the private stan-
dard-setting association was vulnerable to producer capture, in addition
to the deliberate misrepresentations made by the defendant, alerted the
court to the possibility of petitioning abuse. The Ninth Circuit, however,
emphasized that the sham exception would not apply to deny Noerr im-
munity to petitioning misrepresentations in the absence of evidence es-
tablishing a capture objective.386
In Indian Head, there was similar conduct that should have alerted
the courts to the possibility of opportunistic petitioning seeking regula-
tory capture objectives, though there were apparently no misrepresenta-
tions or distortions. 387 Subverting democratic process by purchasing
votes should have been seen as paradigmatic capture behavior by a pro-
ducer group bent on monopolizing competition. Hence, a threshold
showing that sham petitioning was in furtherance of a conspiracy to re-
strain trade should be required as a condition precedent to denying the
normal presumption in favor of antitrust immunity under Noerr. Forms
of unethical conduct lacking an anticompetitive design would not be ille-
gal under the Sherman Act since such conduct would fall outside the
reach of the legislation.
Finally, while Justice Brennan's analysis (focusing on the source, na-
ture, and context of the restraint) led him to a similar result in Indian
Head, there are good reasons for favoring a sham exception approach.
Justice Brennan's approach confuses antitrust immunity analysis with
antitrust violations, collapsing the essential difference between these two
different forms of antitrust inquiry.388 The sham exception focuses the
attention of the court on the factors most relevant for determining if anti-
trust immunity is warranted. The proper analysis for the applicability of
the Noerr doctrine should focus on factors such as subversion and cor-
ruption of governmental process. 389 Antitrust considerations concerning
the nature of the restraint become relevant only after the antitrust immu-
386. See Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., 827 F.2d 458, 467 (9th Cir. 1987), va-
cated, 108 S. Ct. 2862 (1988).
387. The Ninth Circuit recognized this possibility in its analysis of the Second Circuit's
decision in Indian Head. See Sessions Tank Liners, 827 F.2d at 466 (citing Wiley, supra note
4).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 265-67.
389. See Session Tank Liners, 827 F.2d at 465.
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nity issue has been resolved against the party claiming protection and the
question is one of determining whether a substantive violation has in fact
occurred.
C. Petitioning to Influence Legislative and Quasi-Legislative Action
Modem theories of interest group behavior suggest that producer
groups may seek to influence government to obtain economic advantages
that they would not normally receive by competing on the merits. The
danger is that producer groups will utilize their petitioning effort to cap-
ture legislatively created benefits of regulation at the expense both of ri-
vals and the public good. In designing an antitrust approach to deal with
problems of producer capture and rent-seeking behavior in the legislative
sphere, antitrust judges should seek to isolate the circumstances under
which government-petitioning is a sham based on a strategic capture ob-
jective, irrespective of whether such activity seeks genuinely to influence
governmental action. The courts should examine the nature of the con-
duct involved to determine whether the petitioning activity is in fact a
sham designed to achieve an anticompetitive purpose.
(1) Factors Determining Sham Behavior Likely to Have a Predatory Market
Design
a. Was the Petitioning Effort Based on Misrepresentations, Falsehoods,
Distortions, or Unethical Propaganda Techniques?
Perhaps the most relevant factor in establishing a predatory peti-
tioning purpose is whether the petitioning materials sought to distort the
true nature of relevant policymaking by making intentional misrepresen-
tations, lies, and half-truths with regard to matters that are material to
governmental decisions. Petitioning based on the desire to mislead gov-
ernmental decisions serves no legitimate representative function. The
only objective of such activity is to mislead policymakers for collateral
purposes. Moreover, it is unlikely that the process for policymaking will
counteract the negative effect of such information, especially when com-
plex matters are involved or when a select group has access to the materi-
als relevant to these decisions. Lies and misrepresentations are difficult
to counteract, especially when sophisticated means are used to camou-
flage the truth.
Consequently, the use of advertising propaganda techniques coupled
with intentional misrepresentation of relevant facts should be viewed as
relevant, but not conclusive, evidence to support the invocation of the
antitrust laws when there is reason to believe that competition will be
restrained. While not every misrepresentation should be grounds for de-
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nying antitrust immunity, repeated instances of misrepresentations that
pollute the deliberative process should be grounds for invoking antitrust
remedies. In Noerr, the record was replete with examples of Madison
Avenue propaganda tactics used in the railroads' publicity campaign to
kill pro-trucking industry legislation. Propaganda films, third-party tac-
tics, manufactured statistical studies, false endorsements, and other ques-
tionable tactics were used by the railroads to shape legislative preferences
much in the same way that advertising shapes demand for products.3 90
The view expressed by Justice Black, that the political process
should be a "no-holds-barred fight" or an "anything goes" struggle for
governmental favors, should be rejected. The political process should
not be merely one of pressure group influence in which legislation is
bought and sold like a commodity. A commitment to democratic ideals
should require that the processes of government "ensure that political
outcomes will be supported by reference to a consensus (or at least a
broad agreement) among political equals. ' 39 1 The courts should ensure
390. Liberal economists have argued that some of the most serious market performance
problems in the American economy are caused by informational problems that deny consum-
ers the ability to make informed economic decisions. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 417-18 (1980); see also Mensch & Freeman, Effi-
ciency and Image: Advertising As An Antitrust Issue, 1990 DUKE L.J. - (forthcoming) (on file
with the Hastings Law Journal). Some economists have attributed these informational
problems to certain forms of misleading product advertising that cause misinformation. F.
SCHERER, supra at 417-18.
First, consumers pay unnecessarily high prices for heavily advertised and otherwise
differentiated products because they lack the technical knowledge to tell whether a
particular [product is distinguishable from another]. Second, in such fields as home
building and repair services, the consumer can be cheated or exploited because he
cannot distinguish honest from dishonest workmanship ....
Id.
Conservative economists have taken a different position on the issue of advertising, argu-
ing that advertising promotes competition through information dissemination. See, e.g., IN-
DUSTRIAL COMPETITION AND THE NEW LEARNING 115-37 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J.
Weston ed. 1974); see also Nichols, Advertising and Economic Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
213 (1985).
Conservative economists, however, adopt the view that "taste" is exogenous to the mar-
ket-that advertising merely caters to pre-existing wants. See Mensch & Freeman, supra.
What is the possibility that advertising may shape and create preferences? Advertising that
distorts information crucial to consumer choice distorts allocative efficiency in the market.
Petitioning that distorts crucial information for political choices causes a similar distortion in
the allocation of policy decisionmaking. These arguments are supported by republican criti-
ques about the role of interest groups in government. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, supra note 15, at 1543-47. Hence, while it may be true that politics today is like the
market, that does not mean that advertising in the market or in the political arena should be
immune from federal regulation.
391. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 15, at 1550.
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that powerful interest groups do not distort the deliberative processes of
government through control over crucial information.
Antitrust regulation that seeks to limit the use of misinformation for
predatory purposes would limit petitioning activity, not because of its
content, but rather because of its secondary effects on the legislative pro-
cess. 392 In restricting misrepresentations and misleading propaganda in
the political arena the courts would be furthering first amendment values
by preserving the integrity of a process necessary for political discourse.
This would not mean that the antitrust statutes would be transformed
into a.new code of political ethics; the purpose for invoking the antitrust
laws in the government-petitioning cases would be limited to traditional
antitrust objectives-the effectuation of federal competition policy. Ethi-
cal conduct in the political arena would be relevant, if at all, only to the
extent that it bears on the type of antitrust issues that the Sherman Act
was designed to handle.
b. Did the Producer Group Have a Unique, Anticompetitive Interest in the
Subject Matter of Petitioning Activity?
A related factor is whether the producer group had a unique, an-
ticompetitive interest in the subject matter of its petitioning effort. For
example, if the National Association of Widget Manufacturers lobbies
hard for a capital gains tax reduction, national health insurance, or a
balanced budget amendment, such lobbying should not be troublesome
under the antitrust laws. When producers conspire to lobby for legisla-
tion that would impose added burdens on a competitor by subverting the
deliberative process of government, such lobbying should be viewed sus-
piciously under the antitrust laws.
If a producer group is seeking to influence legislative decisionmak-
ing over matters that directly involve the group's economic or financial
interest, then there may be grounds to suspect that such petitioning is
premised upon an illegitimate purpose. For example, in Noerr, the rail-
roads were petitioning for antitruck legislation in various state legisla-
tures. Although the subject matter of their petitioning effort did not
directly involve considerations pertaining to the railroad industry, it did
affect the financial and competitive interests of the railroads. The rail-
392. See, eg., Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 913-14. Antitrust regula-
tion imposing liability for unethical forms of petitioning activity that restrain trade would not
offend the first amendment principle that requires content-neutral speech restrictions. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, content neutrality merely requires that regulations be neutral in
"reference to the content of the regulated speech." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding city zoning restriction on adult theatres); see also Farber &
Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 914.
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roads' purpose was to erect barriers to entry through legislation that ex-
cluded a potential competitor from their industry. While it is true that
trucking legislation would have an effect on the railroads' interests by
enabling a competitor to compete more effectively, the railroads' purpose
was to render a rival less effective in the marketplace. Petitioning for
legislation that would cripple a potential competitor industry should be
strong evidence of an anticompetitive scheme to erect barriers to entry
through governmental influence intended to cause antitrust injury. In
other cases, there should be a required showing that the challenged peti-
tioning activity affects either the economic or financial interest of pro-
ducer groups seeking to influence governmental action.
c. Was the Petitioning Totally Negative in its Appeal? Was It Designed to
Block Entry or Exit of a Rival from the Market Rather Than
Affirmatively Advance a New Policy?
Recent empirical studies of interest group behavior suggest that or-
ganized interest groups are most likely to dominate the legislative process
when the "objective is to kill a proposed measure than when the goal is to
see one become policy. ' 393 Of course, the fact that a lobby group seeks
the most effective strategy to influence legislative decisions should not by
itself be a reason for establishing that petitioning is a sham. Neverthe-
less, courts should view negative petitioning suspiciously, especially
when such activity seeks to impede the competition of a potential rival by
blocking the rivals entry or exit from the market. This is because the
effectiveness of negative political campaigns will pose the greatest dan-
gers to market competition when they are aimed at influencing the gov-
ernment to cripple the competitive freedom of an actual or potential
competitor. The fact that petitioning is designed to block legislation
should also be a relevant factor in determining the presence of a capture
motive. Of course, such a factor should not be deemed conclusive for
establishing unlawful motive. Otherwise, even benign petitioning would
be subject to antitrust liabilities.
This factor would have had a bearing on the Noerr litigation. In
Noerr, the railroads' petitioning campaign was, at least in part, a cam-
paign seeking to kill legislation that favored truckers. The truckers' peti-
tioning effort, on the other hand, was almost entirely designed to support
new legislation and policy. The district judge concluded that while both
sides engaged in propaganda techniques, the truckers always used such
techniques for the "affirmative purpose of seeking legislation," whereas
393. See, e.g, D. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY,supra note 102, at 314-15, 395-96, 389-98; see
also Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 15, at 887.
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the railroads sought "to destroy the good will" of a competitor by oppos-
ing pro-truck legislation at every turn. 394 The district judge thus dis-
missed the antitrust claims against the truckers, while upholding the
claims against the railroads.
The recent empirical evidence on interest group influence suggests
that the district judge in Noerr may have had sound reasons for reaching
the legal conclusions he did. It is more likely that the railroads' publicity
campaign created a substantial and imminent threat to competition since
it was almost exclusively negative in its appeal and effect. While the
truckers may have had similar designs, it is unlikely that their efforts had
a similar anticompetitive potential since there it was unlikely that barri-
ers would have emerged in trucking had unfavorable trucking legislation
occurred. Moreover, it was the truckers, not the railroads, that were
excluded from the long-haul freight market. On the other hand, while it
is true that blocking efforts are highly effective in preventing governmen-
tal action, it may be unclear whether such efforts in themselves were pre-
mised upon an anticompetitive purpose of design. At the very least, this
factor would aid in judging the likelihood of harm caused by sham peti-
tioning, but would not in itself determine the whether petitioning was a
sham.
d. Petitioning Expenditures
A factor that may be relevant but not conclusive in and of itself is
the size of expenditures incurred in the petitioning effort. If a producer
group is found to have expended considerable financial resources in its
petitioning activities then the size of petitioning expenditures, along with
other factors, may establish a predatory design to restrain trade. Heavy
petitioning expenditures may create a barrier to entry that denies com-
petitors a fair opportunity to engage in countervailing petitioning cam-
paigns. If heavy petitioning expenditures serve to raise barriers to entry
to political markets, adverse competitive consequences may result from
governmental action influenced by wealthy competitors. For example, in
Noerr the railroads' petitioning expenditures were substantial. The pub-
lic relations firm that was retained to guide its petitioning efforts was
paid 250,000 dollars per year plus expenses that included the salaries of
employees of the firm. 395 In Indian Head, Allied Tube spent over
100,000 dollars for the membership, registration, and attendance ex-
394. See Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp.
768, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
395. In 1950 dollars, this was an extremely significant sum to spend for advancing the
railroads' industry position on truck legislation.
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penses of its representatives who packed the private standard-setting as-
sociation meetings.396  At the very least, the size of petitioning
expenditures, such as those involved in Noerr and Indian Head, should
have alerted the courts that the petitioning effort was not simply directed
at expressing opinions and disseminating information, but rather was
seeking to reap anticompetitive benefits through the establishment of a
barrier to a political market.
Petitioning expenditures should not, however, be sufficient in them-
selves for establishing the denial of antitrust immunity for petitioning
government. Even substantial petitioning expenditures may be unexcep-
tional depending on the nature and complexity of the public policy issues
at stake, as well as the location and number of policymakers involved.
For example, the fact that state legislation was the subject of the petition-
ing effort in Noerr would suggest that sizable expenditures for petitioning
were required, since a number of state legislatures were petitioned.
Moreover, because the subject of the petitioning effort involved technical
and scientific matters, the cost of petitioning was likely to be high. The
relevance of petitioning expenditures should depend on the nature of the
particular petitioning at issue as well as other relevant factors establish-
ing that the petitioning was nothing more than a "sham."
(2) Successful Versus Unsuccessful Petitioning-Causation and Antitrust Injury
As a general principle, antitrust plaintiffs should be granted anti-
trust remedies only if they can establish that they suffered antitrust inju-
ries caused by sham petitioning. The so-called Brunswick, or "antitrust
injury," doctrine requires the antitrust plaintiff to establish an injury of
the type that the antitrust laws were intended to condemn. 397 In addi-
tion, the plaintiff must show that these injuries were proximately caused
by the defendant's conduct. 398 In cases in which sham petitioning is suc-
cessful in its effort to influence governmental action restraining trade, an
"antitrust injury" is easily established; but issues of causation may deny
recovery.
In cases involving petitioning activity that is successful in bringing
about governmental action, defendants will argue that the plaintiff's anti-
trust injuries were caused by valid governmental action, rather than the
396. Indian Head, 108 S. Ct. at 1934.
397. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see also
P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 324-31 (discussing the "striking develop-
ment" of the "antitrust injury" concept).
398. The antitrust plaintiff must show that the injury "flow[ed] from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful" under the antitrust laws. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
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defendant's conduct. Antitrust defendants will argue that the act of gov-
ernment causing the injury was a supervening event breaking the chain of
causation between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's antitrust
injury.399 The causation argument, however, should not preclude recov-
ery if the antitrust plaintiff can establish that defendant's petitioning ac-
complished a capture objective. If predatory forms of petitioning result
in producer capture of the governmental process, then the petitioning
activity should be treated as "legally proscribed" conduct, similar to
bribery, justifying antitrust liability.4°° If petitioning activity is success-
ful in capturing the benefits of legislative action, then the petitioning, not
the resulting governmental action, should be viewed as the proximate
cause of plaintiff's antitrust injuries.
This raises additional questions concerning the status of governmen-
tal action initiated by forms of petitioning activity declared illegal under
the federal antitrust laws. If petitioning successfully results in state regu-
lation that restrains trade, then the relevant policy consideration is that
of antitrust federalism, and the appropriate legal doctrine is antitrust pre-
emption. In such cases, antitrust courts should apply Professor Wiley's
four-part test, and preempt state regulation shown to be the product of
producer capture. In applying Wiley's state action test, however, more
consideration should be given to political values, independent of effi-
ciency. In determining if state or local regulation is preempted under the
antitrust laws, the courts should consider whether the democratic
processes giving rise to economic regulation were undermined by pro-
ducer capture. Lobbying activity found to be a sham then would be
grounds for establishing producer capture under Wiley's capture criteria.
399. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, at 12.
400. Professors Areeda and Turner, for example, recognize that the grounds for immuniz-
ing political activity in antitrust suits do not cover "legally proscribed" conduct such as bribes.
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 63, at 47. Areeda and Turner suggest, however, that
such a result "leaves many questions unanswered." Id. For example, they posit the following
unanswered questions:
Should the category be limited to legislative proscription or broadened to include
judge-made proscriptions? Should it be limited to criminal proscription or broad-
ened to include any conduct to which the law attaches some sanction? Should it be
limited to conduct proscribed with relative particularity or broadened to include pro-
scriptions phrased in such general terms as "unreasonable" behavior?
Id. Areeda and Turner ultimately avoid answering the questions they raise for they are of the
view that causation in most cases should deny recovery. Id. Antitrust liability for sham peti-
tioning, however, does not have to lead to overly broad judicial standards of antitrust liability.
Liability can be properly limited by an antitrust immunity standard that permits recovery only
for "legally proscribed" forms of strategic behavior seeking to capture governmental processes
for predatory purposes. Criminal proscription would not normally be appropriate unless the
defendant's conduct involves extremely flagrant and pernicious conduct. Ambiguous judge-
made standards should be avoided.
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Whether state regulation furthers the values of economic efficiency
should not be the exclusive factor for determining the propriety of federal
preemption under Wiley's test. Economic efficiency should be relevant,
but so should the democratic and equality values of a truly deliberative
governmental process.
If federal regulation is involved, courts should seek to construe such
legislation to avoid a construction that would give effect to the anticom-
petitive purposes of producer capture as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion.40 1 In antitrust law there is a strong presumption against implied
repealers or legislative exceptions to the antitrust laws. That presump-
tion should be liberally invoked to avoid any potential conflict between
federal regulatory measures and the antitrust laws. If federal legislation
cannot be interpreted to avoid a result that favors the producer groups
responsible for its enactment, then the courts should consider invalidat-
ing federal legislation. However, this route should be taken only if: (1)
federal legislation has been shown to be the product of producer capture,
and (2) if the legislation clearly conflicts with federal antitrust law and
policy. An antitrust exemption should not be implied, given the Supreme
Court's hostility to implied repealers of antitrust law.4 °2
If petitioning is unsuccessful or challenged before legislative action
is taken, the issue then will be whether the antitrust plaintiff has in fact
suffered an antitrust injury. In such cases, the antitrust plaintiff should
be allowed to demonstrate antitrust injuries. Even unsuccessful petition-
ing can restrain trade of competitors by forcing them to incur additional
costs of defending against false propaganda or otherwise responding to a
negative lobbying effort. Antitrust injuries may thus arise even if the
petitioning activity is unsuccessful. These cases should be analyzed as
antitrust attempt cases. 40 3 Antitrust liability should be imposed if the
gravity of the harm and the extent to which dangerous probability of
success presented by defendants' conduct establish an antitrust injury.
Of course, in most cases, unsuccessful petitioning may be the best evi-
dence that the defendants' conduct fell short of establishing the danger-
ous probability of success required to impose liability.
401. See Sunstein, supra note 125, at 486 (arguing that "[c]ourts should narrowly construe
statutes that serve no plausible public purpose, and amount merely to interest-group
transfers").
402. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (cooper-
ative railroad association).
403. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 60, at 159-61 (introducing the offense of
attempt).
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D. Petitioning to Influence Executive and Administrative Action
As Pennington and California Motor Transport reveal, attempts to
influence government can also occur before the executive branch of gov-
ernment as well as in the legislative setting. Because each of these
branches is involved in policy decisionmaking there is reason to apply the
factors applicable to legislative and quasi-legislative bodies to the execu-
tive as well.
In the executive context, the relevant inquiry should be whether the
attempt to influence governmental decisionmaking involves the exercise
of policy as distinguished from nondiscretionary forms of decisionmak-
ing. If policy discretion is involved, the petitioning effort should be scru-
tinized under the factors applicable to petitioning in the legislative
setting. Normally, petitioning activity should be presumed immune from
antitrust prosecution unless it can be shown that the executive agent's
exercise of policy decisionmaking had been captured or subverted by pro-
ducer groups. Because executive and administrative officials must be
granted a degree of discretionary authority in performing their adminis-
terial duties and responsibilities, the courts should not impose antitrust
liability except in those cases that involve egregious abuses such as brib-
ery, collusion, and the like.
Thus, Pennington should have been a doubtful case for antitrust lia-
bility. Unlike Noerr, there was an absence of misrepresentations, false-
hoods, and unethical behavior in the petitioning at issue. The fact that
producers seek to influence an executive decision that might favor their
particular commercial interests should not be conclusive proof in and of
itself of an anticompetitive purpose or motive. The political influence
brought to bear on the Secretary of Labor and officials of the TVA in-
volved administerial discretion of executive officers that was necessary to
facilitate resolution of a collective bargaining impasse. Furthermore, it
was far from clear whether the executive decisions involved in Pen-
nington actually involved any policy discretion.4°4 If policy decisionmak-
ing was not involved then there would be justifications for upholding the
petitioning effort unless fraud, bribery, or collusion were shown.
Boycotts seeking to pressure governmental policy decisionmaking of
governmental officials raise unique concerns, as the Court's Indian Head
decision illustrates. Because boycotts are without doubt coercive, and
since governmental officials may be vulnerable to such pressures, the
courts should give great weight to the interest of government in deter-
mining if this form of activity should be immunized under Noerr-Pen-
404. See Fischel, supra note 7, at 85.
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nington. If the boycott is brought by producer groups, then traditional
antitrust principles applicable to commercial boycotts should apply. If
the boycott is brought by a non-producer group, the focus should be on
whether the participants in the boycott had less restrictive alternatives
available for communicating their political message. If alternative ave-
nues for petitioning were not available because of collective action
problems, then the boycott should be protected by the antitrust immu-
nity doctrine unless the interest of government in maintaining essential
services is impaired, and the government lacks alternative measures to
protect its interests.
Executive decisionmaking involving nondiscretionary functions
should be subjected to antitrust scrutiny. In determining whether or not
a nondiscretionary standard should be enforced, executive officers engage
in an interpretative process not unlike that of judges to determine the
applicability of legal standards. Similarly, in determining the application
of legislative directives, as distinguished from nondiscretionary stan-
dards, executive officers perform administrative functions that normally
do not call for input from special interest groups. Indeed, interest group
influence at this level of executive decisionmaking is likely to bias the
decisionmaker's judgement in favor of private interests. There is justifi-
cation for treating nondiscretionary executive actions under an approach
similar to the one recommended for the judicial and quasi-judicial sphere
of government discussed below.
E. Petitioning to Influence Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Action
Regulating predation through governmental process makes sense in
the legislative and quasi-legislative setting, but it makes little sense in the
judicial and quasi-judicial setting-at least under the sham litigation the-
ory developed since California Motor Transport. Sham litigation has be-
come confused and unfocused because the Supreme Court has been
unable to articulate a persuasive antitrust theory to justify its regulation,
and it is submitted that none is possible.
The sham litigation exception, when applied to the judicial and ad-
ministrative agency context, assumes that litigation might be used as an
entry-deterring strategy by increasing a rival's costs through litigation.
As previously discussed, 40 5 however, such a theory might backfire.
Moreover, there are other remedies and sanctions available for dealing
with the bad faith and malicious prosecution problems. Private litigants
can invoke common-law remedies, and judges can impose sanctions for
405. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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harassing litigation. Moreover, in allowing judges to impose antitrust lia-
bility for bringing litigation, legitimate litigation is likely to be chilled,
including antitrust litigation necessary to enforce important federal pol-
icy. In view of these realities, the courts would be wise to get out of the
business of relying upon the antitrust laws to police bad faith litigation
and instead refocus their efforts on dealing with the much more serious
problem of truly flagrant and abusive behavior in this sphere of
government.
Nevertheless, predation utilizing the judicial machinery of govern-
ment should still be subject to antitrust attack. Decisions such as Walker
Process4° 6 should be followed in dealing with instances in which a
predator seeks to enforce fraudulent legal claims, or valid claims based
on information that was known to be false. Barriers to entry resulting
from the use of fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated through the ju-
dicial machinery of government should be treated as any other attempt
to restrain trade. Perjury and fraud in court as well as bad faith litigation
and other forms of abuse of process, however, may best be addressed
with nonantitrust sanctions. Such abuses must be distinguished from
cases in which legally-proscribed conduct independent of litigation is the
basis for an antitrust violation.40 7 Conspiracy with a judicial or adminis-
trative official to eliminate a competitor may result in the imposition of
an antitrust sanction. 4°8 Bribery of judicial officials is illegal and can be
punished without additional antitrust remedies.
Administrative agencies performing regulatory functions may, how-
ever, present special circumstances that justify a more vigorous antitrust
regulation policy. Public choice theorists have argued that regulatory
agencies are vulnerable to capture by the very interests the agency was
created to regulate.4 9 For example, a number of empirical economic
studies have revealed that a major effect of Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) regulation has been to increase the freight rates for the
trucking industry.410 These studies, while not conclusive,4 11 imply that
agency regulation in the trucking industry may have been captured by
406. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
407. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Ford Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-
177 (1965) (suit to annul patent).
408. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07
(1962); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
409. Wiley, supra note 4, at 724-26.
410. See, e.g., Sloss, Regulation of Motor Freight Transportation: A Quantitative Evalua-
tion of Policy, I BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 32 (1970); see also Moore, The Beneficiaries of
Trucking Regulation, 21 J.L. & ECON. 327, 327 n. 1 (1978) (noting several empirical studies on
trucking regulation).
411. See Moore, supra note 410, at 327.
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industry interest. Ironically, the truckers, having lost the competitive
struggle for legislative favors in the 1960s, may have achieved a measure
of monopolistic power through ICC regulation. Governmental agencies
performing regulatory, as distinguished from adjudicatory, functions
should be the subject of higher antitrust scrutiny due to the greater likeli-
hood of producer capture. Corporate interests seeking to influence regu-
latory actions of agencies through improper means should be treated like
legislative lobbying and regulated under the sham petitioning exception.
F. Substantive Violations and Remedies
While issues of antitrust immunity must be distinguished from is-
sues of substantive violations, antitrust analysis of substantive violations
must also remain selective in its emphasis. For example, an antitrust
immunity test that focuses more selectively on problems of regulatory
capture should require a rule of reason analysis for determining antitrust
violations. The meat cleaver approach of the per se rule of antitrust,
biased as it is in favor of violation, is too insensitive for determining sub-
stantive violations in the government-petitioning cases. As Justice Bren-
nan noted in his dissent in Trial Lawyers, the per se rule prevents judges
from engaging in the type of particularized examination necessary to de-
termine whether political expression merits protection under Noerr and
the first amendment.4 12
While Justice Stevens applied the per se rule in Trial Lawyers, the
case may have limited significance in that the majority (inaccurately)
characterized the Trial Lawyers' boycott as a naked restraint of trade
involving a price-fixing objective.41 3 In determining whether the anti-
412. Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 732 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
413. Justice Stevens' invocation of the per se rule in Trial Lawyers can surely be criticized
as inconsistent with what he has said about the per se rule in other antitrust cases. In National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. University of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984), for example,
Justice Stevens stated in a footnote that "there is often no bright line separating per se from
rule of reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions
before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct." Moreover, in the most
recent United States Supreme Court decision dealing with a group boycott by a producer
group, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985), a unanimous Court concluded that a rule of reason analysis, not the per se rule, was the
appropriate standard for determining whether a group boycott of producers violated the anti-
trust laws. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Trial Lawyers, "[tihe [majority's] con-
cern for the validity of the per se rule.., is misplaced, in light of the fact that we have been
willing to apply rule-of-reason analysis in a growing number of group-boycott cases." Trial
Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 790. Furthermore, while the horizontal price-fixing agreements between
competitors are condemned under the per se rule, see Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3 10 U.S. 150,
223 (1940) ("[u]nder the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in inter-
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trust laws have been violated in future government-petitioning cases, the
courts should require that the plaintiff prove that the petitioning defend-
ants' unimmunized petitioning constituted an exercise of market power
or an attempt to obtain such power. The reason for requiring proof of
market power is that antitrust regulation of political expression is war-
ranted only if there is a basis for establishing that the petitioning conduct
represents a substantial and real (not presumed) antitrust harm.
Proof of market power in the government-petitioning cases need not
require the same degree of proof required in monopolization cases under
section two of the Sherman Act.4 14 In cases in which a competitor group
has attempted to exclude a rival from the market through governmental
regulation, proof of exlcusionary conduct may itself be proof of market
power.4 15 In other cases, market structure data can provide a basis for
determining market power.4 16 Market structure data is relevant because
it may serve to establish information concerning the likelihood of the
antitrust harm.417
Because concentrated industries are more likely than unconcen-
trated ones to foster collusive behavior,4 18 judges should be critical of
political solicitations by firms seeking protective economic legislation in
highly concentrated market structures (for example, in industries in
which there are ten or fewer firms). Industry concentration is especially
state or foreign commerce is illegal per se"), there are cases that involved literally horizontal
price-fixing and yet the per se rule was found not to apply. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979) (blanket-licensing scheme having a direct
effect on price held not to be per se unlawful). See generally Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations
in Antitrust: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165 (1988). Finally, the Supreme
Court also has held that certain practices by members of a learned profession such as law
should be scrutinized under the rule of reason even if they would be viewed as a violation of
the Sherman Act under the per se rule. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975). The general point is that even under the traditional antitrust analysis there was reason
for questioning the applicability of the per se rule to the trial lawyers' boycott.
414. For a discussion of the concept of market power in the law of monopolization, as well
as economics, see Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop, Monopoly Power and Market Power in Anti-
trust Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 241 (1987).
415. Id. at 255.
416. See id. at 259-64.
417. For example, empirical surveys of price fixing conspiracies reveal that certain indus-
try characteristics are more likely than others to facilitate collusive anticompetitive conduct.
See, e.g., Hay & Kelly, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & EcON. 13
(1974); McElroy & Siegfried, The Economics of Price Fixing, 20 SURV. OF Bus. 19 (1984). The
structural characteristics that are most likely to encourage and foster collusive behavior and
encourage predatory forms of conduct are concentrated market structures and restrictions on
conditions of entry. These factors can help guide judges in their determination of the likeli-
hood a governmentally induced restraint of trade will be successful in establishing or maintain-
ing monopoly power.
418. See, Hay & Kelly, supra note 417, at 14.
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relevant in cases in which the petitioning activity seeks legal restrictions
on market entry. 4 19 The fact that the railroads in Noerr sought to com-
pete in the long-haul freight market should have alerted the courts to a
serious antitrust danger.
Hence, while market structure should be a relevant factor for deter-
mining the propriety of antitrust immunity for petitioning activity, the
relevant analysis required need not entail a full-blown rule of reason ex-
amination required for substantive violations under the rule of reason
standard in monopolization cases. Requiring a complex market analysis
in every case may not be worth the administrative cost involved. Since
important petitioning rights are involved, burden of proof standards
must be carefully tailored so that such rights are not unduly
restrained. 420
A proper antitrust analysis should also require a remedial approach
that makes distinctions between injunctive and damage remedies. Such
an approach must allow for different remedies in private antitrust cases
depending on whether government-petitioning has been successful in
bringing about a government created restraint of trade.42 1 When the
challenged petitioning has been successful in inducing governmental ac-
tion, the remedies applicable to a successful preemption attack should
apply if state regulation is involved.4 22 An injunction should issue de-
claring state law invalid and preventing its enforcement. A similar rem-
edy could be fashioned in cases in which federal legislation has been
captured by a producer group or single firm seeking to erect a barrier to
entry, or otherwise to restrain trade in the industry. Public defendants
should not face damage liability under the antitrust laws.423 Traditional
antitrust remedies, including treble damages, should apply to private
defendants. 4 24
Finally, problems of causation may bar recovery for substantive vio-
lations if a causal link between anticompetitive consequence and legisla-
419. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 417.
420. One might argue that the party seeking to restrain political activity should normally
have the burden of proof. Because market structure data can be more easily obtained by the
petitioning defendants, however, there is reason for placing the initial burden of proof on the
issue of market structure on them. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, for example, have
suggested that the speech-conduct cases of antitrust should be covered by a "special rule" that
would require the "defendants to prove their de minimus market power." P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 78, § 113.1 , at 8. Such a rule might be warranted in the govern-
ment-petitioning cases.
421. See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 4, at 773-76.
422. Id. at 773.
423. See, e.g., id.
424. Id.
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tive action is in fact impossible to establish. Antitrust plaintiffs should be
alldwed to prove the causation issue, however, and if proved they should
recover accordingly. The courts should not presume as a general rule
that causation denies recovery in every case.
Conclusion
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is ripe for reconsideration because it
is premised upon two highly questionable perspectives-a pluralistic per-
spective that assumes that interest group factibns within a representative
democracy promote social welfare; and a rather strained absolutist per-
spective of the first amendment that equates the right of interest groups
to petition government with constitutionally-protected speech. These
perspectives have resulted in a doctrinal "quagmire" because judges who
adopt these perspectives in decisionmaking have mistakenly assumed
that painful choices must be made in upholding either of two seemingly
contradictory values-democratic values associated with the political
freedom of citizens to petition government, and antitrust values protect-
ing private actors from restraints of trade.
The perceived conflict between antitrust and politics masks a deeper
theoretical problem embedded within Noerr-Pennington and first amend-
ment jurisprudence. Both the first amendment defense as well as Noerr
immunity have been grounded in a theory that presumes the validity of
the distinction between politics and market, public and private. In find-
ing that the Noerr immunity doctrine protects petitioning activity seeking
to influence governmental action, but not private action, the Supreme
Court has uncritically assumed that distinctions drawn between private
versus public actions can mark the line separating antitrust and politics.
Similarly, in finding that the first amendment defense for political
activity depends on whether an economic or political objective is at stake,
the Court has adopted a doctrinal test that mirrors the very distinctions
drawn for determining Noerr immunity. Political expression loses its
claim to first amendment protection if it seeks to accomplish private eco-
nomic interest; while political expression remains protected if it is found
to be instrumental to the advancement of public or political objectives.
The problem with such a view is that it fails to recognize that politics is a
"sphere of power" of producer interests. Protecting regulatory lawmak-
ing from certain corrupting forms of petitioning activity may be the only
way to avoid the external effects of monopolistic market power.
Neither first amendment jurisprudence nor the principles of repre-
sentative government will be able to define an autonomous sphere of
political or public activity independent of market or private activity, and
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at the same time respect the values of competition and free expression.
Competition policy as well as freedom of speech can be restrained by
private as well as public power. In attempting to maintain a political
sphere of activity free from governmental regulation, the Supreme Court
has unwittingly created antitrust and first amendment doctrines that
grant private economic power an avenue for realizing monopolistic mar-
ket objectives. While the Supreme Court has recognized the anticompe-
titive dangers of interest group petitions of government in Indian Head
and Trial Lawyers, the Court has continued to adhere to distinctions that
fail to appreciate that "our actual experiences of political, economic, and
social life are too messy, too mixed, and too ambiguous to support any
... categorical, wholesale answer. ' '425
It is thus time to reconsider the background premises and assump-
tions that have supported policy justifications for allowing corporate in-
terest to use governmental process for anticompetitive purposes. Modern
interest groups suggest that federal competition policy cannot survive if
antitrust enforcers allow corporate interest to dominate and capture gov-
ernmental processes for purely private benefit. The true threat to the
values of free expression and representative government lies not with an-
titrust regulation of petitioning, but rather with antitrust immunity,
which has allowed the political process to be overwhelmed by the exces-
sive influence of corporate greed and private access.
By immunizing government-petitioning cases under the Noerr-Pen-
nington antitrust doctrine, the courts have allowed business interests to
use political expression as a predatory strategy for capturing the benefits
of regulation, thus threatening the political legitimacy of government. In
refusing to intervene in the governmental sphere merely because activity
is seen as political, or because otherwise valid governmental action has
been engineered for private benefit, the courts have sharply limited the
ability of the Sherman Act to protect the process of competition from a
dangerous form of predation. If left unchecked, predation by business
will not only undermine the foundations of the antitrust laws, but also
adversely affect the integrity and the quality of political debate and delib-
eration occurring within government. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
erected upon discredited notions of interest group pluralism, has thus
established an antitrust immunity policy that is at odds with the very
policies that the Warren Court sought to advance by its doctrine.
425. Michelman, supra note 171, at 313.
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